The Nash Farm Battlefield: History and Archaeology

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Abstract

The LAMAR Institute led a study of Civil War action at the Nash Farm property in Henry County, Georgia. This property was the scene of two important battles of Major General William Tecumseh Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign in late August and early September, 1864. Archaeological survey was conducted over a portion of the study property revealing a wide assortment of Civil War era artifacts. The spatial patterning of the various artifact classes enabled the researchers to reconstruct many elements of the August 20th cavalry battle, as well as the September 2-5 Infantry engagement, and possibly two other little-known battles. Several C.S.A. campsites on the park property, which also date to 1864, were explored by the research team. Project historians gathered primary and secondary records about these battles and the soldiers who participated in them. The merger of the historical and archaeological evidence provides a rich picture of these historical military events. This information should help to clarify modern understanding of the final days of the Atlanta Campaign and will provide essential fodder for interpretation and future planning of the Nash Farm Battlefield Park.
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I. Introduction

"I can make more generals, but horses cost money." - Abraham Lincoln

Henry County is currently developing the Nash Farm Battlefield Park, which occupies a 204 acre tract at the Henry-Clayton County line, northeast of Lovejoy, Georgia. This decision by the Henry County Commissioners is a vital step towards saving the last vestiges of a battlefield that was extremely important in American history. The Nash Farm is located south and west of Babbs Mill Road in Henry County, south of McDonough/Jonesboro Road, and east of the Hastings community (or Hastings Farm) (Figure 1). The area consists of rolling topography, typical of the Georgia Piedmont. The land is mostly in pasture.

Figure 1. Recent Aerial View of Study Area (Source: MapperAcme.com 2006).
Historical research has identified this location as related to two important battles in the American Civil War—Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick’s Union Cavalry charge at Lovejoy and the final military action in the battle of Jonesboro (Figure 2). Kilpatrick’s cavalry raid on Lovejoy took place from August 18-20, 1864. The military action associated with the study tract that was part of the Battle of Jonesboro took place on September 2-5, 1864. Archaeological expressions of both military events are likely contained within the Nash Farm property.

This report focuses specifically within the property boundaries of Nash Farm and the battle that ensued thereon. Particular attention is focused on descriptions of terrain, who was positioned where, sequence of events, and specific individuals who were involved, injured, or killed. Primary and secondary documents have been reviewed and sifted to recreate what transpired on the specific property of “an abandoned plantation” known as Nash Farm on August 20, 1864. Some conflicting documents exist because some accounts tended to be blown out of proportion depending on who was reporting, and other accounts were written years after the event. Also, many reports and descriptions relied on one another.

Additional insight into the cultural resources contained on the park property comes from oral accounts of relic collectors, who have identified several Civil War era encampments. Additional information about the battlefield was recently gathered during the Flint River Basin Archaeological Survey (FRBAS) project, which was conducted by the LAMAR Institute for the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (Elliott and Dean 2006). The FRBAS project report, as well as digital images of many Civil War battlefield relics collected near the Nash Farm, can be found at the FRBAS website (http://flintriversurvey.org).

RESEARCH METHODS

The archaeological field survey consisted of two parts. First, the area surrounding the Nash farmhouse was surveyed by systematically placed shovel tests. These tests were spaced at regular intervals, 5 or 10 meters apart. All shovel tests were excavated to sterile depth and the contents of each test were sifted through ¼ inch screen. The location of each test was carefully mapped using a Sokkia total station and TDS Recon data collector. The results from this effort are summarized in Appendix 1.

Secondly, the surrounding pasture land was sampled for its archaeological content. This was done by first plowing rectangular strips across the study tract. The placement of these plowed strips was determined on the basis of existing knowledge of the battlefield, relic collector accounts, and preliminary reconnaissance. The location of each plowed sample was mapped with a total station and their distribution is shown in Figure 3. A variety of topographic settings (knolls, ridge slopes, swales, etc.) was sampled so that a fuller picture of the battlefield environment could be reconstructed. Once these areas were plowed a systematic survey was conducted using metal detectors and surface inspection. All non-ferrous metal detector “hits”, or other diagnostic surface artifacts, were marked with pin flags and then accurately mapped with the total station. As the artifacts were mapped, they were assigned a number designation and then collected. In some cases, where modern artifacts were recognized for example, the finds were analyzed in the field and returned to the ground.

The data gathered by the plow strip investigation were used to delineate sensitivity zones within the study property. Certain diagnostic artifacts, such as military insignia, buttons, and bullets, should allow for the geographic identity of specific military units. From this information a map of the battlefield, as it relates to the modern-day landscape, was constructed. This survey strategy will lead to a more accurate understanding of the military terrain and will result in a genuine history experience for visitors of the battlefield park. The survey followed National Park Service, American Battlefield Protection Program guidelines in mapping the battlefield (Lowe 2000).

The archaeological fieldwork was directed by Mr. Daniel T. Elliott. Mr. Elliott serves as President and Research Associate of the LAMAR Institute.
Figure 2. Map of the Atlanta Campaign, Showing Study Area at Extreme Lower Right.
Figure 3. Plowed Samples Shown in Blue.

Historical research was conducted by Mr. Elliott, Ms. Tracy Dean, and Mr. Daniel E. Battle. Mr. Elliott served as Principal Investigator for the proposed work and was assisted by two archaeological technicians, Daniel Battle and Mike Benton, from the LAMAR Institute’s staff. Henry County provided necessary heavy equipment for preparing the ground of the survey sites. The LAMAR Institute research team was assisted in the survey by members of the Georgia Historical Artifacts & Research Group.

Two small sample portions of the battlefield were surveyed using Ground Penetrating Radar technology. The GPR areas included one rectangular area immediately east of the driveway entrance and south of Jonesboro Road, and a second rectangular area south of the recently filled-in swimming pool, north of the barn, and east of the pasture fence. The LAMAR Institute has used this technology at other battlefields in Georgia with excellent results. It also proved successful at Nash Farm.

HISTORICAL SETTING

Lovejoy was a station stop on the Macon and Western Railroad Company line that connected Atlanta to Macon, Georgia. As such, the rail line was an important military object for the U.S. Army (Central of Georgia Railway Company 1846-1873). Major General Sherman understood that severing this transportation artery was essential to capturing and controlling Atlanta and he made several attempts to do just that. To do this Sherman sent two Cavalry brigades, General McCook’s and Stoneman’s, to sever the railroad
line south of Atlanta. Their goal, as planned, was not achieved. The two Union cavalry units were to rendezvous at Lovejoy Station. McCook’s Cavalry arrived as planned and proceeded to tear up portions of the tracks. Stoneman’s Cavalry did not comply with Sherman’s orders and they never reached Lovejoy. Instead Stoneman’s horsemen raided areas well to the south and east of Lovejoy before Stoneman and many of his troops were captured in an engagement at Sunshine Church, north of Clinton, Georgia. On July 29 a skirmish involving General McCook’s Cavalry and General Hood’s supply train took place near Lovejoy Station on the Atlanta and West Point Railroad (Jones 1999:122). This action took place well to the west of the Nash Farm property and therefore, its history is not fully explored in the present study. McCook’s Cavalry met with misfortune on July 30th at Brown’s Mill, near Newnan, Georgia, when his raiding party was engaged and defeated by General Joseph Wheeler’s Cavalry. Wheeler reported to General Hood that 950 prisoners were captured in that action (Lanham 2007a). Casualty figures for that engagement are vague, but apparently hundreds of U.S. Cavalry were killed at Brown’s Mill. General McCook downplayed his losses in his battle report, estimated the number of killed, wounded or missing at under 500 (ehistory.com 2007, OR Volume 38(2):763).

Several participants in the battle at Nash Farm wrote descriptions of the terrain and other landscape features. After finding himself surrounded by Confederates, Kilpatrick “called his division commanders together and instructed them to cut their way out, designating as the point to strike an old deserted plantation” (Curry 1984:180). This “old deserted plantation” was Nash Farm located in Henry County, Georgia. Accounts from individuals involved in the Nash Farm Battle on August 20, 1864 described the terrain of the farm. Colonel Robert H. G. Minty with the Union’s First Cavalry Brigade described the land in his August 24, 1864 report as “... very disadvantageous for a charge, being very much cut up by rain gullies, and intersected by half a dozen high rail fences.” (OR, Vol. 38(2):824-826). In another account Minty continued to describe Nash Farm as “The ground indicated by Gen. Kilpatrick was a deserted plantation [bold added, probably referring to Nash Farm] creased in every direction by rain gullies, and there were two rail fences between us and the enemy, who were at work building rail barricades” (Minty 1903).

John L. Sherk, a surgeon, described it in a letter as, “The ground from which the start was made and over which they charged, was a plantation of about two square miles; thickly strewn with patches of wood, deep water cuts, fences, ditches and morasses” (The Pottsville Miner’s Journal, September 10, 1864). Based on these descriptions, the land was rugged, rough and presented obstacles or barriers the columns of cavalrmen had to charge and navigate.

Disappointed with the performance of Generals McCook’s and Stoneman’s cavalry in the July 1864 mission, Sherman persevered with his strategic use of the U.S. Cavalry and he dispatched Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick’s cavalry to finish the job that generals Stoneman and McCook had failed to do. Kilpatrick’s horsemen arrived at Lovejoy Station on August 18, 1864 and proceeded to destroy sections of track. Before they had accomplished much destruction, however, they were distracted from this task by Confederate troops. Kilpatrick later bragged that he had severed the railroad line for at least 10 days, in correspondence to Sherman, when in fact, the railroad was again serving Atlanta within two days of Kilpatrick’s raid. Although the railroad line was located several miles distant from the Nash Farm, it figures in prominently in the story of the battles there, since it was the primary reason that the troops were in the vicinity.

Following the August 20th action, other major military engagements took place in the Lovejoy area on September 2-5 and on November 16, 1864. These two battles are discussed in greater detail later in this report. Other minor military action was reported on McDonough Road on October 2 and November 6, 1864. It was not determined if these events were near the Nash Farm property because the geographical descriptions about them are vague (Jones 1999:122).
II. Kilpatrick’s Charge, August 20, 1864

The Civil War event that is most linked to the Nash Farm property is a cavalry action that took place on August 20, 1864. On that day, approximately 4,700 U.S. Cavalry troops, commanded by Major General Hugh Judson Kilpatrick, found themselves surrounded by massive numbers of Confederate troops. Kilpatrick’s solution to the problem was to organize a cavalry charge across what he considered to be the most vulnerable part of the Confederate lines. The cavalry were quickly formed by Colonel Robert H.G. Minty and, at about 2 p.m. that hot August afternoon, they charged eastward with their sabers drawn, running over Brigadier General Sullivan Ross’ (dismounted) Texas Cavalry Brigade. The event was brief, but remarkable, and it was long remembered by many who participated in it as an epic military event of the Civil War. As a result of this action, Kilpatrick’s cavalry, at least those who were not killed, wounded or captured, escaped to fight another day.

The Battle of Nash Farm is known as the most massive cavalry action in Georgia and one of the most memorable in the entire Civil War. This battle should not be confused with the skirmish that took place prior to the forces reaching Nash Farm nor the massive Battle of Lovejoy Station which occurred a couple of weeks later on September 2-5, 1864, between Union Major General Sherman and Confederate Major General William T. Sherman sent Judson Kilpatrick to raid Rebel supply lines. Kilpatrick left Atlanta on August 18, 1864, and hit the Atlanta & West Point Railroad that night. On the 19th his men attacked the Jonesboro supply depot on the Macon & Western Railroad around 4:00 p.m. The next day they reached Lovejoy Station and engaged with the enemy around 2:00 p.m. on Nash Farm. Cleburne’s Division of 4,500 cavalrymen (Ross’, Ferguson’s and Armstrong’s Brigades) had been pursuing Union troops since Jonesboro, and Kilpatrick was forced to fight. Confederate troops sandwiched Kilpatrick’s Union soldiers, and Kilpatrick chose to charge the Confederates about four miles from the railroad on Nash Farm in a large corn field. Kilpatrick’s biographer Martin summed it up,

[Kilpatrick] called his entire force together and ordered Colonel Robert H. G. Minty to lead the men in a charge through the Rebel cavalry, who were dismounted along a defensive line to the east. He would follow later with the stragglers . . . “It was the most perfect rout,” Kilpatrick wrote later, “any cavalry has sustained during the war . . .” (Martin 1996:187).

Judson Kilpatrick’s cavalry exploits and flamboyant style were highlighted in the popular Union press. Figure 4 is an illustration from *Harper’s Weekly* apparently depicting Kilpatrick’s Cavalry involved in a cavalry raid in Virginia (*Harper’s Weekly* 1863b). Figure 5 shows another view of Kilpatrick’ Cavalry in a charge at Waynesborough, Georgia on December 4, 1864. The scene at Nash Farm was likely similar to the actions shown in these two newspaper images. Unfortunately, no newspaper artists were present at Nash Farm to capture that event.

The stage for the battle was set with Confederate Major General Joseph Wheeler (1836-1906) raiding Union supply lines, while Union Major General William T. Sherman sent Judson Kilpatrick to raid Rebel supply lines. Kilpatrick reported to Sherman. Kilpatrick reported the Macon railway would be useless to the Confederates for ten days. It was precisely at this time that they heard a train whistle in the distance.

[Major Frank W. Mix (4th Michigan Cavalry), believed the battle (charge) lasted only thirty minutes. Meanwhile, upon returning to Atlanta, Kilpatrick reported to Sherman. Kilpatrick reported the Macon railway would be useless to the Confederates for ten days. It was precisely at this time that they heard a train whistle in the distance.

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Figure 4. Cavalry Raid (Kilpatrick Shown in Center), *Harper's Weekly*, 1863.

Figure 5. Kilpatrick's Cavalry at the Battle of Waynesboro, Georgia (*Harper's Weekly* 1865).
Several researchers have dedicated their lives to compiling information and writing histories of events during the Civil War. An excellent book is David Evans’ *Sherman’s Horsemen*. In Chapter 24, Evans covers Kilpatrick’s Raid in detail based on thirty years of research and his description reads like a novel. Mary L. Weigley’s 2006 *Kilpatrick’s Raid Around Atlanta* is a very good depiction of Kilpatrick’s Raid and has excellent background descriptions of individuals involved in the Nash Farm Battle.

Many descriptions and good histories have been written but this report focuses specifically within the property boundaries of Nash Farm and the battle that ensued thereon. Particular attention is focused on descriptions of terrain, who was positioned where, sequence of events, and individuals by name who were involved, injured, or killed. Primary and secondary documents have been reviewed and sorted to recreate what transpired on the specific property of “an abandoned plantation” known as Nash Farm on August 20, 1864. Some conflicting documents exist because some reports tended to be exaggerated depending on who was reporting, and other accounts were written years after the event. Also, many reports and descriptions relied on one another.

Background history begins with Major General Joseph Wheeler (1836-1906) raiding Union supply lines, and Major General William T. Sherman sending Judson Kilpatrick to raid Rebel supply lines. Kilpatrick left Atlanta August 18, 1864, hit the Atlanta & West Point Railroad that night. On the 19th his men attacked the Jonesboro supply depot on the Macon & Western Railroad around 4 p.m. On the 20th they reached Lovejoy’s Station, and engaged with the enemy around 2 p.m. on Nash Farm. Cleburne’s Division arrived and they were forced to fight. (Rebel cavalry pursuing from Jonesboro consisted of Ross’, Ferguson’s and Armstrong’s brigades, which totaled about 4,500 men.) Confederates sandwiched Kilpatrick’s Union soldiers, and Kilpatrick chose to charge the Confederates about four miles from the railroad on Nash Farm in a large corn field. Some accounts, such as Mix, believed the battle (charge) lasted thirty minutes. The remaining U.S. Cavalry troops continued to cover the rear for about an hour and a half.

The U.S. Cavalry contained twelve troops. Each troop equaled one hundred men, and was commanded by a Captain, 1st Lieutenant, 2nd Lieutenant and Supernumerary Lieutenant. In 1863 the cavalry became more flexible and the Squadron was dropped. Four troops were handier on the march due to shorter columns, and better size to detach. A regiment was commanded by a Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, 3 Majors, Staff of Adjutant, Quartermaster, Commissary, Surgeon and Assistant. Each regiment formed into Brigades, each Brigade formed into Divisions, and each Division formed into Corps.

The order of battle for the August 20th engagement at Nash Farm is presented below. The sources for this Order of Battle include research by the LAMAR Institute team and other information from: Evans (1996); Pollard (2006); NPS Soldiers and Sailors System (2007); and the Official Record of the Rebellion (OR Volume 38); Love (1866:501-502, 1023-1025); Quiner (1866:958-961); and Dyer (Volume 2, 1979:1672-1673).
ORDER OF BATTLE, AUGUST 20, 1864

Union Forces
Major General Judson Kilpatrick

Army of the Cumberland
Major General George Henry Thomas
Cavalry Corps
Brigadier General Washington Lafayette Elliott

2nd Cavalry Division – Brigadier General Kenner D. Garrard supplemented two brigades:

1st Cavalry Brigade – Colonel Robert H. G. Minty
• 4th Michigan Cavalry Regiment ([Colonel Robert H. G. Minty] Major Frank W. Mix)
• 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry Regiment – Major William H. Jennings
• 4th U.S. Cavalry Regiment – Captain James B. McIntyre

2nd Cavalry Brigade – Colonel Eli Long (Colonel Beroth B. Eggleston)
• 1st Ohio Cavalry Regiment – Colonel Beroth B. Eggleston
• 3rd Ohio Cavalry Regiment – Colonel Charles B. Seidel
• 4th Ohio Cavalry Regiment – Lieutenant Colonel Oliver P. Robie
• Chicago Board of Trade Battery – Lieutenants Bennett and George Robinson

Kilpatrick’s Third Cavalry Division:

1st Cavalry Brigade – Lieutenant Robert Klein
• 3rd Indiana Cavalry – Major Alfred Gaddis
• 5th Iowa Cavalry – Major John Morris Young

2nd Cavalry Brigade – Lieutenant Colonel Fielder Alsor Jones
• 8th Indiana Cavalry – Major Thomas Herring
• 2nd Kentucky Cavalry – Major Owen Starr
• 10th Ohio Cavalry – Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Wakefield Sanderson

3rd Cavalry Brigade – Colonel Eli Houston Murray
• 92nd Illinois Mounted Infantry – Colonel Smith Dykins Atkins (Major Albert Woodcock)
• 3rd Kentucky Cavalry – Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. King
• 5th Kentucky Cavalry – Colonel Oliver L. Baldwin
• 10th Wisconsin Battery Light Artillery – Captain Yates V. Beebe

Confederate Forces
ARMY OF MISSISSIPPI
STEWART'S CORPS, Major General Joseph Wheeler

Cavalry Division - Brigadier General William Hicks Jackson

Armstrong’s Brigade - Brigadier General Frank Crawford Armstrong
1st Mississippi Cavalry Regiment--- Colonel R. A. Pinson
2nd Mississippi Cavalry Regiment--- Major J. J. Perry
28th Mississippi Cavalry Regiment—Major Joshua T. McBee,

Ballentine's (Mississippi) regiment, Lieutenant Colonel William L. Maxwell
Company "A" 1st Confederate Cavalry--- Captain James Ruffin
Ross's Brigade - Brigadier General Lawrence Sullivan Ross
1st Texas Legion (or 27th Texas Cavalry)--- Colonel Edwin R. Hawkins; Lt. Col. John H. Broocks
3rd Texas Cavalry Regiment--- [ Lieutenant Colonel Jiles S. Boggess
6th Texas Cavalry Regiment--- Lieutenant Colonel Peter F. Ross
9th Texas Cavalry Regiment---Lieutenant Colonel Thomas G. Berry; Colonel Dudley W. Jones
Ferguson’s Brigade - Brigadier General Samuel Wragg Ferguson
2nd Alabama Cavalry Regiment--- Colonel John N. Carpenter
56th Alabama Cavalry Regiment---Colonel William Boyles
9th Mississippi Cavalry Regiment--- Colonel H. H. Miller
11th Mississippi Cavalry Regiment--- Colonel R. O. Perrin
12th Mississippi Cavalry Battalion---William M. Inge
Artillery - Captain John Watkins [Cherokee?]
Croft’s Battery, Georgia Light Artillery (Columbus Artillery)—1st Lieutenant Alfred J. Young
Captain Farris’ Battery, Missouri Light Artillery (Clark Artillery)— Captain Houston King
Company “B”, 3rd Battalion, South Carolina Light Artillery (Palmetto Battalion)— Lieutenant R. B. Waddell

UNION FORCES

Major General Hugh Judson “Kill Cavalry” Kilpatrick (1836-1881)

Brigadier General Kilpatrick commanded approximately 4,700 U.S. troops on August 20, 1864. Because Kilpatrick is a controversial figure who played a large role in the Nash Farm Battle, it is important to study this complicated individual to better understand his character, his credibility, and his actions on the battlefield.

Kilpatrick knew how to utilize influential people. He applied to military school in 1855 but couldn’t gain acceptance without appointment by a congressman. Knowing his ultimate goal, he worked for New Jersey Congressman George Vail during his re-election campaign. Vail returned the favor and appointed Kilpatrick to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York.

Immediately after graduating from West Point, Kilpatrick married Alice Shailer, the niece of F. H. Allen, a prominent New York politician then left for war. Alice gave Kilpatrick a flag he carried throughout the war. She died in the fall of 1863 followed by his child in January 1864.

While Kilpatrick’s men trained outside Washington D.C., Kilpatrick opted to stay at Willard’s, an expensive hotel where he could mingle with politicians.

Kilpatrick was hazed while attending West Point. The young and diminutive Kilpatrick was harassed by classmates. “The upper classmen immediately went to work hazing the odd-looking plebe, but the 5’5” 140 pound Kilpatrick did not hesitate to fight back with his fists” (HistoryNet.com 2007). Kilpatrick graduated 17 in a class of 45 in May 1861 and received a commission as a second lieutenant in the 1st U.S. Artillery.

According to biographer Samuel J. Martin, since Kilpatrick was hazed, his favorite diversion was making sure the new cadets suffered too. Kilpatrick attended the military academy with students who would become both Union and Confederate officers. The question is could the opposing officers have taken part in the hazing of Kilpatrick and did this affect his decisions and responses on the battlefield? Fifty-five of the sixty battles fought in the Civil War had West Point graduates on both sides. Further investigation of individual officers and West Point’s records should be made in order to gain a better understanding of how these interactions may have affected war strategies.

In his early career, Kilpatrick was an embarrassment to his superiors and engaged in scams for both position and money. Colonel Abram Duryee, the commander of the 5th New York, dispatched Kilpatrick to New York City to recruit more men for the regiment. Kilpatrick competed with Colonel J. Mansfield Davies for recruits. Davies was organizing a cavalry regiment and Kilpatrick was organizing an infantry regiment. “The two struck a deal. Instead of enrolling men into the infantry,
Kilpatrick signed them up as horsemen. When Davis reached his quota, he would make Kilpatrick a lieutenant colonel. Duryee soon learned of this scheme and ordered Kilpatrick to return to Fortress Monroe. Kilpatrick instead applied for sick leave, awaiting the payoff from his deal with Davies. Duryee was disgusted and suggested to his superiors that his derelict subordinate be replaced, to ‘relieve us from what has been . . . an embarrassment.’ On September 25, 1861, Davies fulfilled his promise and made Kilpatrick lieutenant colonel of his “Harris Light Cavalry,” the 2d New York” (HistoryNet.com 2007).

Kilpatrick dealt with crooked sutlers (men who followed the army and sold provisions to the soldiers) and Hiram C. Hill later testified he paid Lieutenant Colonel Kilpatrick twenty dollars in gold to steer an army contract his way. Kilpatrick confiscated horses from local farms for the Union, kept the best mounts for himself and sold the rest in the north. Kilpatrick stole tobacco from plantations and the sutlers would sell the tobacco to the troops giving Kilpatrick one-third of all monies received. Kilpatrick breached army regulations when he borrowed money from the sutlers.

Kilpatrick liked attention and submitted skewed reports to the press. Kilpatrick claimed in his report that he had captured a brigade of infantry, two cannon, two caissons, and a large number of small arms. He sent The New York Times a copy of this twisted account, and the editors published his lies. When [General] Lee saw the article, he was so incensed that he wrote a letter of protest to the Confederate President and the Union claimed the letters were forged. Kilpatrick was demoted to brigade command and assigned to serve under his replacement. Kilpatrick requested to move to the western theatre with Major General William T. Sherman, who thought Kilpatrick was a “damned fool,” but wanted him anyway. In late spring below Dalton, Georgia, Kilpatrick was shot in the thigh. He recuperated at West Point, New York, and rejoined his command July 23, 1864.

Brandy Station, Virginia was the scene of the largest cavalry battle of the entire Civil War, but Kilpatrick’s leadership there was lackluster. He did not align his brigade and failed. Hall (1990:40) noted in his summary of Kilpatrick’s assault,

Kilpatrick watched horrified as these regiments [the 2nd and 10th New York Cavalry Regiments] immediately ‘floated off like feathers on a wind.’ They were the victims of a devastating flank attack pulled off by Georgians of Cobb’s Legion and cavalrymen of the 1st South Carolina…The dismayed Union colonel turned to men called, ‘Puritans,’ troops of the 1st Maine Cavalry, ‘Men of Maine, you must save the day,’ Kilpatrick urged.

The heroic success of the 1st Maine Cavalry at Brandy Station served as partial redemption for Kilpatrick’s earlier bungling of the assault. In General Alfred Pleasonton’s report Kilpatrick was absent from the list of officers cited for gallantry.

On June 10 [1863] Shenandoah Valley, Kilpatrick unwittingly slaughtered the 1st
Kilpatrick was popular with the ladies. Although his banner bore the name of his wife Alice, his lack of discretion with various women throughout the war did not go unnoticed. One historian noted, “Returning to duty on August 5, [1863], Kilpatrick found Annie Jones, a teenage harlot, visiting his headquarters at Falmouth, Virginia. The new father immediately talked her into sharing his tent. This was not his first indiscretion. His entourage included several other women, and the word around camp was that their duties went far beyond cooking his meals. Two weeks later, Jones moved in with [George Armstrong] Custer. Outraged, Kilpatrick had her arrested as a spy and shipped off to the Old Capitol Prison” (HistoryNet.com 2007).

Kilpatrick even held a Nero Ball in Virginia where he invited the ladies to a ball while his soldiers ransacked and burned their homes to the ground. Figure 6 shows Kilpatrick at his headquarters at Brandy Station, Virginia in 1864. The identities of the two women in this photograph were not determined, although neither of them is his wife, since she had died the previous year.

Figure 6. Kilpatrick and His Staff, Brandy Station, Virginia, 1864 (Library of Congress 2007).

Kilpatrick’s Cavalry Division was probably the source, in part, for Sherman’s reputation among Georgians as scoundrels. In Atlanta, Kilpatrick’s troopers “pillaged one plantation after another. They drove off cows, sheep and hogs,” one
owner said, “took every bushel of corn and fodder, oats and wheat, and burned the house” (HistoryNet.com 2007). Although this was a common tactic in war, Kilpatrick took it a step further. “At another farm, Kilpatrick rounded up horses to replace his own worn-out mounts. His men gathered about 500 more animals than they needed, so Kilpatrick ordered the surplus killed. One by one the poor beasts were bashed on the head. The farm owner watched in horror as a mountain of dead horses arose in his yard. “My God,” he gasped, knowing that he could never bury so many animals. “I'll have to move” ” (HistoryNet.com 2007).

Kilpatrick plundered the Virginia countryside and “borrowed” two mules from a farmer. The farmer filed a complaint and the investigation exposed Kilpatrick’s schemes. Kilpatrick was imprisoned in the Old Capitol Prison in Washington. The Secretary of War, the Edwin M. Stanton said the affidavits left “little question of [Kilpatrick’s] guilt.” He was released three months later on January 21, 1863. Upon his release, Major General Joseph Hooker commanded the Army of the Potomac and Brigadier General George Stoneman led the corps of 9,000 horsemen. Kilpatrick, a colonel, was given command of the 1st Brigade in Brigadier General David McMurtie Gregg’s 3rd Division (HistoryNet.com 2007). Apparently, the U.S. Army valued Kilpatrick’s skills as a cavalry commander more than their disdain for his negative behavior.

In December, 1864, Kilpatrick torched the Sunbury Baptist Church, an integrated church that had stood in Sunbury, Liberty County, Georgia since about 1810. The ensuing flame was intended to indicate to the Union warships offshore that Sherman’s forces had arrived on the Georgia coast (Elliott 2005).

After Kilpatrick’s Raid, Kilpatrick was respected by his men. Having just returned on July 23, 1864 from an injury, one month later he was engaged in the Battle of Nash Farm. Many of the men involved in the Nash Farm Battle had just been assigned under Kilpatrick. Interestingly after the battle, these men admired him. Years later a debate raged about the facts. An individual who wrote a public letter under the guise of “M.W.H.” stirred many Kilpatrick supporters who responded by saying M.W.H was erroneous and Minty’s information was true. Regarding Kilpatrick Frank Mix said, “He was everywhere, was prompt in all his movements, and although it was the first time we had ever seen him or been with him, we admired him for his dash and perseverance, and it was not necessary then, much less now, to call praise for him taffy. He was a gallant fellow, and did his whole duty on that raid, and every one stands ready to say so” (Mix 1891). L. B. Smith responded to M.W.H.’s version of Kilpatrick’s raid in The National Tribune, July 2, 1891 by saying Kilpatrick “was one of the very best cavalry Generals in the service.” Needless to say, the Confederates had a different view of Kilpatrick and the U.S. Cavalry (Figure 7).

![Figure 7. Caricature of a U.S. Cavalryman (LaBreem 1898).](image)

### 2nd Cavalry Division

The 4th Michigan Cavalry Regiment were part of the 2nd Cavalry Division, 1st Brigade. The 4th Michigan was authorized on July 1, 1862 and Colonel Robert Minty was given command of the regiment. The regiment had a distinguished record of service, most notably action was participating in the capture of Confederate President Jefferson Davis in Georgia in May, 1865. A total of 2,217 soldiers were enrolled in the regiment throughout its Civil War service. Of these, 32 were killed in action, 15 died from wounds, and 328 died of disease. The 4th Michigan Cavalry was mustered out of service on August 29, 1865 (NPS 2007).
The 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry Regiment were part of the 2nd Cavalry Division, 1st Brigade. The 7th Pennsylvania was popularly known as the Saber Regiment, owing to their “daring and deadly use of that weapon in the mounted charge” (Sipes 1957, 2000). The soldiers in this regiment were recruited from the coal mining region of Pennsylvania. The regiment had distinguished service in the war and participated in more than 30 battles or skirmishes. A total of 292 soldiers were enrolled in the 7th Pennsylvania in its Civil War service. The regiment was organized in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in September 1861 and continued to serve until August 13, 1865 when they were mustered out. Throughout their service in the war, the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry Regiment lost eight officers and 94 enlisted men killed or mortally wounded. Additionally, five officers and 185 enlisted men died by disease (NPS 2007). Figure 8 shows the battle flag of the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry. Figure 9 shows a group of unidentified cavalrymen in the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry.

The 4th U.S. Cavalry Regiment (Regular Army) formed part of the 2nd Cavalry Division, 1st Brigade. The 4th U.S. Cavalry was originally formed in 1855 as the 1st Cavalry but, at the beginning of the Civil War it was re-designated the 4th U.S. Cavalry. Ironically, Colonel Robert E. Lee was appointed commander of the 1st U.S. Cavalry just prior to the onset of war and before leaving to join the Confederacy. Approximately 2,179 soldiers were enrolled in this regiment during the Civil War (NPS 2007; Military Service Institute 2007; Quarterhorsecav.org 2007). Brigadier General George Stoneman was placed in command of the 4th U.S. Cavalry in August, 1862. Soon promoted to Major General, Stoneman was captured in July, 1864 at the Battle of Sunshine Church near Clinton, Georgia. Stoneman and Major Keogh (who was also captured at Sunshine Church and who would later achieve infamy with General Custer at the Little Bighorn) were released in a prisoner exchange in September, 1864—too late for their participation in the battle at Nash Farm. In addition, between 500-600 U.S. soldiers were captured by the Confederates when Stoneman surrendered (ehistory.com 2007).
Figure 9. Unidentified Private, Company F, 4th Michigan Cavalry (civilwarmysteries.com 2007).

Figure 10. Battle Flag of the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry Regiment (Bellsouthpwp.net 2007).

Figure 11. Unidentified Cavalrymen, 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry (Bellsouthpwp.net 2007).
Captain James B. McIntyre commanded the 4th U.S. Cavalry in the August 20th action. Captain McIntyre had commanded a detachment of the 4th U.S. Cavalry in April, 1862 in McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign, while the rest of the regiment served in the western theater. That detachment consisted of two companies (A and E) consisting of four officers and 104 men. This detachment was loaned to General Ambrose Burnside in August, 1862 to scout the Rappahannock River in Virginia and in October, 1862 they joined the regimental headquarters in Tennessee. The companies of the 4th U.S. Cavalry that participated in the Atlanta Campaign (at Dallas, Georgia) included Companies A, B, C, E, F, I, and M. The exact composition of the regiment on August 20th was not documented but likely included most of these companies and possibly others. McIntyre’s battle report cited participants from Companies A, C, G, H and L. Most of these companies had dwindled in size as a result of losses in 1862, 1863 and 1864. Company D accompanied General Stoneman in his raid and were among those captured after his surrender. By late October, 1864 the 4th U.S. Cavalry had been reduced to about 175 men (Military Service Institute 2007). Colonel Robert Minty’s casualty report listed two officers and 40 men from the 4th U.S. Cavalry who were either killed, wounded or missing as a result of the August 20th action. If these numbers are added to the 175 number, then the approximate troop strength of the 4th U.S. Cavalry on August 20th was about 217 officers and men.

The 1st Ohio Cavalry Regiment was part of the 2nd Cavalry Division, 2nd Brigade. The 1st Ohio Cavalry Regiment (Ohio Volunteers) was organized in late 1861 and the regiment was mustered out of service in September, 1865. A total of 3,266 soldiers were enrolled in the 1st Ohio in the Civil War era. The 1st Ohio Cavalry lost a total of 204 men in the Civil War. These included 6 officers and 45 enlisted men who were killed or mortally wounded and 3 officers and 150 enlisted men who died from disease (NPS 2007). Captain William Leontes Curry normally commanded Company K in 1864, but Captain Curry was ordered to serve as regimental Quartermaster pro tem on September 12, 1864, which distanced him from combat operations. Nevertheless, Curry wrote a letter describing Kilpatrick’s “victorious” raid on Jonesboro in August, 1864 (Curry 1859-1868).

The 3rd Ohio Cavalry Regiment was part of the 2nd Cavalry Division, 2nd Brigade. The regiment was organized in December, 1861. The regiment was mustered out in August, 1865. A Civil War-era photograph of Private Wilson Farner (Company C, 3rd Ohio Cavalry is shown in Figure 13.)

Figure 12. General George Stoneman, 4th U.S. Cavalry (Harpers Weekly 1863).

Figure 13. Private Wilson Farner, Company C, 3rd Ohio Cavalry (Ancestry.com 2007).
The 4th Ohio Cavalry Regiment formed part of the 2nd Cavalry Division, 2nd Brigade. The regiment was organized in Ohio in late 1861 and Colonel John Kennett was placed in command. The regiment was mustered out on July 11, 1865. Like the other Ohio Cavalry regiments, the 4th Ohio saw distinguished service and fought in many battles in the war. A total of 225 soldiers were enrolled in the 4th Ohio. Of these five officers and 50 enlisted men were killed and mortally wounded and one officer and 169 enlisted men died by disease (NPS 2007; Stevens 2007; Pape-Findley 2002; Pike 1865; Crane 1861-1864; Wulsin 1891).

One of the more unique military units involved in the August 20th action was the Chicago Board of Trade Independent Light Battery. The battery was organized in Chicago in August 1862, and originally formed as Stokes’ Independent Battery Light Artillery. James H. Stokes, a graduate of West Point, was appointed as Captain of the Battery. George L. Robinson was elected Senior 1st Lieutenant. The Battery was initially outfitted with six James rifled 10-pound field artillery guns. Soon after these were received four of the rifled guns were exchanged for smooth-bored 6-pounders (NPS 2007; Tortorelli 2007b; Nourse et al. 1886). The Chicago Board of Trade Battery proved their effectiveness in battle at Stones River, near Murfreesboro, Tennessee. West (2007) noted.

Union artillery units at Stones River were generally volunteer units with a few U.S. Regular Army batteries part of the mix. Usually, there would be one battery, normally six to eight cannons, per brigade. However, the fighting near Murfreesboro was to prove just how effective massed batteries could be.

The action of two artillery units was particularly important on Dec. 31. Stokes’ Illinois Volunteers and Batteries H & M of the 4th U. S. Artillery helped repel Confederate charges that threatened to snap that “knife blade” completely closed.

Stokes’ unit was a unique one. It was formed and funded by the Chicago Board of Trade, which is the world’s oldest futures and options exchange. When President Lincoln sent out his call for volunteers, the Board of Trade raised the $15,000 necessary to start the new battery of 156 men within 48 hours.

James H. Stokes, a graduate of West Point Military Academy, was elected and mustered as captain. Aug. 2, 1862, en route to camp, the new battery marched in review past the Board of Trade’s offices on Chicago’s famous Water Street.

Ironically, Stokes was a Virginia native who had family members that sided with the Confederacy. By Dec. 20, 1862, the Chicago Board of Trade was attached to an even more unique group, the Pioneer Brigade, commanded by Capt. St. Clair Morton, of the regular Army’s engineering department. The brigade was formed by Maj. Gen. W.S. Rosecrans who detailed two men from each company of infantry in the Army of the Cumberland (West 2007).

Prior to the battles in Tennessee in December, 1862 and January, 1863, the Battery was a seven-gun battery but when they arrived at Lovejoy only four guns were present. The
Chicago Board of Trade Independent Light Battery, Guns 1, 3, 4 and 5, were assigned to Brigadier General Kilpatrick on August 17, 1864. According to one history of the battery,

On the 17th, guns 1, 3, 4 and 5, with the First and Second Brigades, Second Division Cavalry, reported to General Kilpatrick, at Sandtown, on the right of the line; at 6 o'clock P.M. on the 18th, we started to make the raid around Atlanta, and to cut the railroads running into the city. Kilpatrick, instead of using the battery belonging to his own division, placed us in the advance of the column in the movement to Lovejoy Station, then, when the command was entirely surrounded, used us to open the way for his troops to retreat, throwing gun into a river, but captured and brought away a 6-pounder. We reached Decatur on the 22d, four days and three nights in the saddle, having made a complete circle around Hood's army, and the city of Atlanta, and “First Lieutenant George I. Robinson [was] commissioned Captain [on] August 22, 1864 (Tortorelli 2007; Nourse et al. 1886).

The Chicago Board of Trade Battery lost a total of 19 men in the war, including 10 enlisted men killed and mortally wounded and nine enlisted men by disease. No officers from the unit were lost in the war. A total of 430 soldiers were enrolled in this unit during the Civil War. The battery was mustered out of service on June 30, 1865 (NPS 2007).

The 3rd Indiana Cavalry was part of Kilpatrick’s 3rd Cavalry Division, 1st Brigade. The 3rd Indiana Cavalry was organized into eight companies on August 20, 1861 in Evansville, Indiana and Colonel Conrad Baker was placed in command of the regiment and Lieutenant Colonel Robert Klein was second in command. By December, 1862, the 3rd Indiana was expanded to include 12 companies (Pickerill 1906:8, 100). The regiment was mustered out of service on August 31, 1864.

Goecker (2007) has researched the weapons used by the 3rd Indiana Cavalry. These included a variety of carbines such as Gallaghers, Sharps, Burnsides and some Smiths. In January, 1864, Company L was armed with 56 Gallaghers and Company M was armed with 31 Sharps. These troops also carried .36 caliber Colt Navy revolvers. In April, 1864 the regiment carried mostly Gallaghers with some Smiths and Sharps. Company G also brandished mostly Colt Navy revolvers and some Starr Army .45 caliber and Whitney Navy revolvers. By July, 1864 all companies were armed with Burnsides, except for Company M, which carried Sharps. Colt Army and Navy revolvers were reported for the regiment in that list. The final munitions report of the 3rd Indiana Cavalry dates to December, 1864, and noted that Companies L and M carried Spencer revolvers.
The 5th Iowa Cavalry Regiment was part of the 3rd Cavalry Division, 1st Brigade. Major John Morris Young commanded the regiment in the August 20th action (Young 2007). The 5th Iowa Cavalry was originally organized by General Fremont as the Curtis Horse, Companies A, B, C, and D at Omaha, Nebraska beginning in September, 1861. The regiment was mustered out at Nashville, Tennessee in August, 1865. The 5th Iowa Cavalry lost 246 men in the Civil War, which included seven officers and 58 enlisted men killed and mortally wounded and two officers and 179 enlisted men killed by disease (Civilwararchives.com 2007). The 5th Iowa Cavalry also participated in cavalry action at Lovejoy on July 29 and September 2-6, 1864. No official reports were filed by Major Young pertaining to their activities on August 20th.

Figure 17. Soldiers in the 3rd Indiana Cavalry at Petersburg, Virginia in 1864 (old-picture.com 2007).

The 8th Indiana Cavalry Regiment was part of the 3rd Cavalry Division, 2nd Brigade. The 8th Indiana Cavalry was organized in August, 1861 at Indianapolis, Indiana. Major Thomas Herring served as commander of the regiment on August 20th. The 8th Indiana participated in McCook’s raid and they fought valiantly against Wheeler’s Cavalry, including Ross’ 3rd Texas Brigade, at Brown’s Mill near Newnan (ehistory.com 2007, OR Volume 38(2):763). The 8th Indiana Cavalry lost a total of 398 in the Civil War, which included nine officers and 138 enlisted men killed and mortally wounded and one officer and 250 enlisted men dead by disease (Civilwararchives.com 2007).

The 2nd Kentucky Cavalry Regiment was part of the 3rd Cavalry Division, 2nd Brigade. The 2nd Kentucky was organized at Camp Joe Holt and Muldraugh’s Hill, Kentucky beginning in September, 1861. They participated in many battles before being mustered out at Camp Joe Holt in July, 1865. Over the course of the war, the 2nd Kentucky lost five officers and 51 enlisted men killed and mortally wounded and one officer and 122 enlisted men died of disease for a total of 179 dead. The 2nd Kentucky participated in the action at Lovejoy Station of July 29, August 20, September 2-6, and November 16, so they became quite familiar
The 10th Ohio Volunteer Cavalry Regiment formed part of the 3rd Cavalry Division, 2nd Brigade. The 10th Ohio was organized on October 1, 1862 at Cleveland, Ohio. Colonel Charles C. Smith was appointed its commander. During the winter of 1863 the regiment lost its horses as a result of starvation and in the spring of 1864 it was re-equipped. The 10th Ohio accompanied General Kilpatrick in several engagements and they had severe losses in a charge at Resaca, Georgia. Dyer’s Compendium lists the engagements of the 10th Ohio Cavalry, which included Lovejoy Station on August 10; Lovejoy Station on August 20; Lovejoy Station on September 2-6; and Bear Creek Station, November 16, 1864. The regiment was mustered out on July 24, 1865 (Woods County Herald 1891:1-15; Stevens 2007). Figure 19 shows a candid view of Corporal Samuel Mock (or Meek), Company B, 10th Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, at mealtime. The 10th Ohio Cavalry lost a total of 201 men in the Civil War, including three officers and 34 enlisted men killed and mortally wounded and one officer and 158 enlisted men dead by disease.

Figure 18. Major John Morris Young, 5th Iowa Cavalry (Iowa State Historical Society; Young 2007).

The 92nd Illinois Mounted Infantry was part of Murray’s 3rd Cavalry Division, 3rd Brigade. Colonel Smith D. Atkins served as the unit’s commander. The regiment was organized in September 1862 in Rockford, Illinois and was composed of five companies. The regiment was assigned to Colonel John T. Wilder’s brigade of mounted infantry on July 10, 1863. It was while serving with Wilder’s brigade that the 92nd Illinois cavalrymen were issued Spencer repeating rifles. In early April 1864, the 92nd Illinois was assigned to Murray’s Brigade, Kilpatrick’s Cavalry Division. The regiment participated in more than 60 battles and skirmishes from 1862-1865. The regiment was mustered out of service in July, 1865. The regiment lost a total of 181 soldiers in the war including one officer and 51 enlisted men killed and mortally wounded and two officers and 127 enlisted men by disease. (Tortorelli 2007a; King and Swedberg 1999; NPS 2007).

The 3rd Kentucky Cavalry was part of the 3rd Cavalry Division, 3rd Brigade. The 3rd Kentucky was organized in 1861 in Mercer County, Kentucky by Colonel James S. Jackson. In December, 1861 the 3rd Kentucky was mustered into the U.S. Cavalry and placed under command of 18 year old Major Eli H. Murray. Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. King commanded the regiment in the August 20th action at Nash Farm. The regiment was mustered out of service in April, 1865 near Lexington, North Carolina (Cross 2007; Ison 2007).

The 5th Kentucky Cavalry was part of the 3rd Cavalry Division, 3rd Brigade. The 5th Kentucky Cavalry was organized at Columbus, Kentucky beginning in December, 1861. Colonel Oliver L. Baldwin commanded the regiment on August 20th at Nash Farm. The regiment served at many battles prior to their participation in the August 20th action at Lovejoy Station. They were also present for the action at Lovejoy on September 2-6, 1864. The regiment was mustered out of service on May 3, 1865. The 5th Kentucky Cavalry lost a total of 213 men in the Civil War and these included four officers and 32 enlisted men killed and mortally wounded and five officers and 172 enlisted men killed by disease (Civilwararchives.com 2007).

The 10th Independent Battery, Wisconsin Light Artillery was commanded by Captain Yates V. Beebe (NPS 2007). A total of 424 soldiers are
listed in this artillery battery throughout its Civil War activity (NPS 2007). The battery lost 28 enlisted men in the entire war, including three killed or mortally wounded and 25 who died from disease. Beebe’s artillery battery participated in many engagements of the Atlanta Campaign, including several in the Jonesboro and Lovejoy areas. On August 20, the 10th Wisconsin provided artillery support for the U.S. cavalry charge. Their battery was positioned on the north side of Jonesboro Road, a short distance northwest of the Nash Farm property, according to historian Mark Pollard. Pollard reported finding several cannon friction primers at this location, which is presently owned by Clayton County.

Figure 19. Mealtime with Corporal Samuel Mock, Company B., 10th Ohio Volunteer Cavalry (C. Wesley Cowen Catalog, in Stevens 2007).

Figure 20. Captain Jonathon M. Scermerhorn, 92nd Illinois Infantry, Company G (Lena Area Historical Society 2007).

CONFEDERATE FORCES

Table 1 presents a summary of the 28,051 Confederate Cavalry troops that comprised the Army of the Tennessee, who were in the Atlanta Campaign in August, 1864. Most of these troops were active in the Lovejoy vicinity in August and September of that year.
Calvary Strength, Army of Tennessee, C.S.A., August 1864.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cavalry Command</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Men Present</th>
<th>Aggregate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheeler's Corps</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>11862</td>
<td>18629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson's Division</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>6479</td>
<td>8459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery (Wheeler's)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery (Jackson's)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1191</td>
<td>12053</td>
<td>28051</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Cavalry Strength, Army of Tennessee, C.S.A., August, 1864.

Major General Joseph Wheeler (Fightin’ Joe Wheeler) (1836-1906)

Major General Joseph Wheeler commanded the Confederate Cavalry Corps that fought in Georgia in 1864. Wheeler was born in Augusta, Georgia. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1859, was commissioned in the Dragoons and fought at Shiloh.

Ironically Wheeler’s lowest grades were in cavalry tactics, yet he distinguished himself in cavalry maneuvers earning him nicknames such as “Lumberjack Cavalry” and “the Horse Marines.” During the Civil War, Wheeler wrote the new Confederate cavalry manual *Cavalry Tactics* (1863) advocating mounted infantry over heavy cavalry. He was “among the first to recognize that the day of the mounted charge was over, he advised troopers to ride to battle but to fight on foot. That was a lesson many officers had still not learned 50 years later”(HistoryNet.com 2007). The reason Wheeler advocated Mounted Infantry is because the men were infantry trained and could ride to battle, dismount and fight. Cavalry were cavalry trained and used sabers. With the invention of the repeating rifle cavalry were targets and Wheeler felt infantry soldiers could get into position faster and defend themselves dismounted. This information is important because the Confederate cavalry were dismounted at Nash Farm when they were run over by Kilpatrick’s men. The Confederate Cavalry was highly mobile.

Confederate cavalrymen traveled lighter than their Union counterparts and were not usually armed with the more modern carbines. Short, muzzle-loading carbines were more common in southern regiments, including imports from England. Some Southern troops preferred to leave their sabers behind and carried extra pistols instead of sabers, for close work. Southern arsenals attempted to mass produce breech loading carbines, even making copies of Union carbines made by the Sharps Rifle Company. Attempts at mass production of the weapon failed and southern cavalrymen relied upon a varied stock of captured and imported arms (civilwar.com 2007).

During the war, Wheeler was wounded three times, had sixteen horses shot under him, saw seven of his staff officers killed, and three wounded. After the war he declined a professorship of philosophy in the Louisiana Seminary in 1866. Many consider Wheeler a competent general, not outstanding, but efficient with what he had.

The action of August 20th began on the railroad line at Lovejoy Station, where Kilpatrick’s Division was busy destroying track. The U.S. Cavalry came under unexpected attack by Confederate infantry troops. The 1st Arkansas Mounted Rifles were among the Confederate infantry who surprised Kilpatrick’s men. (McReynolds 2007; Kempstead 1890; Allen 1988). The 1st Arkansas Mounted Rifles was organized in June, 1861 at Little Rock, Arkansas and Colonel Thomas J. Churchill was appointed its first commander. A total of 2,645 men enrolled in the regiment during its period of existence.

General Lawrence Sullivan ‘Sul’ Ross (1838- )

General Ross was born in Iowa and his father Captain S. P. Ross moved to Texas the following year in 1839. As a child he and his father were attacked by fifteen to twenty Comanche warriors and had to outrun the Indians. At the age of twenty he commanded 135 friendly Indians against the Comanches. In one battle he rescued a little white girl he later raised as Lizzie Ross.

Captain W. V. Lester (Co. K), Captain J. E. Turner (Co. I) and Captain J. A. King (Co. G) all of the First Mississippi Cavalry wrote Colonel Ross, sometime prior to August, 1864, the following letter not knowing they would go to battle together:

Colonel L. S. Ross: The officers of the First Mississippi Cavalry desiring to express their...
appreciation of you as an officer, have designated the undersigned as a committee to communicate their feelings.

It is with profound regret that they part with you as their Brigade Commander, and will cherish, with kind remembrance, your generous and courteous conduct toward them, and the gallant bearing you have ever displayed in leading them in battle. The service, with all its hardships and privations, has been rendered pleasant under your direction and leadership. They deplore the circumstances which render it necessary that they should be taken from your command, but feel confident that, in whatever field you may be called upon to serve, the country will know no better or more efficient officer. Our regret is shared by all the men of the regiment, and you carry with you their best wishes for your continued success.

In conclusion, allow us to say, we are proud to have served under you, and with your gallant Texans, and hope yours, and theirs, and our efforts in behalf of our bleeding country, will at length be crowned with success (Rose 1960:167-168).

Lieutenant-General Stephen D. Lee wrote to the Secretary of War “Colonel L. S. Ross is one of the best disciplinarians in the army, and has distinguished himself on many battle-fields, and his promotion and assignment will increase the efficiency of the most reliable troops under my command” (Rose 1960:168). Colonel Ross was promoted to Brigadier-General in Yazoo City. His brother Peter F. Ross (1836-1909) was also with Texas Cavalry.

The 3rd Texas Cavalry Regiment formed part of Ross’ Texas Brigade and were active participants in the August 20th battle. The 3rd Texas Cavalry Regiment consisted of about only 200 men at the end of the Civil War (Nolan 2007). The 3rd Texas was originally composed of 10 companies, plus additional field and staff officers. The regiment was organized in Dallas, Texas on June 13, 1861 with Colonel Elkanah B. Greer appointed as commander. The regiment was reorganized over the course of the war. On December 16, 1863, it was formed into a brigade consisting of the remnants of the 3rd, 6th, 9th and 27th Texas Cavalry, which was commanded by Colonel Lawrence Sullivan Ross. The regiment arrived in Georgia in May, 1864 to support the Confederate defensive line. After Atlanta fell on September 2, 1864, Ross’ Texas Brigade rode to join General Hood in his Tennessee campaign. The NPS’s Civil War Soldiers and Sailors System lists 1,960 soldiers enrolled in the 3rd Regiment, Texas Cavalry over its history. The regiment was also known as the South Kansas-Texas Mounted Volunteers (NPS 2007). The 3rd Texas Cavalry surrendered at Citronelle, Alabama in May, 1865, although only 207 men remained in the regiment (Barron 1908; Rose 1960; Hale 2007).

Figure 23 is a photograph of 2nd Lieutenant Alf Davis, 3rd Texas Cavalry, Good’s Battery. It was probably taken around 1862. A group photograph of veterans of the 3rd Texas Cavalry, taken in 1915, is shown in Figure 24.

Figure 21, Confederate Cavalry Returning from a Successful Raid (Wright 1906).

Brigadier General Lawrence Sullivan Ross’s Texas Cavalry Brigade (aka Ross’ Brigade) was composed of four regiments of the Texas Cavalry, which were the 3rd, 6th, 9th and 27th. By the early afternoon of August 20, Ross’s cavalry was dismounted and positioned along three north-south lines near the Nash farmhouse.
Figure 22. Civil War-era Caricature of a Texas Ranger (*Harper's Weekly* July 6, 1861: 430).

Figure 23. Texas Cavalry Uniform, circa 1862, Worn by 2nd Lieutenant Alf Davis, Good’s Texas Battery (McDonald 2007).

Figure 24. Veterans of the 3rd Texas Cavalry, 1915.

Figure 25. Battle flag of the 3rd Texas Cavalry (Lanham 2007b).

The 6th Texas Cavalry Regiment formed part of Ross’ Texas Brigade and were active participants in the August 20th battle. The regiment’s commander on August 20th was Colonel Peter F. Ross. Brigadier General Sullivan Ross, brother of Peter F. Ross, had served in the 6th Texas Cavalry, enlisting under the command of his brother. Ross rose in the ranks to command the Texas Cavalry Brigade, after General Whitfield became ill in late 1863 (Nolan 2007).

The 6th Texas Cavalry Regiment (also known as Wharton’s Regiment and Stone’s Regiment) was originally composed of 10 companies, plus additional field and staff officers. The regiment was organized in 1861 in Dallas, Texas. The 6th Texas suffered heavy losses from battles in the Western theatre and they were assigned to Ross’ Brigade (NPS 2007). By June 1864, when the 6th Texas participated in the Atlanta Campaign, the ranks were greatly dwindled and some
consolidation occurred. Many official records from this troop reduction and consolidation were either not kept, or have not survived. Company I, 6th Texas Cavalry, for example, was a sharpshooter company that lost so many men that they were not a viable company by August 1864 and they merged with some other units. Colonel Lawrence S. Ross commanded the regiment in 1864. A total of 1,825 men belonged to the 6th Texas Cavalry Regiment throughout its Civil War history (NPS 2007).

Figure 26. Battleflag, 6th Texas Cavalry Battalion (Texas State Library and Archives Commission 2007).

The 9th Texas Cavalry Regiment formed part of Ross’ Texas Brigade and were active participants in the August 20th battle. By the time the 9th Texas Cavalry Regiment went with Ross’ Brigade back to Tennessee, their ranks had been reduced from approximately 1,000 to 140 men. These men were consolidated into one large company. Approximately 900 men from the 9th Regiment were either dead, wounded, sick or left behind by late 1864 and by they time of their surrender in May, 1865, only 100 remained under the command of Colonel Dudley W. Jones. Colonel Jones led the 9th Regiment in battle on August 20th (Nolan 2007). The 9th Texas Cavalry Regiment (also known as Sims’ Regiment). The 9th Texas Cavalry originally consisted of 1,050 men, who enlisted in Grayson County, Texas in 1861 but by the spring of 1862, it was reduced to 657 effective troops. After further reduction they joined with Ross’ Brigade and participated in the Atlanta Campaign. A total of 1,712 soldiers was associated with the 9th Texas Cavalry throughout the Civil War (NPS 2007). The 9th Texas was commanded by Colonel Dudley W. Jones in mid-August 1864, but Colonel Jones was injured when his horse fell on him and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas G. Berry assumed command days prior to the August 20th engagement.

At least three battle flags flown by the 9th Texas Cavalry during the Civil War are known. The first one shown was captured by a soldier in the 27th Ohio Volunteer Infantry at Corinth, Mississippi in 1862. It is currently curated at the Georgia State Capitol Museum, where it has been since it was mistakenly returned by the State of Ohio in 1972 (Brothers 2007; Livermore 1889).

Figure 27. Battle Flags of the 9th Texas Cavalry (Brothers 2007).

Figure 28 shows black and white view of a banner flown by the 9th Texas Cavalry as it appeared in 1898 (The Confederate Veteran 1898:253; Brothers 2007). Private A.W. Sparks, Company I, 9th Texas Cavalry, described this flag as, “a small brownish red silk flag, in the center of which was a crescent moon and thirteen five-pointed silver stars. It was trimmed with silk fringe and was attached to a dark mahogany colored staff with a gilded spear head at the top” (Sparks 1987). The flag shown here was probably retired in October, 1863, when new flags were issued. This specimen may be curated at the Layland Museum in Cleburne, Texas, although its status has not been confirmed (Brothers 2007).
Figure 28. Battle Flag, 9th Texas Cavalry, after October 1862 (*The Confederate Veteran* 1898:253).

Figure 29 shows a black and white view of the 9th Texas Cavalry flag, which was flown in 1864 (Tuck 1993:389). The present whereabouts of this flag remains undetermined. Brothers (2007) noted that it existed in 1988, where it was in a private collection in Tulsa, Oklahoma.

Figure 29. Battle Flag, 9th Texas Cavalry, 1863-1864 (Tuck 1993:389).

The 27th Texas Cavalry Regiment (also known as the 1st Texas Legion and Whitfield's Legion) was organized in early 1862 and was formed from Whitfield's 4th Texas Cavalry Battalion. The regiment was originally organized with 1,007 soldiers. A total of 2,344 soldiers belonged to this regiment throughout its Civil War history. They lost 22 percent of 460 troops in the Battle of Iuka, Mississippi. They later were assigned to Ross' Brigade and participated in the Atlanta Campaign. When the regiment was reorganized in November, 1862, it consisted of 12 Cavalry companies. The commanders in August, 1864 were Colonel Edwin R. Hawkins and Lieutenant Colonel John H. Broocks (NPS 2007). On August 20, 1864, the 27th Texas Cavalry Regiment was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John H. Broocks. At the time of their surrender on May 4, 1865, the 27th Texas Cavalry Regiment consisted of only about 150 men (NPS 2007; Nolan 2007; Wright and Simpson 1965; Sifakis 1995).

Colonel Ross and his Texas Cavalry Brigade had hoped to be joined by two other Confederate Cavalry divisions, Armstrong's and Ferguson's, on August 20 but neither arrived in time. Colonel Armstrong's Cavalry did arrive in time to pursue Kilpatrick's Cavalry, however, and Armstrong's horsemen dogged Kilpatrick's Division, as the U.S. Cavalry escaped eastward along the Jonesboro Road.

Ross' Brigade had artillery support from Croft's Battery of Georgia Light Artillery (also known as the Columbus Light Artillery) and possibly additional (as yet unidentified) Confederate artillery. Croft's Battery was organized in early 1862 by Captain Edward Croft with members from Russell County, Alabama and Muscogee County, Georgia (Forbes 1993). By November, 1863, Croft's Battery consisted of 139 officers and men. A total of 357 soldiers belonged to Croft’s Battery throughout its history. The battery served with Major General John B. Hood in northern Georgia and the Atlanta Campaign. The battery was commanded by 1st Lieutenant Alfred J. Young on August 20, 1864 (NPS 2007). Croft's Battery had consisted of four artillery pieces and conflicting battlefield reports indicate that either one or four guns were present on August 20th.

Captain Farris’ Battery, Missouri Light Artillery (also known as Clark Light Battery) was organized in early 1862 and by September, 1862, it consisted of 71 active troops. A total of 341 soldiers belonged to Farris’ Battery throughout its Civil War history. The unit was commanded by Captain Houston King when it was assigned to the Army of the Tennessee in early 1864. Records show that the battery participated in the Atlanta Campaign (NPS 2007), although no records were found to indicate whether or not Farris’ Battery participated in the August 20th action along Jonesboro Road.
Company “B”, 3rd Battalion, South Carolina Light Artillery (also known as the Palmetto Battalion) was commanded by Lieutenant R. B. Waddell. Waddell’s Company participated in the Atlanta Campaign.

UNION ACCOUNTS

General Sherman ordered Kilpatrick from Sandtown to the Macon and Western Railroad (near Jonesboro). Kilpatrick was specifically instructed to stay away from the Confederates and only destroy railroad tracks. Kilpatrick rode with his Division and two of Kenner Garrard’s cavalry brigades. Garrard’s Brigades consisted of approximately 2,398 men bringing Kilpatrick to a total of 4,500 men and two batteries with eight guns. While destroying railroad tracks Kilpatrick was forced to make a decision to engage or flee the Confederate forces. As Vale recalled,

"Before Kilpatrick had time to learn what was coming, a spirited attack was made on the rear, but he soon comprehended the situation” (Robertson 1889:668). Kilpatrick found himself sandwiched between Confederate forces. Colonel Robert H.G. Minty (1st Cavalry Brigade, 4th Michigan Cavalry) noted, “we were in a pretty tight box: A brigade of infantry in our front, and partly on our left; a division moving to hit us on the right, and but a little distance off; and three brigades of cavalry in our rear (Vale 1886:361).

General Kilpatrick wrote:

The enemy were finally checked and driven back with heavy loss. We captured 1 battle-flag. At this moment a staff officer from Colonel Murray informed me that a large force of cavalry, with artillery, had attacked his rear. In twenty minutes I found that I [sic] was completely enveloped by cavalry and infantry, with artillery. I decided at once to ride over the enemy’s cavalry and retire on the McDonough road. A large number of my people were dismounted, fighting on foot, and it took some time to mount them and form my command for the charge. During the delay the enemy constructed long lines of barricades on every side. Those in front of his cavalry were very formidable. Pioneers were sent in advance of the charging columns to remove obstructions. Colonel Minty, with his command in three columns, charged, broke, and rode over the enemy’s left. Colonel Murray, with his regiments, broke his center, and in a moment General Jackson’s division, 4,000 strong, was running in great confusion. It was the most perfect rout any cavalry has sustained during the war. We captured 4 guns (3 were destroyed and 1 brought off); 3 battle-flags were taken; his ambulances, wagons, and ordnance train captured, and destroyed as far as possible; many prisoners were taken and his killed and wounded is known to be large. My command was quickly reformed, thrown into position, fought successfully the enemy’s infantry for one hour and forty minutes, and only retired when it was found that we had left only sufficient ammunition to make sure our retreat (General Kilpatrick, Camp Crooks, Ga., September 13, 1864).

Colonel Robert H. G. Minty (1831-1906), 4th Michigan Cavalry, Commanding First Brigadier, Second Cavalry Division, filed his report on August 24 with Captain Estes, Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Cavalry Division, on events in late August 1864 and it is presented below (OR Volume 38(2):824-826). A wartime portrait of Robert Minty is shown in Figure 30.
First and Second Brigades of the Second Cavalry Division, numbering as under:

At 6 a.m. I halted on the banks of the Utoy Creek, and in obedience to orders from Brigadier-General Garrard, commanding Second Cavalry Division, reported to Brigadier-General Kilpatrick, commanding Third Cavalry Division, at Sandtown.

In accordance with orders from General Kilpatrick I marched at dusk same day, following the Third Division, and marched all night.

August 19, about break of day my advance (the Second Brigade) crossed the Atlanta and Montgomery Railroad. The rear brigade was sharply attacked on the left flank by artillery and dismounted cavalry. The Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry cut through and the column divided. Major Jennings, commanding Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, and Major Mix commanding Fourth Michigan Cavalry, attacked the enemy with vigor, drove him from the ground, and reunited the column. At this point I lost 3 ambulances, which were driven into the woods by the drivers and broken. I was here ordered to take the advance with my two brigades and push the enemy, Ross’ brigade, to Flint River. The woods were thick, and impracticable for cavalry. The Second Brigade was, therefore, dismounted. We advanced steadily, driving the rebels before us, until we arrived at Flint River, where I found the bridge destroyed, and the enemy in position on the opposite bank. His guns were soon silenced by Lieutenant Bennett’s section of the Board of Trade Battery. General Kilpatrick ordered up all the artillery, eight pieces, and shelled the rebel rifle-pits by volleys. After the firing of the fourth volley, my men in line advanced at the double-quick, and took, shelter behind a fence on the bank for the river, and their fire soon drove the enemy from his works. We then crossed on the stringers of the ruined bridge, which was quickly repaired, and one section of the Board of Trade Battery, under Lieutenant Robinson, crossed. I was directed by General Kilpatrick to drive the rebels from, and take possession of, the town of Jonesborough. I deployed the Fourth Michigan as skirmishers. The Fourth United States and First Ohio, with a section of artillery between them, moved in line, and Third and Fourth Ohio followed I advanced, steadily driving the rebels, Ross’ and Ferguson’s brigades, before me into the town, where they took possession of the houses and opened a sharp fire on us. I ordered the section of artillery into the skirmish line, and directed Lieutenant Robinson to shell every house from which a gun was fired, and in five minutes I had possession of Jonesborough. The railroad buildings were quickly destroyed and a portion of the track torn up, I was then ordered to take position across the railroad, facing toward Atlanta, to cover the Third Division which had been ordered to tear up the track. About 10 p.m. I was ordered to take up a new position near the Third Division, which was about moving farther south to continue the work of destruction. As soon as I had moved Colonel Murray attempted to advance, but found the enemy in force and strongly posted in his front. A flank movement was now directed. The general ordered that my own brigade should take the advance and that I myself, with the Second Brigade, should remain to cover the movement. The column marched toward McDonough for about five miles, then, turning to the right, moved directly toward Lovejoy’s Station, on the Macon road. As the rear of the column turned to the right the rebel cavalry came up with it, and a sharp skirmish ensued between them and Colonel Long’s brigade, ending in the repulse of the rebels a little after daybreak.

August 20, when within one mile of Lovejoy’s Station the Second Brigade rejoined the First at the head of the column. At this point the road forks, one branch leading to the station and the other to a point on the railroad quarter of a mile north. On this, the right-hand road, I detached the Fourth Michigan, with orders to gain possession of and destroy the railroad. The column moved directly for the station, driving a small squad of rebels before it. When within quarter of a mile of the railroad, I received a report from Major Mix, commanding Fourth Michigan, that he had succeeded in gaining the road, without meeting with any opposition, and was then engaged in destroying it. At this moment the advance was fired upon pretty sharply. I immediately dismounted it and, together with the remainder of the regiment (Seventh Pennsylvania), sent it forward to clear the woods, but finding that a fire was maintained on my right, I sent one battalion Fourth U.S. Cavalry, to extend the line in that direction; but before it could gain its position, an entire brigade of rebel infantry rose from the brush in our front, delivered a terrific volley, and rushed forward with a yell. Our little force, scarcely 300 men, appeared for a moment to be annihilated; the Second Brigade formed rapidly. The Chicago Board of Trade Battery came into position, and the enemy was quickly checked, but from the woods in our front, and on the left flank, a galling fire was kept up, and the battery was forced to fall back, leaving one piece, which had been disabled, on the ground, and having lost 7 per cent. of their men. The gun was, however, immediately after, brought in by volunteers, taken off the broken carriage, and placed in a wagon. The rebel cavalry now attacked us heavily in the rear. The general ordered me to withdraw my command and form it on the
right of the road, facing to the then rear, and prepare for a charge. I formed the First Brigade in line of regimental columns of fours, the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry on the right, the Fourth Michigan in the center, and the Fourth United States on the left; the Second Brigade in rear of the First, in close column, with regimental front, with orders to follow the First Brigade, but the ground being very unfavorable for such a movement, Colonel Long broke by fours, and moved down the road in rear of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry. Gaps were made in the first fence by a line of skirmishers, and I moved forward at the trot until we got under the enemy's fire, when I gave the commands "gallop" and "charge," and we swept down on the rebel breast-works. The ground we had to pass over was very disadvantageous for a charge, being very much cut up by rain gullies, and intersected by half a dozen high rail fences. The rebels held their position, behind their works, until we were almost on them, when they turned and fled in confusion. We were soon among them, and hundreds fell beneath our keen blades. The race and slaughter continued, through woods and fields, for about three miles, when I collected and reformed my command. In this charge we captured 3 pieces of artillery and 3 stand of colors, viz: Third Texas Cavalry and Benjamin Infantry, captured by the Fourth U. S. Cavalry, and the Zachary Rangers, captured by the Fourth Michigan Cavalry. General Kilpatrick ordered me to cover the march of the column to McDonough. Colonel Long immediately took position with the Second Brigade, and before the head of the column had moved he was attacked by Cleburne's division of infantry. For nearly three hours they were held in check by Colonel Long, who was here wounded in the arm and thigh. The command of the brigade then devolved on Colonel Eggleston, First Ohio Cavalry. The Third Division being out of the way, I placed the Fourth Michigan and Seventh Pennsylvania in position, with Lieutenant Bennett's section of artillery, and directed Colonel Eggleston to retire with his brigade. Cleburne followed closely and vigorously attacked the new line, but our rail breast-works protected the men and our loss was comparatively small, although the enemy's shells were thrown with great precision. Shortly after the retreat of the Second Brigade one of our guns burst and the other was rendered temporarily unserviceable by the wedging of a shell. As soon as the road was clear, I withdrew, mounted the First Brigade. The march was continued until 2 a.m. on the 21st, when we bivouacked north of Walnut Creek.

August 21, we were in the saddle shortly after daybreak. At about 6 a.m. we arrived on the south bank of Cotton River, which was flooded, and the bridge destroyed. This we were compelled to swim, losing in the operation 1 man and about 50 horses and mules. It being impossible to bring across the wagon which contained the gun, it was destroyed and the gun buried. I camped at Lithonia, on the Georgia railroad. August 22, returned to camp, near Peach Tree Creek, passing through Latimar's and Decatur.

Every officer and soldier in the command acted so well, so nobly, so gallantly, that under ordinary circumstances they would be entitled to special mention. Day and night, from the 28th to the 23d, these gallant men were without sleep and almost without food. During that time they marched and skirmished incessantly, fought four pitched battles, and swam a flooded river, and all without once complaining or murmuring.

I cannot close this necessarily long report without calling attention to the gallant and magnificent manner in which the Chicago Board of Trade Battery was fought, by Lieutenants Robinson and Bennett, on every occasion on which it was brought into action. Colonel Long, commanding Second Brigade, and all the regimental commanders, distinguished themselves by the able manner in which they handled their commands. Captain McIntyre, commanding Fourth U. S. Cavalry, rendered himself conspicuous by his gallantry when he was attacked by a brigade of infantry at Lovejoy's, and also by the manner in which he led the charge of his regiment on the 20th.

Private Samuel Waters, Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, rode in advance of his regiment, and made good use of his saber during the charge. Private Douglas, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, rode with Captain McIntyre during the charge, and brought in 15 prisoners, 4 of them commissioned officers. Private William Bailey, Fourth Michigan Cavalry, especially distinguished himself by riding through a narrow gap in the fence, in front of the rebel artillery, galloping into the battery, and shooting the captain dead on the spot. I beg most respectfully to call the attention of the general to these three gallant private soldiers.

I also beg to call the attention of the general commanding to the officers and men mentioned in the report of Captain McIntyre, commanding Fourth U. S. Cavalry, inclosed herewith. Captain McIntyre's is the only sub-reports as yet received by me.

I regret to have to announce the loss of Captain Thompson, Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, my brigade inspector, and one of the most gallant soldiers in the service; he
was wounded, and I fear is now a prisoner in the hands of the enemy.

Inclosed herewith I hand you return of casualties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Killed Officers</th>
<th>Wounded Officers</th>
<th>Wounded and missing Officers</th>
<th>Missing Officers</th>
<th>Total Officers</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Men</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>59</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>87</td>
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<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ROBT. H. G. MINTY,
Colonel, Commanding.

Table 2. Minty's Casualty Report, August, 1864.

Colonel Minty later wrote that it was his suggestion the Union army form in columns:

Immediately after the repulse of Reynolds my Adjutant-General, Capt. Burns, informed me that Gen. Kilpatrick desired to see me at once; that Cleburne’s Division of Infantry was closing in on our right, Martin’s and Jackson’s Divisions of Cavalry were on our left and rear and “we knew what is in front of us.” I instructed Capt. Burns to recall the 4th Mich., and galloped to the rear to report to Gen. Kilpatrick. I found him on the McDonough road. He repeated what Capt. Burns had already told me, and added: “Our only recourse is to cut our way out. You will form your division in line, on the right of the McDonough road, facing to the rear, Col. Murray will form in the same manner on the left of the road and you will charge simultaneously.

The ground indicated by Gen. Kilpatrick was a deserted plantation creased in every direction by rain gullies, and there were two rail fences between us and the enemy, who were at work building rail barricades. I said: “General, I will form in any way you direct; but, if it was left to me, I would never charge in line over this ground; when we strike the enemy, if we ever do so, it will be a thin, wavering blow that will amount to nothing.” He asked: “How, then, would you charge?” I replied: “In column, sir. Our momentum would be like that of a railroad train where we strike, something has to break.” He paused a moment, and then said: ‘Form in any way you please” (Minty 1903).

Colonel Minty later reported that Colonel Murray told Kilpatrick that his men could not charge over “that ground”. Kilpatrick ignored Murray, then
asked Minty if he were ready and, with Minty leading the charge, the cavalry charged forward (Minty 1903).

The first brigade formed by Colonel Minty “on the right or west side of the road” about 150 yards between the columns. The following is an excellent description of the Confederate formation from Joseph G. Vale’s 1886 book *Minty and the Cavalry: A History of Cavalry Campaigns in the Western Armies*:

> Immediately on the charging columns showing themselves, the enemy opened with shell from four pieces of artillery in our front, and from six pieces on our right front, canister was, after the first or second discharge, substituted for shell, but the battery in our front. After the columns had passed the first fence, the infantry and cavalry opened a fire of musketry. Through this storm of shell, canister, and musketry, the charging columns, closely followed by the gallant Land and his brigade of intrepid Ohioans, in column of regiments, swept over the fields, broken through the ground was with deep gulleys or washouts, leaping over three sets of out-lying rail barricades, and, without firing a shot, reached the rebel first line, posted slightly in the rear of a fence. The rebel cavalry broke and fled in the wildest panic, just before we struck them, but the infantry stood firm. Leaping, in maddened rush at the top of speed, our horses over the fence, and where this could not be done, dashing with impetuous force against it, the impediment was passed, without drawing rein, and, with their keen blades, the brigade in an instant cut the rebel front line to pieces! rode [sic] over, and destroyed it! And assailed with renewed vigor their second line. Between the first and second lines, the columns obliqued slightly to the left, and, striking it thus in half left turn, presented somewhat the appearance of a movement by platoons in “echelon,” assaulting it in many places in quick succession, penetrated and saberred it to pieces as quickly as they had the first! The third line now broke and ran in utter confusion and rout, but we were soon among them, riding down and sabering hundreds as they ran.

Pennsylvania and Fourth Michigan, making a full left wheel, dashed upon the artillery, sobering gunners beside their pieces the while. Three of the pieces, all we had horses for, were brought off, and the other one was disabled by spiking, blowing up the caissons and chopping to pieces the wheels. . . (Vale 1886:347-349).

Vale’s description continues as follows:

> The Fourth regulars instead of keeping parallel with us, as was intended, seeing an opening in the fence by the side of the road, and finding very high fences in front of them, turned to the left and struck out on the main road . . .
> Colonel Long’s brigade did not charge in line, as it was intended, but finding the ground impracticable for it, formed in columns and followed the Fourth regulars. Colonel Murray’s command, instead of sweeping all to the left of the road, as we supposed they would do, turned to the right, and filed in after Colonel Long. Had he (Murray) done as was expected, both sides of the road would have been cleaned out. As it was, a good many of the rebels escaped off to the left (Vale 1886:363).

Vale’s account has a negative slant towards Colonel Eli Houston Murray (1843-1896) (3rd Cavalry Brigade). The underlying tone may be rooted in politics and command dynamics. Murray was part of Kilpatrick’s original command. Prior to leaving Atlanta, Kilpatrick was supplemented by two brigades from Brigadier General Kenner Dudley Garrard’s Division. The two brigades that supplemented Kilpatrick made up the 2nd Cavalry Division (consisting of 4th Michigan, 7th Pennsylvania, 4th U.S., 1st Ohio, 3rd Ohio, 4th Ohio and the Chicago Board of Trade) who led the charge at Nash Farm. Colonel Murray leading the 3rd Cavalry Brigade was part of Kilpatrick’s usual command. Accounts from the aforementioned supplemental brigades tended to be negative towards Colonel Murray.

Colonel Robert H.G. Minty is certainly one of the more colorful and courageous leaders in the August 20th engagement at Nash Farm. His biography and involvement in the battle should be the subject of future historical research. That information would provide important interpretive history content guaranteed to make the battle come alive to visitors at Nash Farm.

32
1st Cavalry Brigade, 4th Michigan Cavalry, Commanded by Major Frank W. Mix

Major Frank W. Mix commanded the 4th Michigan Cavalry in the August 20th action. Figure 31 is a wartime portrait of Major Mix. Major Mix filed his report of operations August 18-22 (Kilpatrick's raid) with the Acting Assistant Adjutant General, 1st Cavalry Brigade on August 24, and it is presented below (OR Volume 38 (2): 828-831).

Figure 31. Major Frank W. Mix, 4th Michigan Cavalry. (Ancestry.com 2007).

...On the 17th of August I received orders to have my command in readiness to march at 6 p.m., with five days' rations, but, owing to some delay, we did not leave our camp until 2 a.m. on the morning of the 18th. Having the advance of the brigade, we moved off in a southwesterly direction. We marched very steady throughout the night, and about 6 a.m. arrived at a place called Sandtown, where we found the Third Cavalry Division. Here I received notice that we would remain through the day, and be ready to join the Third Division, under General Kilpatrick, for a raid on the Atlanta and Macon Railroad, which was to leave at sundown. At 6 p.m. I received orders that I would use my command as rear guard, and it was near 9 o'clock before I moved out of camp. We moved very slow though the night, making it very tiresome for both men and horses. At daylight on the morning of the 19th, when near the East Point railroad, artillery was distinctly heard in our front, and, by the movements of the advance, I learned the enemy were firing into our flank. The ambulances of the brigade were in advance of me, and attempted to follow the command and to dash past fire (and officer having them in charge). Instead of following the command, they turned to the right into a small bridle path. I had followed them to this point, and felt bound to save them, if possible, and accordingly moved my command in the same direction. After proceeding a short distance, I found the ambulances halted and no opening for them to escape, and that we were cut off from the rest of the command. I sent the ambulances to the rear, and formed the Third Battalion, under Captain Eldridge, on the right of the path facing the main road, which we had just left. About this tie I was joined by a battalion of the Seven Pennsylvanias, under Major Andress. Being the senior officer, I ordered him to form his command on the right of the Third Battalion of Fourth Michigan. The enemy were moving toward the main road, and had already opened a heavy fire upon us. I ordered Major Andress and Captain Eldridge to move forward with their commands as skirmishers, and drive the enemy from the road. Captain Eldridge moved forward in fine style, driving the enemy before him, but Major Andress, with his battalion, soon left me without my knowledge, and I found my right unprotected. I ordered Captain Hathaway, commanding First Battalion of my regiment, to dismount his battalion and move it forward to assist Captain Eldridge; but before the movement was completed Captain Eldridge sent me word that he had possession of the main road. I sent my adjutant (Lieutenant Dickinson), to the ambulances to have them fall in between the First and Second Battalions, and to charge out with us, as the enemy had full command of the road with his artillery. But no one could be found to take charge of them, some of them having been turned over and broken. Upon gaining this information, I ordered the command forward on the gallop, crossed the railroad, thence down the railroad on the left for about two miles, to Fremont's Corners, closely followed on the gallop, crossed the railroad, thence down the railroad on the left for about two miles, to Fremont's Corners, closely followed by the enemy. Here I found two battalions of the Seventh Pennsylvania, under Major Jennings. Here I formed the regiment and built a stockade across the road, where we held the enemy in check. They soon disappeared. I then sent Company K, Lieutenant Bedtelyon commanding, back to find our pack-mules (which had been cut off), and see if the ambulances could be found and brought out. He soon returned with the pack animals and three of the ambulances, the other three having been broken.

And here let me say that with proper management, or with some one to look after them, the ambulances could all have been brought out, but some of the drivers acted in a cowardly and unsoldierly manner, having abandoned their teams on the first appearance
of danger. Sergeant Ray, of Company M, took one team from an ambulance he found upset and drove it in ahead of his horse. I soon received orders from Colonel Minty to join the command, which was waiting for me some three miles to the left. Upon joining the command, I learned that our brigade had been ordered to pass the Third Division and to follow Colonel Long's brigade. We now moved forward at a good walk until 2 p.m., when artillery was heard again at the front, and the entire command was halted and artillery was used upon both sides for over an hour. I was then ordered to dismount my regiment and move to the front, and, under cover of the woods, move down to the skirmish line, which was then resting on Flint River, some two and a half miles from Jonesborough, on the Macon railroad. An advance was ordered, and, with the Second Brigade, Second Division, we crossed the river, driving the enemy in all directions. The command was now halted, and the advance given to the Fourth Michigan Cavalry. We moved forward, meeting with very little opposition, and reached the railroad at 5 p.m., Captain Van Antwerp being the first man on the road. The boys went to work with a good will, pulling up the rails and firing the road. Late in the evening I was ordered to mount my command and move in an open field, to unsaddle and groom my horses, and to build a stockade in my front, but ere it was completed we were ordered farther down the railroad to guard our left flank. Here we remained until 1 o'clock in the morning, the enemy continually trying our lines. At this time I was ordered to move up the road and be ready to fall back. At 2 a.m. the command commenced moving in the direction of McDonough, the First Brigade in the advance. We moved at a rapid pace until daylight, when we halted to feed our weary horses.

At 8 a.m. the advance again sounded and we moved forward, following the Seventh Pennsylvania, who were in the advance. Heavy skirmishing had already commenced in our rear. The command struck off to the right, leaving McDonough on our left, and here I learned that we were to make another attempt on the railroad at Lovejoy's Station. We moved steadily along until within one mile and a half of the station, when I was ordered to take my regiment to the right, move down the railroad in that direction, and break the road as soon as possible, to prevent any trains coming to that point, and to lead the enemy in that direction. Tailoring forward the Third Battalion, under Captain Eldridge, as skirmishers, we moved down to the road without meeting with any resistance. I immediately sent forward the Second Battalion, Captain Van Antwerp commanding, to join the third, and move across the track and cover our front while we destroyed the road. By the time we had made a breakage in the road, heavy firing was heard on my left in the direction of the main column. Soon portions of the Seventh Pennsylvania came running into my lines, and I learned they had been attacked in large numbers by infantry, and that the enemy were driving our lines back. I immediately withdrew the Second and Third Battalions and formed the regiment to receive the enemy, should they see fit to give me a call. Up to this time we had taken up two lengths of rails from the road and had fires built for several rods each way. I received orders from Colonel Minty at this time to move back to the forks of the road as rapidly as possible, to prevent being cut off from the main column. As soon as we reached the point we were ordered into line, and to throw up a stockade in our front. While building the stockade, twenty volunteers were called for to go with Colonel Minty and bring off a piece of artillery, which had become disabled, and which the gunners had been unable to bring off. Lieutenant Purinton and company I responded nobly, every man going but enough to hold the horses, but before they reached the ground the piece was withdrawn. The fight had now become general, both in our front and rear, and we were ordered to the rear for the purpose of charging the enemy. We were formed in a large cornfield, under a hill, in a column of fours, the Fourth U.S. Cavalry on my left and the Seventh Pennsylvania on my right, in the same formation as my own command, for it was to be a charge of the entire brigade. We moved forward at a walk until we reached the top of the hill, from which point we could see the fields we were to charge over, and the enemy's lines, which were in a piece of woods some half a mile distant, and from which they were sending their balls and shells in a very unpleasant manner. Colonel Minty gave the command and led off the charge in person, and the whole command dashed across the field, over ditches and fences, sobering the skirmishers of the enemy, who were trying to get out of our way, never once halting or faltering, although the enemy were plowing the field and thinning our ranks with their artillery. Upon reaching the woods I became separated from the command, and, becoming wounded about the same time, I did not join the command again for nearly an hour. After charging through, we moved about a mile back, where a line was formed composed of the different regiments. The command was soon collected, and horses and mules belonging to the enemy, which were running in every direction, were picked up.

The charge had proved a complete success, the enemy having been completely routed. Many prisoners and one piece of artillery were captured. My wound having become troublesome, I turned the command over to Captain Eldridge. The command soon moved back, closely followed by the enemy's infantry. Some three miles back, a line was formed of the Fourth Michigan, Seventh Pennsylvania, and the Third Ohio, to hold the enemy in check, and for one-half hour we had the hardest fighting that we had seen during the raid. At last we fell back, and the whole command moved off for McDonough. We passed through the town.
about dark, during a heavy rain. At about 11 p.m. we halted, and were permitted to go into camp for the night, the first time for three days and four nights which the men had been permitted to rest or sleep. We were up and ready for an early start in the morning, and 8 a.m. the command started for Atlanta.

The regiment is deserving of great credit for the manner in which they discharged their duties during the march. Where all did so well it is difficult to select any for special praise or notice. I am under many obligations to the officers of the regiment for their cordial support throughout the march, and particularly to Captains Eldridge, Hathaway, and Van Antwerp, battalion commanders.

*Nominal list (omitted) shows 2 enlisted men killed, 5 wounded, and 7 missing; total, 14.

The 4th Michigan was positioned in the center column during the charge. Captain Burns was to the left with Thompson on his right and Minty on Thompson’s right. During the charge Mix got separated from command and sustained a wound in his hand. Captain Heber S. Thompson (Minty’s A.A.I.G.) was wounded, his horse killed and he was taken prisoner. Colonel Minty’s horse was wounded, fell, got up and continued at the head of the column. The company’s losses included two enlisted killed, five wounded and seven missing.

Dr. George W. Fish, a physician of Genesee township and, later, Flint, Michigan, enlisted in the 4th Michigan Cavalry in 1862 and was mustered out in August, 1865. He returned to private practice in Michigan after the war but died not long afterwards, either in September, 1865 or, in Tunis, Africa in 1871, where he served in the United States consulate. Dr. Fish may have been alive in 1876, when he reportedly gave an address to the Genesee County Medical Society (Archives of Michigan 1865; NPS 2007; Wood 1916:323). Despite his untimely death, his writings provide us with important information about the battle at Nash Farm. His wartime portrait is shown in Figure 32. George W. Fish, whose medical career dated back to the 1830s, entered the war as a private and was later promoted to 1st Lieutenant. He served as Surgeon for the 4th Michigan Cavalry (and Brigade Surgeon for Minty’s Brigade) throughout his period of service. Dr. Fish noted Adam Kain of Company K was killed on the 20th. At this point, it is unclear if Kain died on the Nash Farm property or elsewhere. Dr. Fish describes the Confederate’s position and provides an excellent visual of the carnage left in the wake of the charge:

The enemy’s cannon were so placed as to enable them to command the whole field. There was “cannon on the right of us,” and “cannon on the left of us,” and “cannon all around us.” The charge will never be forgotten by those who witnessed it . . . The enemy had dismounted men behind fences and temporary rail breastworks. Our men received their fire without once wavering; The front line had to dismount several times to throw down fences and demolish breastworks: . . . The ground over which our troopers charged presented ghastly evidence of the deadly nature of the struggle. Horses and riders together lying stark dead – with feet in stirrup, rein in hand, and saber clasped tightly, while the countenance of the dead warrior showed the fierceness of his passion. The keen blades of our sabers left many foemen dead, cloven down – literally through and through (4th Michigan Cavalry, Letters of Dr. George W. Fish:89-90).

Figure 32. Portrait of George W. Fish, Surgeon, 4th Michigan Cavalry (ca. 1862-1865) (Archives of Michigan 2007).

Colonel Minty wrote the following description about what happened after the charge. It was part of an ongoing debate of facts published in The National Tribune:

The facts are, that as soon as we had cut our way through the surrounding force, Gen. Kilpatrick, with the Third Division, marched for McDonough, leaving orders for me to cover his retreat. I instructed my Provost-Marshall, Capt. Dickson, of the 7th Pa., to at once turn over the prisoners to the Third Division, and I sent Lt. Simpson, of the 4th Mich., a temporary Aid on my staff, to Col. Long with
orders to dismount his brigade, form across the McDonough road, and hold the enemy in check as long as possible. When too hard pressed to fall back through the first brigade. At this moment Capt. McIntyre, commanding 4th U.S., reported that his regiment was out of ammunition, and I directed him to follow Gen. Kilpatrick.

I dismounted the 7th Pa., and 4th Mich., and placed them in position on rising ground, with an open space in front of them, the 7th Pa. and one section of the battery on the right and the 4th Mich. On the left of the road, and instructed them to construct rail breastworks as quickly as possible. The horses of both brigades were strung out on the road in our rear.

Col. Long was brought to the rear, wounded, and the command of his brigade devolved on Col. Eggleston, of the 1st Ohio, who soon after reported that Cleburne’s infantry was endeavoring to turn both of his flanks. I ordered him to fall back, and as he passed the First Brigade I instructed him to move his men on the double-quick, to mount and follow the Third Division, to take position with Lieut. Robinson’s guns on the high ground beyond the swamp in front of him . . . I found Col. Eggleston with his brigade and Lieut. Robinson with his two guns in position on the high ground beyond the swamp (Minty 1891).

After the Nash Farm Battle, the 4th Michigan Cavalry, the men and their mounts, had reached their limits by the time they arrived in Atlanta. The 4th Michigan later gained national reputation by the capture of Confederate President Jefferson Davis (Harvey 2007).

7th Pennsylvania Cavalry,
Commanded by Major William H. Jennings

Major William H. Jennings, commanded the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry in the August 20th action. Major Jennings filed two reports pertaining to the events of August 20 (OR Volume 38(2): 832-834). His reports are somewhat unique in that he provided detailed statistics on the horses lost by his cavalrymen in his regiment. By doing this Major Jennings provides us with a rare glimpse of another type of casualty of war that is not often considered in battlefield interpretation.

Major Jennings filed a report on August 27, 1864 with Captain Robert Burns A. A. G., First Brigade, Second Cavalry Division, and it is presented below:

HDQRS. SEVENTH PENNSYLVANIA VET. VOL. CAVALRY.

Pace's Ferry, Ga., August 27, 1864.

I have the honor to report that my regiment left camp on Peach Tree road, at 12 p. m. on the 17th instant, as rear guard of the brigade. Arrived at Sandtown at 8 a. m. on the 18th instant. Left Sandtown at sundown, as rear guard to the expedition, until, daybreak on the 19th, the order of march was changed. At 8 a.

HDQRS. SEVENTH PENNSYLVANIA VETERAN VOL. CAV.,

Near Blake's Mill, Ga., September 13, 1864.
m. my command was fired into from and
ambush. My Third Battalion, commanded by
Major Andress, was cut off. With two
battalions (First and Second) I proceeded down
the road about 300 yards, dismounted, and
formed a line, and deployed Company E as
skirmishers. My Third Battalion rejoined
regiment in about one hour, by making a circuit
through the woods; barricaded the road, and
remained until the entire command had passed.
Received an order from Colonel Minty to
rejoin the brigade at a cross-roads (name
unknown). The brigade moved with the Second
Battalion of my regiment, commanded by
Captain B. S. Dartt, in the advance. With the
remainder of the command I picketed the
cross-roads until the entire command had
passed. Two miles west of Jonesborough my
Second Battalion was halted, with instructions
to rejoin the brigade upon my arrival at
Jonesborough, which I did about dusk. Here we
rested for three hours; received an order from
Colonel Minty to picket along the east side of
the Atlanta and Macon Railroad. The pickets
and vedettes were scarcely established before I
received an order to draw the pickets in and
rejoin the brigade at the rallying post of the
brigade. After a half hour's halt, the brigade
moved out on the Lovejoy's road, my regiment
in the center. Four miles from Jonesborough
we halted about two hours. My regiment
moved in the advance. One mile and a quarter
from the railroad we met the enemy, turned to
the left, advanced some 300 yards, and found
the enemy enforce; dismounted and deployed
the First and Third Battalions to the right to
cover the front of the brigade. We held our
position until Long's (Second) brigade was
formed in our rear. The enemy pressed us with
a heavy force of infantry, pouring volleys of
musketry as they advanced. We succeeded in
checking them twice. They advanced with
renewed vigor, compelling us to retire in some
disorder, owing to the loss of 3 officers and
several sergeants commanding the companies.
They were soon rallied, and I attempted to
form the regiment on the right of the Second
Brigade, which was only partially successful,
owing to a part of my right being cut off by an
[unexpected] move of the enemy. The center
and left remained intact, until ordered to our
horses, leaving the line of skirmishers out.
After mounting, I drew in the skirmishers of
my regiment and replenished our ammunition.
Was ordered to form on the right of the Fourth
Michigan Cavalry, in a corn-field, which was
complied with. Upon the completion
"forward," my regiment moved with alacrity,
driving the enemy over gullies, fences,
swamps, and through dense thickets, for two
miles. As the rally was sounded by
Colonel Minty, the enemy enforce; dismounted and
remained in line, until ordered to
move to the left wing on the 22nd instant.

My loss is as follows: Captains, 2; lieutenant,
1. Enlisted men—killed, 5; wounded and
missing, 10; wounded, 11; missing, 15. Total,
44. Horses lost, 112. (OR Volume 38(2):833-
834).

Major William H. Jennings’ report imparts good
information on the condition of the horses, how
they were treated, and specifically what happened
during the engagement at Nash Farm. In April the
7th Pennsylvania received 919 fresh horses from
Nashville, Tennessee. The majority of these horses
were young and not used to military duty. Three
hundred of the enlisted men were raw recruits.
Some had never been on a horse before they
entered service four months earlier. On August 17th
and 18th the horses received one pint of feed from
the 3rd Division. Between August 19th and the 24th
the horses traveled 120 miles being fed green corn
once.

Major Jennings (7th Pennsylvania Cavalry) filed
two reports reporting 112 horses lost in action on
August 20th. Jennings also reported the regiment
traveled 902 miles, not including picket duty and
company scouting. For twenty-six days the horses
were without food. The majority of the horses died
or were abandoned to starve to death. Jennings
wrote,

. . .The enemy pressed us with a heavy force
of infantry, pouring volleys of musketry as they
advanced. We succeeded in checking them
twice. They advanced with renewed vigor,
compelling us to retire in some disorder, owing
to the loss of 3 officers and several sergeants
commanding the companies. They were soon
rallied, and I attempted to form the regiment on
the right of the Second Brigade, which was
only partially successful, owing to a part of my
right being cut off by an [unexpected] move of
the enemy. The center and left remained intact,
until ordered to our horses, leaving the line of
skirmishers out. After mounting, I drew in the
skirmishers of my regiment and replenished
our ammunition. Was ordered to form on the
right of the Fourth Michigan Cavalry, in a
corn-field, which was complied with. Upon the
completion “forward,” my regiment moved
with alacrity, driving the enemy over gullies,
fences, swamps, and through dense thickets,
for two miles. As the rally was sounded by
At least four officers in the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry penned accounts of their experiences at Lovejoy in the decades after the war. These include accounts by Colonel William B. Sipes, Captain Joseph G. Vale, Captain Heber S. Thompson, and Sergeant Thomas F. Dornblaser. Colonel Sipes, who commanded the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry, wrote his account in 1905. Another regimental history of the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry was published by Sipes in 1906. Sergeant Dornblaser, Company E, wrote a personal account of his experiences as a corporal in the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry in August 1864, which was published in 1884. Dornblaser also published another account in 1930.

One unidentified participant from Pennsylvania wrote this contemporary description of the sights and sounds of the battlefield,

At the word, “Away,” went the bold dragoons at the height of their speed. Fences were jumped, ditches were no impediment, the rattles of the sabers mingled with that of the mess kettles and frying pans that jingled at the sides of the pack mule brigade, which were madly pushed forward by the frightened darkies who straddled them (The Pottsville Miner’s Journal, September 10, 1864).

Private Samuel Waters, an orderly of Major Jennings, rode in advance of the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry and used his saber. Waters,

...rode upon a rebel cavalryman who threw up his hand to guard the blow. The saber came down, severing the hand from the arm. Another blow followed quickly, after upon the neck, and over the rebel rolled out of his saddle, the neck only clinging to the body by a thin fiber. Pvt. Douglass and Captain McIntyre of the 4th U.S., charged side by side, killing 4 or 5 with the saber; capturing a Captain and a Lieut. And 13 men, who were turned over to Douglass by the Captain, who rushed forward into the fray (The Pottsville Miner’s Journal, September 10, 1864).

After forming, his command faced to the rear, Kilpatrick directed Minty to lead the charge with his, the Second, division. Minty formed, placing the First brigade in the advance; on the right or west side of the road, in regimental columns of fours, the Seventh Pennsylvania, under Major Jennings, on the right, the Fourth United States, under Captain McIntyre, on the left and the Fourth Michigan, under Major Mix, in the center; the distance between the columns being about one hundred and fifty yards. Two companies, B and M, of the Seventh Pennsylvania, were deployed in front as skirmishers, and directed, covering the whole front, to throw down the first of the intervening fences.

As soon as the skirmishers reached this fence, the advance was sounded, followed, after passing the fence, by the ‘gallop’ and the ‘charge.’

Immediately on the charging columns showing themselves, the enemy opened with shell from four pieces of artillery in our front, and from six pieces on our right front, canister was, after the first or second discharge, substituted for shell, by the battery in our front. After the columns had passed the first fence, the infantry and cavalry opened a fire of musketry. Through this storm of shell, canister, and musketry, the charging columns, closely followed by the gallant Long and his brigade of intrepid Ohioans, in column of regiments, swept over the fields, broken though the ground was with deep gulleys or washouts, leaping over three sets of out-lying rail barricades, and, without firing a shot, reached the rebel first line, posted slightly in the rear of a fence. The rebel cavalry broke and fled in the wildest panic, just before we struck them, but the infantry stood firm. Leaping, in maddened rush at the top of speed,
our horses over the fence, and where this could not be done, dashing with impetuous force against it, the impediment was passed, without drawing rein, and, with their keen blades, the brigade in an instant cut the rebel front line to pieces! rode over and destroyed it! and assailed with renewed vigor their second line. Between the first and second lines, the columns obliged slightly to the left, and striking it thus on a half left turn, presented somewhat the appearance of a movement by platoons in ‘echelon,’ assaulting it in many places in quick succession, penetrated and sabered it to pieces as quickly as they had the first! The third line now broke and ran in utter confusion and rout, but we were soon among them, riding down and sabering hundreds as they ran.

The formation of the brigade led the Seventh Pennsylvania squarely against the left center of the infantry, the Fourth Michigan against its right, and the rebel battery, and the Fourth United States against the battery, and that part of the rebel line held by their cavalry. After cutting the enemy’s lines to pieces, the Seventh Pennsylvania and Fourth Michigan, making a full left wheel, dashed upon the artillery, sabering the gunners beside their pieces the while. Three of the pieces, all we had horses for, were brought off, and the other one was disabled by spiking, blowing up the caissons and chopping to pieces the wheels. The race and slaughter among the fleeing rebels was then continued for three miles, when Minty halted and re-formed his command, now badly scattered. It was understood that the Second brigade of ours, and the Third division, should follow the charge of Minty’s brigade in line, thus securing the full fruits of the conflict, but by some mistake, Colonel Long formed in column of companies, or battalions, and joined in the charge, following rapidly through the rebel lines, while the Third division, holding the column of fours, followed the road; hence the masses of the enemy, which had been run over by the First brigade, were not gathered up, nor was any effort made to ascertain the number of killed and wounded. Minty’s task being simply to crush and destroy the rebel force and save our own, there was no time to form up the columns of fours. He was therefore compelled to charge with his command, now a mere mass, and sabering hundreds as they ran.

August 20th—Saturday. About 10 o’clock Col. Murray was attacked from the south by a Brigade of Infantry under General Reynolds. Some little fighting but of no importance. About 3 o’clock at night moved off to the east, then south again toward Lovejoy Station. When within a mile of the railroad, met some pickets who retired, drawing on our advance. Capt. Vale was ordered to charge but met by a terrible fire, his company was driven back in confusion. Several companies were then disembarked and sent into the woods and immediately after, the 4th Regulars formed line, dismounted and had not tied their horses before a terrible fire was opened on them and the companies of the 7th in the woods, driving all back quite a considerable distance.

A number of the 7th Penna. And 4th U.S. Cavalry were killed and wounded and a few taken prisoners. Kilpatrick supposing that a large force of Infantry had come up, concluded to go back and break through the Cavalry (Ross’) which had come up in our rear. The 4th Mich. Was formed in column of fours about eighty yards on the right of the road, the 7th Penna. about forty yards, in columns of fours, the 4th U.S. in the road in columns of fours. In the rear of the 1st Brigade Long’s Brigade was formed. Murry’s command was formed on the left of the road. Just before the command was given to charge, I was sent back by Col. Minty to order Col. Long to keep his Brigade close up behind the 1st. I found him on the gallop and rode beside him for some time, while I gave my mare the rein and went ahead. The shells from Rebel Artillery exploded in the air and did no damage that I saw; just as we were on the left flank of the artillery, it opened with grape and canister, but I didn’t see what damage was done. Passing around the rear of the artillery I found myself with Lt. Fitzgerald of the 4th U.S. Cavalry leading the 4th Mich. Cavalry. Charging down a road through the woods we came into an open field directly in rear of the Rebel Artillery. As soon as I came out into the open field a rebel not more than fifty yards in front fired; the ball struck my mare full in the breast, when she reared up on her hind legs and fell over backwards dead. I extricated myself from the saddle and started for the rebel rear, here, however, I came upon about a dozen rebels. Turning back I had gone but a few steps before several bullets came whistling close by me, at the same time three or four Rebels ordered me to halt. Looking around I saw I was surrounded by Rebels and so surrendered at discretion. The Rebels, however, were more scared than I was and every minute expected our Cavalry upon them. Going at a double quick a couple of miles and picking up a rebel here and there, we hid in a thicket of woods, about an hour, the rebels fearing every minute that their whole party (now about twenty) would fall into the hands of our men. Finally after much creeping through the woods and reconnoitering in various directions, they discovered that our forces had gone. Then they took me to Lovejoy Station where they robbed

Captain Heber Samuel Thompson, Company I, 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry, kept a diary in 1864 of his involvement with the 7th Pennsylvania (Fryer 2001a). Captain Thompson, was was the brigade inspector, participated in the engagement of August 20th, where he was wounded, captured and taken prisoner by the Confederates. His diary account for August 20 is presented below:
me of my hat, boots and watch. Capt. Baglan, Inspector Genl. On Genl. Reynold’s Staff, took my boots, giving me his old shoes in their stead. Here I met Capt. McCormick, 4th U.S. Cav. Who introduced me to Capt. Thompson and Lt. White, 4th Ohio Cav. captured in the first fight with the Infantry. Met also quite a number of our Brigade prisoners. Lt. Herman and Capt. White both wounded and prisoners in same train with me, but I could not get to see them. Moved up to Jonesboro (Fryer 2001a:18-20).

Colonel Minty told Major Jennings to go left to the main road, where they found stragglers and met the 2nd Cavalry Brigade at the road trying to reform. They halted, formed a line then received orders to rejoin the brigade. They traveled approximately one mile then received orders to protect the rear. They dismounted and deployed a company as rear guard until they passed first barricade.

Louis Crossland L.C.C. (7th Pennsylvania Cavalry) wrote in The Pottsville Miner’s Journal, dated November 26, 1864:

Of the honors which the 7th PA Cavalry earned in former campaigns, the present one greatly exceeds them. In this move we went through the enemy’s rear from our right; around their line to their left, cutting through them. We captured about 200 prisoners, one piece of artillery, a train of ambulances and an ammunition train, six stand of colors, a lot of horses, arms, etc. General Jackson, commanding their cavalry, was killed by the advance charge. His uniform, saber and Hdq. Flag fell into our hands. General Ross, commanding their infantry, was wounded. The majority of the [Confederate] prisoners taken were under the influence of liquor. Our loss, when accounted for, will not exceed 400 killed, wounded and missing in the Division. Our loss in this regiment was great. Among them are the following: Captain Heber S. Thompson, Co. I, missing in action; Captain [Percy] White, Co. A, missing in action; Captain [James G.] Taylor, Co. K, missing in action; Lieut. [Chauncey] Hermans, Co. C, missing in action. None of the men from Pottsville were hurt (The Pottsville Miner’s Journal 1864).

4th U.S. Cavalry Regulars, Commanded by Captain James B. McIntyre

Captain James B. McIntyre, commanded the 4th U.S. Cavalry on August 20th. The Tennessean graduated from West Point in 1849 and there are several variations of spelling McIntire/McIntyre. It is unclear, which is the correct version. The 4th U.S. Cavalry Regulars’ column was positioned to the far left in the charge and Lieutenant Joseph Hedges rode at the head of the column. They had no carbine ammunition. Captain McIntyre died in 1867 and thus, was unable to provide much post-war analysis of his regiment’s involvement at Nash Farm. Captain McIntyre filed his report of operations in Kilpatrick’s raid from August 18-22, 1864 on August 24 with Captain Robert Burns and it is presented below (OR Volume 38(2):835).
sundown on the 22d, the regiment had no more fighting.

Captain, before closing this memorandum report I fell compelled to mention a few gallant spirits whose coolness under a heavy fire, when dismounted, and gallant bearing in the charge, deserve the highest meed of praise. Lieutenant Joseph Hedges, First Sergeants Harner, Company G, and Rossmalier, Company H, when dismounted, by their coolness and courage kept every man in his place, and Sergeant Cody, Company G, Sergeants Fay and Walsh, Company A, were particularly noticed by me for their bravery. The two latter fell in the first line. But it was in the charge, when cavalry fought in the legitimate way, that the cool, dismounted lieutenant, sergeants, and soldiers became the cavalryman, and where all were heroes it would be invidious to make distinction. Lieutenant Hedges was at the head of the column. Sergeant Rose, of Company L, led us all, and almost cut a road for the rear. Private Douglas, Company C, was conspicuous in taking and keeping prisoners. Lieutenant Roys had his horse killed by a shell.

Prior to arriving at Nash Farm, John Nourse (Chicago Board of Trade Battery) noted:

But six hundred dismounted cavalry and four guns were no match for three thousand of Pat Cleburne’s veteran infantry and we were soon again under a cross fire from both flanks. When the Fourth Regulars, Cavalry, were forced back on our right their commanding officer, Capt. McIntire, was left behind. As the command rallied at the rear of our battery the loss was noticed and word passed down the line. Instantly every man seemed to have the fury of a demon and the regiment, as one man, charged into the Rebel ranks and brought back Capt. McIntire (Nourse n.d., cited in Weigley 2006:91).

Captain Albert Potter (4th Michigan Cavalry) noted in a letter that the night before the charge the 4th U.S. Cavalry Regulars had lost about 36 men. After they formed lines and were awaiting orders to charge Ross’ brigade, a man with the 4th Michigan Cavalry (about six feet from Albert Potter) was shot. The 4th U.S. Cavalry was already “pumped up” for the fight with Ross’ brigade. The regiment had participated in an earlier charge at about 1:00 p.m. Captain McCormick, Lieutenant Sullivan and others were mowed down by one shot. Having lost so many men the night before, losing and recovering their leader prior to line up, several men shot while awaiting orders, not to mention knowing the odds were against them raised the adrenaline levels in the ranks of the 4th U.S., causing them to fight with all their might. The 4th U.S. Cavalry were considered merciless in hacking the opposing army and fought like “demons.” Albert Potter wrote:

The work commences – they [Confederates] surrender by dozens – but many of them were cut down without mercy. For my part I could not strike them after they had given up and but very few did hit them in our regiment – but the Regulars [in the left column closes to the Rebels] slashing right and left and many a poor devil’s brains lay scattered on the ground (Ruddy 2007).

Private Douglas with Company C, 4th U.S. Cavalry, rode with McIntyre and brought in 15 prisoners, four of them commissioned officers. First Sergeants Harner with Company G and Rossmalier with Company H were noted for their coolness and courage when dismounted. Sergeants Cody, with Company G, Fay, and Walsh with Company A fell in the first line. Sergeant Rose with Company L led everyone and almost cut a road for the rear and Lieutenant Roy’s horse was killed by a shell.

Robert M. Wilson of Illinois (4th U.S. Cavalry) wrote this account, originally published in 1908 in S.B. Barron’s The Lone Star Defenders: a Chronicle of the Third Texas Cavalry, Ross’ Brigade. It is a good description of the terrain and positions of the Union,

Our brigade was formed in columns of fours (four men abreast), the Fourth Regulars on the left; Fourth Michigan center; Seventh Pennsylvania on the right. Long’s brigade formed in close columns with regimental front, that is, each regiment formed in line, the men side by side, boot to boot . . . We were formed just below the brow of the hill, skirmishers on the crest of it, the enemy’s artillery to our left and front playing over us, and bullets and shells flying thick over our heads. We drew saber, trotted until we came to the crest of the hill and then started at a gallop. Down the hill we went, the enemy turning canister upon us, while the bullets whistled fiercely, and the battery away on our right threw shells. We leaped fences, ditches, barricades, and were among them, the artillery being very hot at this time. You could almost feel the balls as they passed by (Barron 1964:223).

Wilson explained why the 4th U.S. Cavalry deviated from plans then criticized Colonel Murray (3rd Cavalry Brigade) for deviating:

The Fourth Michigan and Seventh Pennsylvania went straight forward to the woods, the field over which they passed being at least a half a mile wide, with three fences, one partially built barricade, and a number of ditches and gullies, some very wide and deep.
Of course many of the men were dismounted, and upon reaching the woods they (our men) could not move fast, and they turned to the right and joined the main column in the road about one and a half miles from the start. The Fourth Regulars (my regiment, as I joined it when the charge was ordered) could not keep parallel with the rest of the brigade on account of high fences in our front, and seeing an opening in the fence we turned to the left, and struck our on the main road, coming upon the enemy in the road near their battery, and sending them flying. We were soon among the led horses of the dismounted men in their rear and among the ambulances, and a perfect stampede took place, riderless horses and ambulances being scattered in all directions, we in the midst of them, shooting and cutting madly. A part of our regiment, with some of the Fourth Michigan and Seventh Pennsylvania, dashed at the battery, drove the men from the pieces, and captured three of the guns. . . . Colonel Long’s brigade did not charge in line as it was intended, for, finding that the ground was impracticable, it formed in column and followed the Fourth Regulars. Colonel Murray’s command, instead of sweeping all to the left, as we supposed they would do, turned to the right and followed Long. Had Murray done what was expected, both sides of the road would have been cleaned out (Barron 1964:223-224).

2nd Cavalry Brigade

4th Ohio Cavalry, Commanded by Colonel Eli Long

Colonel Eli Long (1837-?), 4th Ohio Cavalry, commanded the Second Brigade during the first part of the August 20th action before he was wounded in action several miles west of the Nash Farm. Earlier in the day, Colonel Eli Long, commander of the 4th Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, was attacked by Cleburne’s Division of infantry and held nearly three hours. Long was wounded in the arm and thigh, then Colonel Beroth B. Eggleston (1st Ohio Cavalry) took over command of the 4th Ohio. Colonel Eggleston was supposed to follow the 4th Michigan but broke by fours and moved down the road behind the 4th U.S. Cavalry. Colonel Eli Long relates the details in his report dated August 23, 1864 (OR, Vol. 38(2):840). Colonel Long filed his report of operations May 26-August 22 on August 23, from Buck Head, Georgia, with Captain R.P. Kennedy, Assistant Adjutant-General, Second Cavalry Division, and it is presented below:

. . . CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the part taken by this brigade in the late expedition of General Kilpatrick in the enemy’s rear. In pursuance of orders received on the evening of the 17th, I furnished my command with rations for five days, and moved from camp shortly after midnight, reporting to Colonel Minty, of First Brigade, in charge of First and Second Brigades, with an effective force of 72 officers and 1,300 men. Lieutenant Bennett’s section of Board of Trade Battery reported for duty with me. Marched in rear of First Brigade for Sandtown, arriving there early the next morning. Remained in camp near Sandtown during the day, and reported at headquarters of Brigadier-General Kilpatrick. According to instructions received from him, marched again at sundown, the Third Cavalry Division being in column and Brigadier-General Kilpatrick commanding. My command now reduced about 100 men by the giving out of horses on the previous night’s march. Traveling all night, we crossed the Atlanta and West Point Railroad, near Fairburn, at daylight on the 10th. Having orders to destroy the road at this point, I detailed for this work the First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, who tore up half a mile of the track. Meanwhile, I had moved forward in column with the remainder of the brigade, the First Brigade holding the rear, and had not marched far when artillery was opened by a force of the enemy, who appeared in the woods on our left. I returned to the railroad, mounted the First Ohio, and formed line of battle in the woods. The First Brigade being now already engaged, I advanced my line to co-operate with the other brigade, and the enemy retired, and, after considerable skirmishing, was driven back through his camp, which we temporarily occupied. The column was then moved forward, my brigade taking the advance, and I soon found a force on my front; skirmished with them during the greater part of the day, driving them gradually toward Jonesborough until my advance guard drew near Flint River.

The enemy had taken a strong position on the farther bank and at the town, and engaged us sharply with musketry and artillery. Dismounting my command, I succeeded in pressing them slowly back, aided by the fire from our artillery, which had been directed upon their lines. We charged down to the bridge over the river, and after a few shots the regiments crossed the bridge, which had been partially torn up. An advance toward the town was then made in tow lines on each side of the road, the Fourth U.S. Cavalry and First Ohio forming the first line and the Third and Fourth Ohio the second line, the Fourth Michigan being deployed as skirmishers in front. Some little firing occurred as the lines advanced, and the command moved into Jonesborough without further opposition. I then ordered forward my led horses, mean time employing a portion of the command in destroying the railroad, burning the track at and below the town for half a mile. At dark went into camp, and rested until 11 o’clock, when I was ordered forward to the breast-works on the south side of the town, remaining here till near
I then moved ut on the McDonough and Jonesborough road, covering the rear of the column, and, arriving at Pittsburgh, marched southwardly toward the railroad again, and at an early hour my rear guard (a battalion of First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry) was attacked by a force of cavalry and driven slowly back upon the column. Upon going to the rear and finding this battalion hard pressed, I brought the remainder of the regiment into position, ordered back the Third and Fourth Ohio Regiments, and succeeded in checking and driving the enemy. A portion of his force now appeared in my front, and between the brigade and the main column, having come in on a right-hand road; but the Fourth Ohio repulsed this demonstration, and, being then ordered forward, I marched in rear of First Brigade. Arriving near Lovejoy's, on the Atlanta and Macon Railroad, I found the advance brigade engaged with an enemy in their front, and received orders to throw forward a dismounted battalion. Before this could be accomplished the skirmish line was forced back, and I dismounted my entire command, forming a line across the field on my left, and threw up a line of rail breast-works in the rear. The firing now became heavy on both sides. The First Ohio and a portion of the Fourth repulsed the enemy, then, falling back to the breast-works, held him in check until he desisted from firing, and enabled a section of our artillery to be withdrawn from the field. The command was then ordered back to their horses, to mount. Immediately after mounting I was directed to take position in rear of First Brigade, Second Division, and to follow it out (when a general charge was made shortly after), which was done. In this charge Captain William H. Scott, of First Ohio Cavalry, inspector on my staff and a most gallant officer, was severely wounded.

The column was now marched on the road toward McDonough, my brigade covering the rear. The motion of forming and moving out was slow, and the rebel infantry now closed up on my rear, a battalion of Third Ohio. The remainder of this regiment was at once dismounted to strengthen this line. The enemy presented a formidable front, extending well to my right, and parting in heavy volleys of musketry, while his artillery opened with excellent precision upon the other regiments in column on the road. Lieutenant Bennett was in position in rear, and worked his one piece with good effect. The enemy still pressed forward with increased numbers. The Third Ohio stood well their ground, pouring repeated volleys into the enemy's ranks, and only fell back from overpowering numbers. Flushed with slight successes, the rebels now made a fierce onset, charging with their main force. In front of the Third Ohio was a declivity descending to marshy ground, and beyond this a creek. The enemy were on the farther side of this creek, and, rising by the side of Colonel Seidel, of the Third, I saw the force advancing to the creek, and directed him to hold the fire of his men, protected somewhat by breast-works, until they should cross, and then to fire rapidly and with precision. Immediately after this I observed Colonel Seidel raise his hand and motion for his regiment to fall back, the cause of this being that the enemy was coming up in heavy force on his right flank and the safety of the regiment being endangered. Just at this moment I was shot in two places, my horse having also been shot a moment before, and I was then forced to retire from the field, turning over the command to Colonel Eggleston, of First Ohio. The Third Ohio fell back, and was soon after relieved by the First Brigade. The command, all now moving forward, marched through McDonough and camped that night near Cotton River. On the morning of the 21st crossed Cotton Indian Creek, swimming the horses, and camped at night at Lithonia.

Arrived at Buck Head on the evening of the 22d.

during the expedition the loss in my brigade was severe, but not great, when considering the forces it engaged. The loss inflicted upon the enemy is, of course, unknown, but he probably suffered severely.

To Lieutenant Bennett and his very efficient section of artillery much credit is due, as also to the First, Third, and Fourth Ohio for their admirable behavior under all circumstances. Officers and men all did well.

Below will be found a summary of casualties during the expedition, the major part of them occurring on the 20th.

To the officers of my staff who were with me on the expedition are due my thanks for promptitude on all occasions, and for efficient aid in the field and on the march; and I would recommended to the favorable notice of the general commanding the names of Captain William E. Crane, acting assistant adjutant-general; Captain William H. Scott, acting assistant inspector-general; Lieutenant E. S. Wood, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant H. H. Siverd, provost-marshal; Lieutenant J. N. Squire, ordnance officer; Lieutenant J. b. Hayden, acting commissary of subsistence, and Asst. Surg. John Cannan, medical director.
### Table 3. Casualty Report by Eli Long (OR Volume 38(2):841)

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**1st Ohio Cavalry, Commanded by Colonel Beroth B. Eggleston**

Colonel Beroth B. Eggleston, 1st Ohio Cavalry, assumed command of the Second Brigade once Colonel Long was incapacitated by his injuries.

Colonel Eggleston filed his report on September 11 from Blake’s Mill, Georgia, with Captain J.E. Jacobs, Assistant Adjutant-General, Cavalry Command, and relevant portions of it are presented below (OR Volume 38(2):):

> ...The brigade being stationed at Columbia, Tenn., marched from that place May 22, Colonel Eli Long commanding at that time and during most of the subsequent operations, but now absent from the command in consequence of wounds received....

> August 15, again went on reconnaissance to Decatur. August 17, marched with First Brigade for Sandtown, Colonel Minty, First Brigade, in command, and from Sandtown moved with Brigadier-General Kilpatrick for an attack upon the rebel lines of communication. Near Fairburn the Atlanta and Montgomery Railroad was destroyed for half a mile by the First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, and the brigade in or rear being here attacked by a force of rebel cavalry with artillery. Colonel Long formed in the woods and attacked the enemy. They were driven from their position, and their camp temporarily occupied. The brigade being then ordered to the advance of the column, soon encountered an enemy in front and skirmished with them during the greater part of the day, driving them to Flint River, where they took possession on the farther bank. A lively action ensued, and it was some time before they could be forced back, but while the artillery played upon their works a charge was made upon them, the river was crossed, and the rebels routed. The town of Jonesborough was then entered, and the Atlanta and Macon Railroad destroyed for some distance. On the morning after, the command moved on the McDonough road, the Second Brigade having the rear. We were attacked at an early hour by a brigade of rebel cavalry. This force was finally repulsed, and the brigade, ordered forward, to follow the first. Arriving near Lovejoy's Station the command was dismounted to re-enforce the First Brigade, which had been attacked on the railroad and was being driven back. The brigade was formed in line across an open field, and breast-works thrown up in the rear. The firing was now very heavy on both sides, but the First Ohio and a portion of the Fourth Ohio at length repulsed the enemy, then fell back to the breast-works, and held him in check until his firing totally ceased, enabling a section of our artillery to be withdrawn. The command was then ordered back to their horses. Colonel Long was subsequently directed to form column and follow the First Brigade in a charge to be made upon the cavalry in our rear. This was effected without much loss, and the brigade was ordered to take the rear of the main column, when it again formed and moved toward McDonough. Before we could move out, however, the rebel infantry closed up on our rear, attacking with great vigor the line of skirmishers formed by a dismounted battalion of the Third Ohio, and shelling the columns of the other two regiments. Lieutenant Bennett, whose section of artillery had been attached to the Second Brigade during this expedition, was in position in the rear with one piece (his other having burst), and worked it with good effect. The enemy still advanced with increased numbers and pressed the Third Ohio heavily, all of that regiment being now dismounted.

> They held their ground firmly, though suffering much, until the enemy moved a heavy force to their right, threatening to cut them off, when they were obliged to fall back. At the same time Colonel Long was wounded in two places and forced to leave the field, turning over the command to myself as next senior officer. The column was now in motion, the enemy following slowly, and we were relieved by the First Brigade.

> Marched that night to Cotton River, and, on the 21st, swam our horses across the swollen waters of Cotton Indian Creek, crossed South
River, and arrived at Buck Head on the night of the 22d.

The loss of the brigade during this expedition was in killed, wounded, and missing, 7 officers and 87 men, including Colonel Long and Captain William H. Scott, of First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, inspector on the colonel’s staff. The latter was severely wounded in the charge upon the rebel cavalry. The loss inflicted upon the enemy is unknown, but must have been considerable. We brought off 14 prisoners.…. 

Since leaving Columbia [Tennessee] the brigade’s main column has marched 716 miles and has captured 151 prisoners, including 9 officers.

Below will be found a general summary of losses during the campaign:

Recapitulation of casualties: Officers-Killed, 1; wounded, 6; missing, 4. Enlisted men-Killed, 32; wounded, 124; missing, 40.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Patten, Commander of the 1st Ohio Cavalry, filed his report on September 11th with Colonel Eggleston, Commander of the 2nd Brigade, and relevant portions of it are presented below (OR Volume 38(2):

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the First Regiment of Ohio Volunteer Cavalry in the campaign which has just come to close: On the 22nd of May this regiment left Columbia, Tenn., with the Second Brigade. On the 17th of August proceeded with brigade to Sandtown, and on the 18th started upon an expedition with General Kilpatrick to destroy the enemy’s communications in the rear of Atlanta. On this expedition the regiment was engaged vigorously on more than one occasion. On the morning of the 20th, as the expedition was marching from Jonesborough, the regiment was attacked, being the rear guard, and for two hours was under heavy fire. Same day was engaged, dismounted, with rebel infantry and cavalry near Lovejoy’s, and also in a charge, in all of which the loss was 4 killed, 13 wounded, and 2 missing. Several of the wounded have since died. Returned to Buck Head, via McDonough, Lithonia, and Decatur.

During the late move of General Sherman the regiment occupied a position on the left wing, and was not engaged, except in slight skirmishers.

The entire loss of regiment, since leaving Columbia Tenn., is 8 killed, 32 wounded, and 8 missing.

Captain William Scott, commander of the 1st Ohio Volunteer was promoted to Captain in March 1864. Five months later, the 1st Ohio was attached to Kilpatrick’s division. Captain Scott, inspector on staff, led the charge to break out and was severely wounded. He was shot through the shoulder but refused to have his arm amputated and died a few weeks later (Weigley 2006:7).

Figure 33. Charge of the First Ohio Cavalry, at the Battle of Stone’s River, Dec. 31st, 1862 (Sketched by N. Finnegon, Co. D).

In his diary, Captain Heber S. Thompson gives specific distances in the Union line up on August 20th,

The 4th Mich. was formed in column of fours about eighty yards on the right of the road, the 7th Penna. about forty yards, in columns of fours, the 4th U.S. in the road in columns of fours. In the rear of the 1st Brigade, Long’s Brigade was formed. Murray’s command was formed on the left of the road (Fryer 2001a:19).

Thompson further describes entering an open field with a “Rebel” not more than 50 yards in front of him. The Confederate fired and the ball struck Thompson’s mare. The mare reared up on her hind legs and fell over backwards dead. Getting up Thompson started for the Confederate rear and came upon a dozen Confederate soldiers. He turned to leave and the soldiers made him halt. He was surrounded but realized the Confederates were more scared than him because they expected Union soldiers to be on them at any moment. The party total was about 20. Together they crept through the woods then to Lovejoy Station where the Confederates robbed him of his hat, boots and watch. Captain Baglan, Inspector General of General Reynold’s Staff, took Thompson’s boots and gave him his old boots. Thompson met Captain McCormick of the 4th U.S. Cavalry. Captain Thompson and Lieutenant White of the 4th Ohio
Cavalry were captured in the first fight with the infantry. Lieutenant Herman and Captain White were both wounded and shared a train to Jonesboro with Thompson.

In *Four Years in the Saddle. History of the First Regiment Ohio Volunteer Cavalry* compiled by W. L. Curry in 1898 he writes about the ammunition and gives a description of Confederate positions:

Our ammunition in the First was exhausted and a detail was sent back to the ammunition wagons and got a supply in boxes and the boxes were broken open by stones, the cartridges were distributed in a few moments, much to the delight of the troopers. The brigade held this line for an hour, and during this time staff officers were busily engaged forming the led horses in columns of fours facing the rear. One of the guns of the Chicago Board of Trade Battery was disabled in a cornfield just to the left of the First, and it was haled to the rear by some troopers of the Second Brigade (I think the Third Ohio).

When the Second Brigade had driven the rebel line back and the firing had about ceased, Colonel Long was ordered to withdraw his brigade and fall back to the led horses a few hundred yards in the rear. We now began to realize that we were surrounded, and the chances began to look desperate, as our ammunition had already been pretty well exhausted, and we must cut our way through the lines. The distance between the two lines of the enemy could not have been more than three-fourths of a mile and the situation was about as follows, quoting from an article written by an officer [Lieutenant W.S. Scott] of the First U.S. Cavalry:

In the rear of the Union troops were two brigades of Cleburne’s infantry, Martin and Jackson’s divisions of cavalry were in rear of the left. A brigade of infantry and six pieces of artillery had been sent up from Macon, and were at Lovejoy Station. Reynolds’ infantry, as before stated, was along the railroad in front. There were also twelve pieces of artillery which had been sent down from Atlanta. It thus seems that there were surrounding the Union troops five brigades of infantry, eighteen pieces of artillery, six brigades of cavalry; in all, a force of twelve thousand men of the three arms. As before stated, Kilpatrick had the Second and Third Divisions, with four pieces of artillery; in all, four thousand seven hundred and ninety-eight cavalymen and seven guns. Finding himself completely surrounded by such an overwhelming force, he called his division commanders together and instructed them to cut their way out, designating as the point to strike an old deserted plantation. We see that up to this point, although his command was composed exclusively of cavalymen and field artillery, the cavalry had been fighting almost entirely as infantry, but now his troopers were to be accorded the privilege of a cavalry charge in its true sense, and their sabers, which had been allowed to rust in their scabbards during the expedition, were to be brought into requisition.

Kilpatrick, a cavalry general, remembering the mistakes which had been made on a former expedition for the same purpose, instead of scattering his troops, massed them.

The Second Division formed on the right of the road and the Third Division on the left of the road, facing toward McDonough, while the artillery, ambulances filled with wounded, and ammunition wagons were formed in the road, with orders to follow up the charging columns as closely as possible. The troops were all formed in columns with the proper intervals, as it was thought best to strike the rebel line and pierce it in several places rather than charge in line, as it was a long distance to charge, and in some places the ground was cut up by ditches and wash-outs, with two or three fences between our forces and the rebel lines. During the time the troops were forming, the surgeons and ambulance corps were busy gathering up the wounded and caring for them as best they could.

The rebels had formed two or three lines with infantry behind barricades of fence rails and logs, as it seems they had anticipated a charge, and they were not disappointed in their expectations. When our troops were forming, two batteries opened up on our lines from the front and the infantry was closing up from our now rear from the railroad. When all was ready every eye was turned intently toward the line of the barricades in front, from whence shells were now coming thick and fast, and through this line and over these barricades we must cut our way out or surrender and perhaps starve in Andersonville! Draw saber! And forty-five hundred sabers ring out as they are drawn from their scabbards, the reins are tightened, the horses are excited, with nostrils extended as it they “snuffed the battle afar off” (Curry 1984:179-181).

Using Curry’s description, the troop placement on the battlefield looked something like this:

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Colonel Charles B. Seidel, commander of the 3rd Ohio Veteran Volunteer Cavalry, filed his report on September 11th with the Assistant Adjutant-General, Military Division of the Mississippi, and relevant portions of it are presented below (OR Volume 38(2)):

...On the 18th of August started, under command of General Kilpatrick, for the expedition to the rear of Atlanta. Left Sandtown at sundown, on the 18th, and marched all night, skirmishing most of the time. 19th, fought all day and got possession of the Macon railroad at Jonesborough, at 4 p.m.; burnt the public buildings and destroyed the railroad for a distance of two miles. Left Jonesborough at 3 a.m. of the 20th, and marched to Lovejoy's Station, having a brisk skirmish in the rear on the route. At Lovejoy's met the enemy in large force, cavalry, artillery, and infantry. After fighting an hour we formed in advance for brigade and charged in column of fours on the enemy in our rear, scattering them badly, and causing them to abandon one piece of artillery, which was brought off the field by our brigade (Second Cavalry); also captured a number of prisoners. The regiment was detailed for rear guard, the column marching toward McDonough, and was attacked by one division of rebel infantry. After fighting them an hour, losing 8 men killed, 30 wounded, and 4 missing, was relieved by a portion of the First Brigade, Second Cavalry Division....The aggregate loss during the campaign is as follows: Killed, or died of wounds received in action, 1 commissioned officer, 20 men; wounded, 1 field officer, 60 men; missing in action, 2 commissioned officers, 20 men; total loss, 4 commissioned officers, 100 men.

Total number of miles traveled during the campaign, 1,021.

Lieutenant Colonel Oliver P. Robie, commander of the 4th Ohio Cavalry, filed his report with Lieutenant Colonel Robie on September 11, 1864 and a portion of it pertaining to events in the Lovejoy vicinity and excerpts from it are presented below (OR Volume 38(2)).

...Returning encamped at Buck Head, Ga., July 31, where we remained until August 18, when we joined General Kilpatrick's forces on the raid around Atlanta, at Sandtown. During this raid the regimental loss was 2 commissioned officers wounded and 2 missing, 3 men killed, 15 wounded, and 6 missing. Returning, reached Buck Head August 22, where we remained until the 25th, when the regiment accompanied the army around Atlanta, reaching Decatur September 10, 1864.
Chicago Board of Trade Battery, Commanded by Lieutenants Bennett and George Robinson

The Chicago Board of Trade Battery was part of the support supplemented by Brigadier General Kenner D. Garrard. Kilpatrick said his “battery is a good one; but the Board of Trade Battery is a better one, and I don’t have to give myself any thought about the result if they get into the action” (Nourse 1890).

Lieutenant George I. Robinson, one of two commanding officers of the Chicago (Illinois) Board of Trade Battery filed two reports on their activity in late August and early September 1864 and extracts of these are presented below (OR Volume 38(2):852-855):

HDQRS. CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE BATTERY,
Near Atlanta, Ga., August 23, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to report to the brigadier-general, chief of artillery, the following general summary of the part taken by my battery in the recent operations under General Kilpatrick upon the enemy's communications south of Atlanta:

On the evening of the 17th instant I received orders from Brigadier-General Garrard to report with four of my guns to Colonel Minty, commanding First Brigade, Second Division Cavalry, to proceed with him to join the command of Brigadier-General Kilpatrick at Sandtown, which I did, and moved with Colonel Minty's command at 2 a. m. the 18th instant, in that direction, reaching Sandtown about 6 o'clock the same morning. Camped for the day, and at sunset moved with the combined forces. Early the next morning (the 19th) we commenced skirmishing with the enemy, which was continued during the day, the enemy giving way before us. During this day my battery was called into action to a considerable extent, doing some good work, among which was the dismounting of one of the enemy's guns, the same shot killing the gunner of the rebel piece. This day I suffered no loss or casualties. The following day (the 20th), near Lovejoy's Station, on the Atlanta and Macon Railroad, my battery was brought into action and very heavily engaged with the enemy, during which one of my guns was disabled by the breaking of the trail at the elevating screw. At this time the enemy opened a severe cross-fire of musketry upon my right flank, compelling me to retire and leave this gun upon the field; but after taking a new position with my remaining three guns, I took a detachment from my command, with the assistance of a similar body from the cavalry supporting me, went to the field, and pulled this gun off, dismounted it from its carriage (which I thoroughly destroyed) and slung the piece under its limber, but my prolongs were found not sufficient strong to hold it, and I then loaded it into one of my wagons, which I happened to have close at hand, and in this way brought it off when our troops fell back. During this engagement 2 of the enemy's guns fell into our hands, 1 of which (a 12-pounder howitzer) I brought off and now have. During the withdrawal of our forces two of my guns were placed in position to assist in covering the movement, and were soon engaged with the advancing enemy, during which action one of these guns exploded, flying into fragments, rendering the carriage unserviceable, but it (the carriage) was brought off. I can attribute this explosion to no definite cause, unless the gun had been taxed beyond its capacity. It was charged at the time with a fuze shell with 2 1/2-second fuze. Having fallen back some ten or twelve miles, we came to some stream (at present unknown to me by name) over which it was found impossible to cross my wagon containing piece, owing to the very high and rapid stage of water, and the wagon was destroyed to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy, and this gun thrown into the stream and sunk in over four feet of water.

The following is a list of casualties in my command during this expedition, viz: Killed, 1; wounded, 4; missing, 1; total, 6.

As no report has been made to your headquarters of the previous actions participated in my command, I have the honor to report the following loss during the campaign to this date, viz: Killed, 3; wounded, 13; missing, 5; total, 21 men.

I am, lieutenant, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. I. ROBINSON, First Lieutenant, Commanding Battery.

Lieutenant E. P. STUGERS, Acting Aide-de-Camp.

HDQRS. CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE BATTERY.
Near Jonesborough, Ga., September 5, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to make to the brigadier-general, chief of artillery, Department of the Cumberland, the following report of the part taken by the battery under my command during the late campaign...
On August 17, p. m., I was ordered by the brigadier-general commanding division to report with our of my guns to Colonel R. H. Minty, commanding First Brigade, Second Cavalry Division, and proceed with his to Sandtown, to join the command of Brigadier-General Kilpatrick, where I arrived early on the morning of the 18th. On the evening of this day I moved with my command, with and under the command of General Kilpatrick, to break the enemy's communication south of Atlanta, being more or less heavily engaged with the enemy on the 19th and 20th of August, near Jonesborough and Lovejoy's Station, suffering a loss of 7 men and a number of horses, and having 2 of my guns disabled and lost to the service by the severe tax then and there put upon them, for the detail of which I would respectfully call attention to my previous report of the part taken by my command during this expedition. On the 22nd of August we again reached the army, and my battery was again brought together. Since then my battery has moved with the division to which it belongs, and which are undoubtedly well known to the chief of artillery.

I have the further honor to report that it is a gratification for me to be able to state that wherever I have encountered the enemy's artillery connected with his cavalry command have almost universally silenced it or caused it to be drawn from the field, and it is known that upon three different occasions one of his guns has been disabled by the fire from my guns, besides evidences of other serious damage has been brought to my notice. As the chief of artillery is undoubtedly familiar with the part taken by the Second Cavalry Division, he will readily appreciate the severe service that my battery was performed, as it has moved with it in all of its marches and countermarches and participated with it in all of its engagements.

I desire to call attention to the valuable services rendered by Second Lieutenant Trumbull D. Griffin and Second Lieutenant Henry Bennett, to whom I am largely indebted for the efficiency of the battery during the campaign.

Below please find a recapitulation of casualties during the campaign: Killed, 1; wounded (3 since died), 16; missing, 5; total, 22.

I am, lieutenant, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. I. ROBINSON, First Lieutenant, Commanding Battery.

Lieutenant E. P. STRUGES, Acting Aide-de-Camp.

In his report, Lieutenant George Robinson (1840-1909) noted the Chicago Board of Trade was under severe cross-fire of musketry from the Confederates on their right flank. The Chicago Board of Trade had to leave one gun on the field yet had three remaining guns. With a detachment assisted by the cavalry, they recovered the gun, dismounted it from its carriage and destroyed it. Then they engaged with the Confederates and recovered two of their guns, one being a 12-pounder Howitzer. One of the guns exploded into fragments. It was charged with a fuze shell with a 2 1/2 –second fuze. Overall one person was killed, four wounded, and one missing (OR, Vol. 38(2):854).

**Third Division, Commanded by Brigadier General Hugh Judson Kilpatrick**

Brigadier General Hugh Judson Kilpatrick, U.S. Army, commanded the Third Division. One of many Civil War-era images of Kilpatrick is shown in Figure 35. Kilpatrick filed several field reports on the actions of troops under his command in late August and early September 1864. Selected portions of these are presented below (OR Volume 38(2):
HEADQUARTERS THIRD CAVALRY
DIVISION,
Sandtown, Ga., August 23, 1864.

GENERAL: I learn from Lieutenant-Colonel
Klein, and from prisoners, taken by him, that the
impression at headquarters that he had done but
little damage to the railroad is erroneous. He
informs me that he effectually destroyed 3
miles of the road below Bear Creek Station;
that he tore up the track, burned the ties, and
bent the rails, that he captured a locomotive
with 9 cars loaded with supplies and car
wheels. He ran the train into a deep, long cut,
and there burned it. He is of the opinion that
the damage done to the road by his command
cannot be repaired in less than four or five
days. Between Bear Creek Station and
Jonesborough sections of track were torn up in
many places, Colonel Klein also captured a
train of 20 wagons, brought home the animals,
and destroyed the wagons. He brought in 17
prisoners; they will be forwarded to you this
evening.

I omitted to mention in my report of this
morning that one gun belonging to the Chicago
Board of Trade Battery exploded in the
engagement near McDonough; that a gun-
carriage of another gun became disabled and
the gun thrown into Cotton Indian Creek.

I will forwarded the report of division and
brigade commanders as soon as received.

J. KILPATRICK

Brigadier-General.

Brigadier-General ELLIOTT,
Chief of Cavalry, Dept. of the Cumberland.

HDQRS. THIRD CAV. DIV., DEPT. OF
THE CUMBERLAND,

On Flint River, August 31, 1864.

GENERAL: I left my camp yesterday
morning at 6.30 a. m., in advance of General
Ransom's column. Met the enemy two miles
out, and drove him back to the cross-roads, five
miles from the railroad. Here he made a
determined resistance with the assistance of
400 infantry. He was again driven back from
one position to another till a favorable
opportunity offered, when I rushed the Ninety-
second Illinois forward, saved the bridge, and
crossed in face of rifle-pits. Captain Estes and
the officers and men of the Ninety-second
Illinois are alone entitled to all the praise for
this successful exploit. Three regiments of my
division were at once crossed and pushed in to
the right of the infantry, and made a deliberate
effort to reach the road below Jonesborough.
The enemy in front of my cavalry was driven
to within 300 yards of the track, but we could
not reach it, owing to my small force and the
fact that it was quite dark. My people fell back
to a strong position, and at daylight this a. m.
recrossed the river.

I will send you during the day a nominal list
of casualties.
As soon as Major-General Howard finds his left flank is safe, by his directions I will cross the river below Jonesborough, and reach the railroad, if possible. One hour of daylight would have given me the road last evening.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. KILPATRICK,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

HDQRS. THIRD CAVALRY DIVISION, DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Near Flint River, August 31, 1864.

I have the honor to report that I forced a passage on the river half a mile below Jonesborough, drove in the enemy's pickets directly in his rear to a point within half a mile of the town, dismounted an entire brigade, sent the horses back across the river, and held position; repulsed two determined attacks of rebel infantry, and only retired when nearly enveloped, as I have since been informed, by the rebel General Cleburne's entire division. The enemy forced me from the banks of the river; crossed on a bridge constructed by my people, attacked the Ninety-second Illinois in opposition a few hundred yards from the river on the crest of a hill, was repulsed, and retired across the river. In the mean time Captain Qualman, Third Indiana Cavalry, with a strong force of picked men, dashed in on the railroad four miles below, effectually destroyed upward of 50 yards of track, burning the ties and bending the rails, and brought with his into camp about half a mile of telegraph wire. He lost 1 man killed. My people are now guarding all the roads leading from fords or bridges as far down as the point where the Jonesborough and Fayetteville road crossed the river. I will make every effort to learn the position, strength, and movements of the enemy and keep you advised.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. KILPATRICK,

Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

Lieutenant DAVID F. HOW,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD CAVALRY DIVISION,
Near Jonesborough, September 1, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to forward the following list of casualties of my command for August 31 and September 1: First Brigade - Killed, 1 commissioned officer; wounded, 7 enlisted men; missing, 8 enlisted men; 2 of this number wounded. Second Brigade - Killed, 1 enlisted man; wounded, 3 commissioned officers and 11 enlisted men; missing, 7 enlisted men. Third Brigade - Wounded, 3 enlisted men.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. KILPATRICK,

Brigadier-General.

Lieutenant DAVID F. HOW,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD CAVALRY DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Camp Crooks, Ga., September 13, 1864.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command during the recent campaign, commencing with the advance across Taylor's Ridge and battle of Resaca, and ending with the defeat of the rebel army and fall of Atlanta...

On the 15th [August 1864] crossed the Chattahoochee, took up position on the south side, fortified, and remained in camp until 5 p.m. 15th, when, with Colonel Garrard's brigade, I crossed Camp creek, tore up portions of the railroad below Sideling, and destroyed the depot at Fairburn containing government stores. On my return scouted the country between Fairburn and the enemy's position at Sandtown. I left my camp at Sandtown on the evening of the 18th instant with the Third Cavalry Division, and two brigades of the Second and two batteries of artillery, numbering 4,500 men, to attack and destroy the enemy's communications. Pickets from the Sixth Texas were met and driven across Camp Creek, and the regiment routed from its camp a mile beyond at 10 o'clock in the evening, and at 12.30 a.m. General Ross' brigade, 1,100 strong, was driven from my front in direction of East Point, and held from the road by the
Second Brigade, Third Division (Lieutenant-Colonel Jones), while the entire command passed. The West Point railroad was reached, and a portion of the track destroyed at daylight. Here General Ross attacked my rear. He was repulsed, and I moved on the Fayetteville road, were I again found him in my front. He slowly retired in the direction of Jonesborough, and crossed Flint River at 2 p.m., destroying the bridge. Under cover of my artillery Colonels Minty and Long, commanding detachments from their brigades, crossed the river and drove the enemy from his rifle-pits. The bridge was repaired, and the entire command crossed and occupied Jonesborough at 5 p.m., driving the enemy's cavalry in confusion from the town. I now learned that the telegraph and railroad had been destroyed at Bear Creel Station at 11 a.m. by a portion of my command, under Lieutenant-Colonel Klein, and that General Armstrong had passed through Jonesborough in that direction at 1 p.m. For six hours my entire command was engaged destroying the road. At 11 o'clock in the evening Colonel Murray's division was attacked one mile below the town and driven back. I now suspended operations upon the road and attacked the enemy and drove him one mile and a half. Fearing an attack from the direction of Atlanta, I moved before daylight, in direction of Covington, five miles, and halted and allowed the enemy to come up; left one brigade to engage his attention, and moved rapidly in direction of McDonough, six miles, thence across the country to the Fayetteville road, and reached the railroad one mile above Lovejoy's Station at 11 a.m. on the 20th instant. On attempting to move on the station I encountered a brigade of infantry - was repulsed; and my command only saved by the prompt and daring [bravery] of Colonels Minty and Long, and Captain Estes, my assistant adjutant-general.

The enemy were finally checked and driven back with heavy loss. We captured 1 battle-flag. At this moment a staff officer from Colonel Murray informed me that a large force of cavalry, with artillery, had attacked his rear. In twenty minutes I found that I was completely enveloped by cavalry and infantry, with artillery. I decided at once to ride over the enemy's cavalry and retire on the McDonough road. A large number of my people were dismounted, fighting on foot, and it took some time to mount them and form my command for the charge. During the delay the enemy constructed long lines of barricades on every side. Those in front of his cavalry were very formidable. Pioneers were sent in advance of the charging columns to remove obstructions. Colonel Minty, with his command in three columns, charged, broke, and rode over the enemy's left, Colonel Murray, with his regiments, broke his center, and in a moment General Jackson's division, 4,000 strong, was running in great confusion. It was the most perfect rout any cavalry has sustained during the war. We captured 4 guns (3 were destroyed and 1 brought off); 3 battle-flags were taken; his ambulances, wagons, and ordnance train captured, and destroyed as far as possible; many prisoners were taken, and his killed and wounded known to be large. My command was quickly reformed, thrown into position, fought successfully the enemy's infantry for one hour and forty minutes, and only retired when it was found that we had left only sufficient ammunition to make sure our retreat. We swam Cotton Indian Creek and crossed South River on the morning of the 21st, and reached our lines near Decatur, by way of Lithonia, without molestation, at 2 p.m. on August 22. We effectively destroyed four miles of the Macon road, from Jonesborough to Bear Creek Station, a distance of ten miles. One train of cars was fully, and a second partially, destroyed. We brought into camp 1 gun, 3 battle-flags, and a large number of fresh horses and mules and about 50 prisoners. My entire loss in killed, wounded, and missing will not exceed 300 men. Two hundred of this number were killed and wounded. Only the dangerously wounded were left with the enemy.

While it is most difficult to single out instances of gallantry, I cannot close this report without mentioning to the favorable consideration of the major-general commanding, the following named officers whose gallant conduct attracted my attention on so many occasions: Colonel Minty, commanding two brigades from the Second Cavallery Division, for his untiring energy through the march, and the consummate skill displayed at the moment when we were repulsed at Lovejoy's Station, and the subsequent gallant ride of his command over the enemy's barricades, deserves immediate promotion. Colonel Long was equally distinguished, and well deserves the promotion he has received. He was twice wounded, and yet remained on the field. Captain Estes, my assistance adjutant-general, and my two aide, Lieutenants Wilson and Northrop, deserve every consideration for the great service rendered me throughout the expedition. Colonel Murray, commanding division, and the brigades of Colonels Jones and King were greatly distinguished at the charge of Lovejoy's Station. Officers were never more gallant, and skillful; men were never more brave. They well deserve a success so great.

August 25, I moved with my command to Steven's Cross-Roads, one miles and a half beyond Union Church; went into camp, covering the entire country in the front and the right flank of the Army of the Tennessee, which had made its first day's march with the grand army in its movement upon the enemy's communications. At 6 a.m., August 26, the command moved in advance of, and upon the right flank of, the Army of the Tennessee, masking its movements, drove the enemy's cavalry, under Brigadier-General Ross, to and beyond the railroad, and went into camp, August 27, on the right of the army and near
Fairburn. In the movements upon the Macon railroad at Jonesborough my command had the advance, and, with the assistance of two regiments of infantry, the Second and Seventh Iowa Regiments, Majors [Hamill and Mahon] commanding, steadily forced the enemy back to within three miles of Renfroe Place, the cavalry moving on the right flank up to this point. Here the Ninety-second Illinois Mounted Infantry, under the direction of Captain Estes, my assistant adjutant-general, pushed in ahead of the infantry, rushed the enemy back to and across Flint River, saved the bridge, crossed and took possession of the rifle-pits beyond, a brigade of infantry having been thrown across, and pushed up the hill in direction of the station to the left of Jonesborough. I rapidly crossed three regiments of cavalry, moved in, and drove the enemy from the high hills on the right, while Captain Estes, with the Ninety-second Illinois, made a daring but unsuccessful attempt to reach the railroad. This attack, made as night was closing in, and although with considerable loss, yet resulted most favorably to the success of the operations during the night and the following morning. The brigade of infantry having been pushed in well toward the station far on the left of Jonesborough, this determined attack of cavalry, dismounted, a mile to the right, with considerable skirmishing between, forced the enemy to believe that a heavy force of infantry had crossed, and there waited instead of making an attack, which might have proved disastrous. My cavalry was relieved by infantry during the night, recrossed Flint River the following morning, and moved to Anthony's Bridge, one mile and a half below. The bridge having been burned, was quickly rebuilt, and a portion of the command passed over and was pushed well in upon the enemy's flank and rear in the direction of the railroad.

During the day a daring and successful attempt was made by Captain Qualman (Third Indiana Cavalry), with a portion of the Third Indiana Cavalry, to reach the railroad and telegraphed. A section of the road was torn up and one mile or telegraphed wire was brought away, with the loss of 1 man killed. At 3.30 p.m. of the same day (August 31) the enemy made a determined attack upon the infantry on my left. It seemed to be the intention of the enemy to break or turn our right flank. At first he entirely ignored my command. This I determined he should not do. Five regiments of cavalry, dismounted, were in position behind barricades directly in the flanks of the charging column. My artillery was in a most favorable position. I directed the artillery to commence firing on the advancing column of the enemy, and the cavalry upon the opposite side of the river to meet and attack him. This attack was determined and gallantly made. The enemy was forced to turn and meet it. He moved down in heavy columns, twice charged and was twice repulsed, but finally forced my people to retire from their rail barricades and across the river. A portion of the enemy succeeded in crossing, were met by the Ninety-second Illinois Mounted Infantry dismounted, and repulsed. We held the bridge until relieved by the infantry under General Blair in the afternoon of the following day, when we moved to Glass' Bridge below Lovejoy's Station, repaired the bridge, which had been burned by the enemy, crossed, and maintained our position upon the opposite side for two days, constantly annoying the enemy's flank and rear, repulsing with loss every attack he made, and formed a junction with the right of the infantry of the Army of the Tennessee near Lovejoy's Station, September 3; we remained in this position until 11 o'clock September 5, and then moved back, first to Anthony's Bridge, then to Red Oak, and finally to Sandtown, having covered the rear and flank of the Army of the Tennessee in its retrograde movement from Lovejoy's Station to its present position.

Accompanying this report will be found a tabulated list of the casualties of this command during the campaign, as well as of prisoners and property captured.

Before closing my report, I desire to assure the chief of cavalry that the officers and men of my command have endeavored to zealously and faithfully discharge every duty assigned them, and I only hope that he and those my seniors in rank are as well satisfied with my conduct and operations as I am with the efforts of my command.

Respectfully submitted.

J. KILPATRICK,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Vols.,
Commanding.

Captain J. E. JACOBS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
List of killed, wounded and missing in the Third Cavalry Division…during recent campaign.

<table>
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<th>Command</th>
<th>Killed Officers</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Wounded Officers</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Missing Officers</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Total Officers</th>
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<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Brigade</td>
<td>1 17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>183</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>7 24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>18</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

J. KILPATRICK,
Brigadier-General, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding.


Someone using the initials “M.W.H.” wrote to The National Tribune (published March 26, 1891) that after a dialog General Kilpatrick and Colonel Murray led the charge of the 4th Regular Cavalry. Kilpatrick had died a decade sooner (1891) and Minty was one of the individuals who wrote in response. Minty responded to the article by saying this was imaginary and his [Minty] brigade led the charge.

Kilpatrick along with Private William Bailey (4th Michigan Cavalry) followed the 4th Regulars. The 2nd Brigade broke into columns and followed the three charging regiments. The Chicago Board of Trade Battery followed the Ohio regiment (which was in the rear of the Fourth Regulars on the McDonough road.) Colonel Murray commanded the 3rd Division and followed the Chicago Board of Trade. According to Minty’s description the troop positions on the battlefield would have looked something like this:

<table>
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<th>Minty’s Brigade</th>
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<tbody>
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54
Kilpatrick and Pvt. William Bailey Followed 4th Regulars

2nd Brigade of Ohio Regiments (in rear of 4th Regulars)

Chicago Board of Trade (in rear of Ohio regiments)

Colonel Murray – commanded Third Division, followed Chicago Board of Trade

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Klein, 3rd Indiana Cavalry, commanded the First Brigade on August 20th (Figure 36). Klein filed two reports with Brigadier General W.D. Whipple, Assistant Adjutant-General and Captain L.G. Estes, from Klein’s headquarters at Sandtown, Georgia on August 21st and August 23rd of operations August 18-20 (Kilpatrick's raid) and extracts of both are presented below (OR Volume 38(2):868-869).

Lieutenant Robert Klein was not at Nash Farm on August 20th because he was part of the group that divided to create a diversion.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command in the late expedition against the enemy's communications in the rear of Atlanta:

At 11 p.m. of the 18th instant, with my command of 13 officers and 292 men, I left the main column at Stevens' farm, seven miles from the railroad at Fairburn. Agreeably to instructions, I tore up a portion of track and telegraph wire, and at 2 a.m. 19th moved on Fayetteville road, reaching that place at 7 a.m., meeting a small force and capturing some prisoners, 40 mules, and 20 wagons, the latter of which were burned. Moved on Griffin road to near Mount Zion Church, turned to left, crossed Flint River, eight miles from Fayetteville and eight miles from Fayette Station, on Macon railroad, at which point I intended striking, but, by a mistake of our guide, struck railroad four miles above Fayette, at Bear Creek Station at 11 a.m.; commenced tearing up track and telegraph wire, destroying over 1 solid mile of track at intervals of three miles, tearing road toward Lovejoy's Station, and 3 miles of wire, taking it down, reeling, and hiding it. The railroad ties were piled up and iron laid on them and burned. At Bear Creek captured a train of 9 cars loaded with whisky, meal, wheat, lard, and railroad trucks. This train was run off railroad in a deep cut, and burned. When three miles toward Lovejoy's heard another train coming and succeeded in cutting it off between Lovejoy's and the destroy track, but I found the guard of infantry too strong, and was disposing of my force for a united attempt to take it, when a cavalry force came in on my flank, compelling me to defend myself in that quarter. In charge some prisoners were captured, from whom I learned that Ferguson's and Armstrong's brigades of cavalry were upon me, and Reynolds' infantry brigade also advancing. Under the circumstances, I deemed it prudent to get out of there. I had one road open, across the bridge I had come over it the morning, or I could have gone toward Griffin, which would have been certain capture, for I had given up
the prospect of meeting the remainder of the expedition. Not being able to hear from them from prisoners captured on the train through from Chapman’s or from Ferguson’s men I decided to fall back on the road I had come, and put my decision in immediate execution, leaving railroad at 4.30 p.m. 19th. When I reached the bridge across Flint River, I found it torn up by the enemy; but a friendly rail fence supplied the place of plank, and my column was soon over and the bridge in flames. When within two miles of Fayetteville the enemy came in on my rear, via the ford road from Lovejoy’s to Fayetteville, and kept up a brisk fire with my rear guard, warming up as we neared the town, when they opened on us in front, being posted in front and in the town. We scattered them by a saber charge, and were not much harassed by them afterward. I passed through Fairburn at 7.30 p.m., one hour and a half after and infantry force, intending to intercept us, and moved farther down on anticipation of meeting us there. I remained the balance of the night near Stevens’ farm, reaching Sandtown at 11 a.m. 20th instant. I brought in with me 17 prisoners and 40 mules. My casualties were 2 men wounded and 3 captured (OR Volume 38(2):868-869).

Figure 35. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Klein, 3rd Indiana Cavalry (Pickerill 1906:24).

3rd Cavalry Division, Commanded by Colonel Eli H. Murray

Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. King, 3rd Kentucky Cavalry, commanding the Third Brigade, filed his report from his headquarters near Sandtown, Georgia on August 23\(^{rd}\) of operations from August 18-22 (Kilpatrick's raid) with Lieutenant J.S. McRea, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, and an extract is presented below (OR Volume 38(2):893):

.... Arriving at Fosterville, we found the brigades of Colonels Minty and Long heavily engaged with what was supposed to be a large force of the enemy’s infantry. The Third Brigade was ordered into line on the left, and partially in rear of these two brigades. Shortly afterward the Ninety-second Illinois Mounted Infantry was ordered from their first position and assigned by Colonel Murray to a different part of the field. The lines of the Third and Fifth Kentucky Cavalry were in a short time changed for the purpose of holding in check any movement of the enemy in front of my brigade until our forces could form for the purpose of forcing their way through the enemy's lines. Preparations for this movements being completed, the Third Brigade was ordered to form for the charge. Never did men obey an order with more alacrity or determination. When the word was given to charge they moved forward with enthusiasm, but with the utmost precision. In fifteen minutes after the charge they were in column ready for another.

To the officers and men of the brigade I returned my thanks for their gallant conduct on every occasion and for the cheerfulness with which they bore the fatigues of the march.

Lieutenant Colonel Fielder A. Jones, commander of the 8\(^{th}\) Indiana Cavalry and who commanded the Second Brigade, filed his report on September 9, 1864 for operations July 9-September 8, 1864 with Captain Estes, Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Cavalry Division (OR Volume 38(2):875).

....At dark on the evening of the 19\(^{th}\) [August] I received orders from Colonel Murray, commanding division, to move through the town, take up position, and await orders. Remained just outside the south limits of the town until 9 o’clock, when I received orders to move down the railroad toward Griffin, clear the front and flanks of the Third Brigade, which was detailed to tear up the railroad track. Moved down the road about a half mile, when I suddenly found myself confronted by a strong force of the enemy posted behind barricades. My advanced guard was checked, and then driven back. I dismounted the Eighth Indiana and Second Kentucky, with the Tenth Ohio on the right and in the road mounted, and the Third Kentucky dismounted on the left, and charged the barricade, but was unable to dislodge the enemy. It was dark, and we could only ascertain the position of the enemy by the line of his fire, which enveloped the Second Kentucky and Eighth Indiana in front and both flanks at point-blank range. Under orders from
Colonel Murray, I withdrew my command, and joined the column on the McDonough road. Marched all night, and early next morning overtook the rear of the column, skirmishing lightly with the enemy. About 9 a.m. of the 20th arrived to within two miles of Lovejoy's, and found the head of the column heavily engaged with the enemy, while I was vigorously attacked in rear by Ross' and Armstrong's cavalry. The rear guard, under direction of Captain Lyon, acting inspector-general on my staff, barricaded the road and held the enemy in check long enough for me to form my command on an advantageous position and barricade it. Captain Beebe's battery was placed in position, covered by a barricade, and my command dismounted, was placed in line along a crest, and immediately were engaged with the enemy, easily holding him off. About noon was informed by Colonel Murray that our forces were to charge the enemy in rear, and I was ordered to mount my command and charge the road directly to the rear. Within three minutes from the time I received the orders my command was mounted and commenced the charge, with Eighth Indiana in advance, Second Kentucky and Tenth Ohio. Two companies, E and F, Eighth Indiana, charged and captured 1 piece of artillery, driving the gunners from the piece. Captain Lyon, of my staff, had his force shot while at the piece. We were unable to bring it off, as the enemy was not yet dislodged from our front. Three men were left with it, however, and remained with it until brought off. Moved back with the division to Sandtown. On the evening of the 26th of August Major Young reported to me with the First Brigade, and acted under my orders until September 7. At 11.45 p.m. August 26, in obedience to orders, I moved out, and occupied a position near Camp Creek. On the 27th advanced to Stever's Cross-Roads, and sent Captain Qualman, with 100 men, to Fairburn, to rejoin the column at or near Red Oak. He met some resistance, but, charging with the saber, drove everything before him, and rejoined the column at Ann [New] Hope Church. The Tenth Ohio was skirmishing heavily at this point all day, losing some horses and a few men wounded. On the 28th moved out on Fayetteville road two miles, to cover operations of infantry on the railroad....On the 8th of September arrived in camp at this place, where the Eighth Indiana and Second Kentucky found their baggage the first time for two months.

I cannot close this report without calling attention to the gallant conduct of Major Thomas Graham and Captain Thomas N. Baker, Eighth Indiana, in the fight with General clanton on the Rousseau laid; to Major Herring, Captains Reeves, Stanley, and Boyer, Eighth Indiana; Major Star, and Captain Park, Second Kentucky, on the McCook raid; and Lieutenant-Colonel Sandersen, Major Tahayer, Captain Norton, and Lieutenant J. M. Harkness, Tenth Ohio; Majors Herring, Graham, and Gordon, Eighth Indiana; Major Star and Captain Park, Second Kentucky, for gallantry on Killpatrick's raid.

My thanks are also due Major Young, commanding First Brigade; Captain Qualman, Third Indiana; Major Thayer and Captain Paisley, Tenth Ohio Volunteer Cavalry; Majors Herring and Graham, Eighth Indiana; Captain Park and Lieutenant Nall, Second Kentucky, for soldierly conduct in the fight with Cleburne's division; August 31 Captain park was wounded in the discharge of his duty, as commanding officer of detachment Second Kentucky; is a brave, dashing officer.

I also respectfully call attention to the fact that many of the Eighth Indiana were serving overtime, and, to my knowledge, not a murmur or complaint. On the contrary, they refused to go to the rear.

To the members of my staff I owe a debt of gratitude for the promptness and zeal with which they executed my every order. Captain Lyon, acting inspector-general; Lieutenants Norvell, Stillwell, and Winters, aides, and the lamented Lieutenant Crooks, proved themselves competent staff officers. Captain Lyon and Lieutenant Stillwell will soon retire from the service, and I can truly say that the army will lose two of its finest offices, and the Second Brigade will regret their loss from our ranks, but extend to them our warmest wishes for their success in civil life.

Doctor Thompson, brigade surgeon, was very prompt in caring for the sick and wounded of my command, and has the thanks of all officers and men of the brigade.

The casualties of the command are as follows:

Have not been furnished with list of casualties of First Brigade. My command is thoroughly exhausted and sadly in need of rest...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Killed Officers</th>
<th>Wounded Officers</th>
<th>Missing Officers</th>
<th>Total Officers</th>
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<tr>
<td>8th Indiana</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>39</td>
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<td>10th Ohio</td>
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<td>29</td>
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<td>2d Kentucky</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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*Note: Jones' tabulation for the total of men killed, wounded and missing is apparently in error. Adjusted calculations are shown.*

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas W. Sanderson, commanding the 10th Ohio Cavalry, filed his report and relevant portions of it are presented below (OR Volume 38(2):886).

A summary of operations of the Tenth Ohio Cavalry, Second Brigade, Third Cavalry Division, from the 2nd day of May, 1864, to the 8th day of September, 1864. As the Second Brigade was passing this point an attempt was made by the enemy to intersect the column, and the Tenth Ohio, being the rear regiment, only succeeded in passing after a sharp contest. At sunset of this day [August 19, 1864] the command succeeded in driving the enemy from Jonesborough, on the Atlanta and Macon Railroad. On attempting to moved southward from this place, the Tenth Ohio in advance, the column came upon a strong barricade hidden by the darkness, behind which the enemy lay in strong force, and from which the advance was forced to recoil by the murderous fire they received. A second attempt to pass the point was made with the like result, and the loss of valuable men killed and wounded. Failing to effect a passage here the command, by a rapid movement in another direction, succeeded in reaching the railroad at Lovejoy's Station. Here, however, before much had been accomplished in destroying the track, an attack was made by the enemy in heavy force, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, which succeeded in surrounding our position. A charge was ordered, and succeeded so far as to drive the enemy from his artillery, throw his cavalry into utter confusion, and enabled the command to pass on its way with little loss and in perfect order. From here the column moved by easy stages, by the way of Decatur, to the ridge of our army, and thence to Sandtown, arriving August 23. On the 27th of August at 1.30 a.m., the Tenth Ohio Cavalry, with the division, marched from Sandtown, Ga., prepared for an advance upon the enemy's lines. . . .

Also in Sanderson’s report the following were commended for gallantry on Kilpatrick’s raid:

- **10th Ohio**: Lieutenant-Colonel Sanderson, Major Tahayer, Captain Norton, and Lieutenant J.M. Harkness;
- **8th Indiana**: Majors Herring, Graham, and Gordon;
- **2nd Kentucky**: Major Star and Captain Park.
- Brigade Surgeon: Doctor Thompson.

Sanderson wrote the following on September 9, 1864:

. . . About noon was informed by Colonel Murray that our forces were to charge the enemy in rear, and I was ordered to mount my command and charge the road directly to the rear. Within three minutes from the time I received the orders my command was mounted and commenced the charge, with Eighth Indiana in advance, Second Kentucky and Tenth Ohio. Two companies, E and F, Eighth Indiana, charged and captured 1 piece of artillery, driving the gunners from the piece. Captain Lyon, of my staff, had his force shot while at the piece. We were unable to bring it off, as the enemy was not yet dislodged from our front. Three men were left with it, however, and remained with it until brought off . . .
Murray filed his report from his headquarters at Camp Crooks, Georgia on September 14th of operations May 13-21 and August 18-23, 1864 (OR Volume 38(2):862-864):

I have the honor to report the operations of the Third Cavalry Division, Department of the Cumberland, from the 13th [May] to the 21st of May [August]? …On the 18th August, with the Second and Third Brigades of the Third Cavalry Division, commanded respectively by Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, Eighty Indiana Cavalry, and Lieutenant-Colonel King, Third Kentucky Cavalry, left Sandtown. The brigade of Colonel King in the advance met the enemy's pickets at Camp Creek, driving them to Stevens' cross-Roads. Here Colonel Jones taking the advance, and from there distant about one mile we again encountered the enemy, driving them down a cross-road. Here Colonel Jones engaged them with a severe fight until the whole column passed, when he joined the rear. Colonel King's brigade again in advance of the column, driving the enemy before them. In crossing the Atlanta and West Point Railroad, Colonel Jones found the enemy on our flank, who succeeded in entirely severing the column and cutting him from it. Charging through the enemy under a heavy fire of small-arms and artillery, he again it, the command of Colonel Minty taking the advance. I brought up the rear, moved with the column to Jonesborough. By direction of the general commanding the expedition, I ordered Colonel Jones to move and take position in the south part of town, afterward to move down the railroad, holding the front and watching the flank while the brigade of Colonel King destroyed the railroad. This work was done quickly and effectually for about one mile and a half. Colonel Jones found the enemy fully one mile and a half from the southern limits of the town. Here was a severe fight. King's brigade immediately prepared for action. The Fifth Kentucky joined on to Jones' left, the Ninety-second supporting Jones and the Fifth covering his right flank. The enemy were here in force, and barricaded. The darkness of the night would of itself make it difficult to dislodge even a small force. With the disposition above named my whole command advanced, and after quite a severe fight it was found impossible to dislodge the enemy. His force, as afterward ascertained and reported by Colonel Jones, was two brigades of cavalry, under Armstrong and Ross, and one brigade of infantry, under Colonel … The conduct of the men here was shortly of high commendation. Everything calculated to confuse men we had here to contend with - an utter ignorance of the formation of the ground, the darkness of the night, with heavy rain, and the only information of the enemy's position was gained by receiving his volleys of fire. Withdrawing, we joined the column on the McDonough road; marched till daylight, and, after feeding, moved with the column in direction of Lovejoy's, the rear of Jones' command skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry, reaching Fosterville in advance. Forces under Colonel Minty were heavily engaged. King's brigade immediate formed for their support and also holding a line to his left, Jones on a commanding elevation covering our rear. Both he and King immediately barricaded their front. Jones was soon attacked heavily. With his position the enemy were kept at bay. Captain Beebe, Tenth Wisconsin Battery, here reported with his four guns to Colonel Jones. The led horses of the whole command were immediately collected to the rear of King's line. The enemy's shots, both from front and rear, covered our entire lines. General Kilpatrick ordered me to cover the withdrawal and mounting of Minty's command, which was done by King's brigade; also to hold the rear, now becoming our front, which was done by Jones, until due preparations were made to enable us to charge the enemy. Everything ready, Jones' men mounting and King's withdrawing from the enemy upon one side, but to meet him upon another. The order was given to charge, Jones' brigade charging down the road, King's on his left, when the most terrific, yet magnificent, charge ever witnessed was made. The enemy's guns opened with canister, but Beebe, true as steel, covered our onset, following Jones after our men had crossed and trampled the enemy's lines, myself charging with the advance of the Eighth Indiana; passed on to the enemy's cannon, which they held until we were within a few yards of them. No movements could have been more properly executed than they were throughout the whole charge. The saber and the horses' hoofs were about our only weapon. My command was soon massed in column in the rear. With orders, I moved for McDonough…

Murray, filed another report from his headquarters at Camp Crooks on September 10th, which was directed to Captain L.G. Estes,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General (OR Volume 38(2):888-892):

CAPTAIN: I have the honor herewith to transmit a report of the operations of the Third Brigade, Third Cavalry Division, in the late summer campaign.

The brigade, composed of the Third and Fifth Kentucky Cavalry, and Ninety-second Illinois Infantry, mounted, at the moment of the commencement of the campaign was unorganized, the Ninety-second Illinois and the non-veteran portion of the Third Kentucky being the only representative, holding an exposed and extended line to the west of Ringgold, Ga. . . . After a sojourn of some days moved with the division by means of a pontoon across the Chattahoochee at Sandtown, which resulted in driving the enemy and striking the Atlanta and West Point Railroad by Lieutenant-Colonel Klein, of the First Brigade, at Fairburn. Returning to Sandtown, we immediately prepared for the expedition, which resulted in striking the Macon railroad and the circuit of Atlanta by the cavalry command, under General Kilpatrick.

Upon his assuming command of the expedition, the command of the Third Division falling upon me, Lieutenant-Colonel King, Third Kentucky Cavalry, assumed command of my brigade. (For the operations of the brigade during the raid see Lieutenant-Colonel King's accompanying report.) On the return of this expedition, again taking command of my brigade, and at once prepared it for the general move. At midnight of the 27th moved in the direction of the West Point railroad, taking up position on Camp Creek for the night. In the morning moved to Bethel Church, holding a barricaded position there that night. At 7 a. m. on the morning of the 28th moved direct for the railroad, striking it at a point midway between Red Oak and Fairburn, the Third Kentucky driving the enemy's cavalry before them. My command, with a section of artillery under command of Lieutenant Stetson, Tenth Wisconsin Battery, held a position faced toward East Point. Parts of each regiment were engaged skirmishing with the enemy. Upon the arrival of the Army of the Tennessee I moved to a position on their right flank, the men held by the reins, the men maintained the position, but finding it impracticable to charge these second works, mounted, and being relieved by the infantry line, the Ninety-second was withdrawn. While here the enemy's guns shelled the whole command with little damage. Moving forward two miles with the infantry advance, and on their right flank, were subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy's guns, but owing to the formation of the ground they did us no damage. Here Lieutenant Stetson was engaged in a heavy artillery duel. After the dislodgment of the enemy we moved forward to Flint River. The bridge across that stream having been taken possession of by the Ninety-second Illinois with but little resistance, and a small command of infantry having been pushed across the river, my command crossed, pushing forward as fast as possible, and by a difficult road leading to the southwest part of Jonesborough. By direction of the general commanding division, the Ninety-second Illinois had dismounted, moved forward, and very soon were hotly engaged with the enemy's infantry. The advance of the Third Kentucky hastened to their assistance, the Fifth Kentucky following. It was just twilight. Here was a most bloody conflict, and here so well and so manfully did our men do their work, charging a hill held possession of by the enemy, and under a heavy across-fire, after ammunition was expended, holding it until ordered to withdraw; engaged thirty minutes with 200 men. They lost 2 killed, and 1 officer and 21 men wounded. The part taken and the noble bearing of these men is a source of just pride, for which too much praise cannot be given them. Separated from the division, my command remained on the east side of the river, holding a line to the right of Major-General Logan's then forming. Relieved by a portion of his command at daylight next morning, recrossed the river, and, after feeding with the division, moved to Anthony's Bridge. Major Breathitt, with a battalion of the Third Kentucky, moved to a burnt bridge at the crossing of the main road from Fayetteville to Jonesborough, skirmishing and driving the enemy across the river and holding the ford. Lieutenant-Colonel King, of the Third Kentucky, with the remaining two battalions of his regiment, moved to a ford one mile and a half below Anthony's Bridge. Our division being attacked by Cleburne's division of rebel infantry, and after a most severe engagement and the entire exhaustion of ammunition on the part of our men engaged,
they fell back from the bridge. My brigade then became the front, and held its position until ordered back to camp, Colonel Baldwin, of Fifth Kentucky Cavalry, covering the rear. Here the enemy had no anxiety attacking, and their demonstrations on my line were very weak. Picketing that night the scene of the engagement.

The next morning took possession of our line of barricades on the east side of the river. Remained in position at the bridge that day. With the exception of the picket-firing by the Fifth Kentucky and artillery firing by Lieutenant Stetson, nothing of importance occurred that day. Being relieved by the Seventeenth Army Corps arriving at that point, I retired, going into camp on a road leading to Gals' Bridge. The next morning moved to that point, took possession and held the bridge that day, night, and also next day. Colonel Atkins, Ninety-second Illinois, rejoining his regiment, assumed command, relieving Major Woodstock, who had so efficiently commanded it during its many engagements. At this point the enemy attempted to drive us away, and brought artillery to bear upon us, but our battery proved too much for them, and drove their artillery from the position they held and from whence they had so earnestly shelled us. Their fire, however, killed several horses. The position held by Colonel Atkins with Ninety-second was such that their attempts at dislodging him were ineffectual.

On the night of the 18th my command moved in the rear and right flank of the rebel army, and joined the division on the right of the Seventeenth Army Corps near Lovejoy's Station, which position we held until the night of the 5th, when withdrawing to Flint River, at Anthony's Bridge, taking position, remained until the 7th, when, forming the rear guard of the division and army, we moved in the direction of Red Oak, with but little skirmishing by the Third Kentucky. No force followed to interrupt or observe. On the 8th Colonel Baldwin moved to the left flank of General Howard's army, to meet a regiment of rebel cavalry reported there. The remainder of the brigade moved to our present encampment near Mount Gilead. Colonel Baldwin joined the brigade September 9th.

Colonel Eli H. Murray, who commanded the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Cavalry Division later wrote in his report commending the valor of several cavalry officers under his command in the August 20th action. Murray wrote,

... Captain A. G. Sloo and Lieutenant Kelly, Third Kentucky Cavalry, for their gallant conduct in the charge at Lovejoy's, which resulted in the capture of two pieces of artillery. I also take pleasure in commending the gallantry of Captain E. V. Brookfield, commissary of subsistence, Third Cavalry Division, in this charge (Ehistory.com 2007, OR Volume 44(1):369).

Murray also wrote these commendations:

The honorable mentions I shall make and thanks to be returned are to Colonel Smith D. Atkins, Ninety-second Illinois, and through him to all his officers and men; to Colonel Baldwin, Fifth Kentucky Cavalry, and to his officers and men; and also to Lieutenant-Colonel Baldwin, Fifth Kentucky Cavalry, is due much for his bold and daring conduct and reliable information.

The efficiency and zeal of my staff officers throughout the whole campaign is eminently praiseworthy. Lieutenant Stetson, Tenth Wisconsin Battery, well performed his part throughout (OR Volume 38(2):892).

92nd Illinois Mounted Infantry, Commanded by Colonel Smith Dykins Atkins (1836-1913) [Major Albert Woodcock]

The 92nd Illinois Mounted Infantry was commanded by Colonel Smith Dykins Atkins (1836-1913) but Colonel Smith was absent from the events of August 20, 1864. Major Albert Woodcock, who commanded the 92nd Illinois Mounted Infantry in the August 20th action, filed his report from his headquarters near Sandtown, Georgia on August 25th of operations from July 19-September 2 with Lieutenant J.S. McRea, A. A. A. G., 3rd Brigadier, 3rd Cavalry Division, and relevant portions of it are presented below (OR Volume 38(2):897).

In obedience to orders, I have the honor to submit the following report:

Colonel Smith D. Atkins was relieved from command of the Ninety-second Illinois Volunteer Mounted Infantry, by order of Colonel Murray, commanding brigade, on the 19th of July, 1864; I, being the ranking officer present, assumed command of the regiment....Moved out at 6 a.m. of the 18th of August, and marched to within five miles of Atlanta and Macon Railroad, between Atlanta and East Point, in quest of Jackson's rebel division. Not finding Jackson, we returned to Sandtown, crossed the river, and went into camp. On the 17th of August we lay in camp. On the 18th we moved out on the raid around Atlanta. The part taken by our regiment in this raid i have reported, and have made full report of the movements of the regiment, while I was in command, since the 18th of August, 1864.
Sergeant Charles Edwin Cort, Company H, 92nd Illinois Mounted Infantry, wrote this description of the battle:

Pretty soon we got the word that we were surrounded by superior numbers of inft and Cvy [Infantry and Cavalry] and were to cut our way out. The 92nd were to take the rear of the artillery and the cavalry the front. By this time the Rebs had rind [runned?] one gun up very near the top of the hill and began to open on us. The 4 reg’s led the charge. On the right Co. Murray led the 3d and 5th Ky and charged the battery Captured three pieces. We brought off one but could not take the other two.

The 92nd followed in rear of the artillery. By the time we got to the foot of the hill the reble Inft that were in heavy timber had recovered and charged the road. The left of our Regt wheeled into line and gave them several volleys from our spencers which sent them back running. Strange to say although they poured in two volleys into our regt not a man was disabled or a horse struck. They were not 20 yds from us when we wheeled and fired on them. One ball passed through the bundle on the front of my saddle within three inches of me. We got out without losing many men got all our artillery and one reb gun. The 4th Regs lost most coming out. We captured one Brig flag and the battle flag of the 3rd Texas Cavalry (Weigley 2006:50).

10th Wisconsin Battery Volunteer Light Artillery, Commanded by Captain Yates V. Beebe

Captain Yates V. Beebe, who commanded the 10th Wisconsin Volunteer Artillery Battery in the August 20th action, filed a brief report on September 7, 1864 with Lieutenant E.P. Sturges, A.A.D.C., Headquarters Chief of Artillery, Department of the Cumberland, and relevant portions of it are presented below.

LIEUTENANT: In compliance with a communication from you of September 4, 1864, I have the honor to state that the Tenth Wisconsin Battery reported to General Kilpatrick for duty May 7, 1864, Special Field Orders, Numbers 125, Department of the Cumberland, May 4, 1864….The company was employed in guarding railroad from Adairsville to Marietta from May 16 to August 18, when they started with General Kilpatrick on a raid. On the 19th struck the Atlanta and West Point Railroad at Red Oak about daylight in the morning. Engaged the enemy, silenced his battery, and drove him off. Struck the Atlanta and Macon Railroad at Jonesborough at 4 p.m. Engaged the enemy and drove him off. On the 20th struck the railroad again at Lovejoy's Station; engaged the enemy about 2 p.m., got surrounded, charged through General Ross; command and marched through McDonough to Cotton Indian Creek. Lost in this action and charge 3 horses killed, 1 set wheel harness for two horses and 1 set of lead harness for two horses, and 1 limber abandoned. 1 man, Michael O'Connor, missing, and 4 men slightly wounded. On the 21st marched to Lithonia Station, on the Atlanta and Augusta Railroad. The company lost on this day's march 1 wagon burned at Cotton Indian River, and 1 man, Thomas Yargan, missing, and 6 horses abandoned, so badly used up that they could not be moved with the battery at the rate the command was moving. On the 22nd marched to General Garrard's headquarters, near Atlanta…. (OR Volume 38(2):903).

Union Ambulances

Medical care in the U.S. Army became more formalized as the war progressed, In time for Antietam, the Army of the Potomac, under its medical director Jonathan Letterman, developed the Letterman Ambulance Plan. In this system the ambulances of a division moved together, under a mounted line sergeant, with two stretcher-bearers and one driver per ambulance, to collect the wounded from the field, bring them to the dressing stations, and then take them to the field hospital. It was a vast improvement over the earlier “system,” wherein bandsmen in the Union command, and men randomly specified in the Confederacy, were simply appointed to drive the ambulances and carry the litters. This plan was implemented in August 1862 when McClellan issued General Orders No. 147 creating the Ambulance Corps for the Army of the Potomac under the control of the Medical Director. . . . Despite the vast improvement in the evacuation of the wounded from the battle field, it was not until March 1864 that Congress published the act (Public 22) to create an Ambulance Corps for all the Union Armies (civilwarhome.com 2007).
Brevet Major-Gen R. H. G. Minty published in *The National Tribune* dated January 22, 1903 wrote the following in regards to his ambulances:

I replied: “General, I like your plan in every particular but one.”

Kilpatrick, in his quick, impulsive manner, snapped out: “What is that, sir?”

Leaving our ambulances in camp. I do not like the idea of having to abandon my wounded men to the mercy of the enemy; and I have always found, and I have no doubt, General, that your experience is the same, that our men will fight with better heart when they know that if wounded they will be taken home with their comrades and not left in the hands of the enemy. Allow me to take my ambulances, and I pledge myself that you will not find them an incumbrance. If they are, I will destroy them.

After a moments consideration Gen. Kilpatrick said: “Well, Col. Minty, you can take your ambulances; but if they impede our movements or delay us in the slightest degree you must burn them. Col. Murray, you will leave your ambulances in camp.”

Kilpatrick gave orders to form columns and “during the time the troops were forming, the surgeons and ambulance corps were busy gathering up the wounded and caring for them as best they could” (Curry 1984:181).

Samuel J. Martin, biographer of Judson Kilpatrick, briefly covered Kilpatrick’s raid around Atlanta. Martin noted, “Minty’s assault scattered the Confederate horsemen, opening a path for those on foot, ambulances [Union] filled with the wounded, ammunition wagons, pack mules, and the artillery. The Negroes from nearby plantations, who had joined the raiders to gain their freedom, rode the mules in the wild dash. “With kettles and pans rattling, and darkies flying for dear life,” one observer recalled, “the scene [was] ludicrous as well as grand” (Martin 1996:187).

Robert Wilson of Illinois (4th U.S. Cavalry) wrote:
We were soon among the led horses of the dismounted men in their rear and among the ambulances, and a perfect stampede took place, riderless horses and ambulances being scattered in all directions, we in the midst of them, shooting and cutting madly (Barron 1964:223-224).

Dr. George W. Fish (4th Michigan Cavalry) noted, “... Pack mules, led horses, ammunition wagons and ambulances with our wounded men, all came safely through. The struggle was brief but fierce and decisive” (4th Michigan Cavalry, Letters of Dr. George W. Fish:89-90).

Other Support Personnel

Many other soldiers accompanied Kilpatrick’s 3rd Division of U.S. Cavalry in the August 20th action. These included many supply wagons, ammunition train, blacksmiths and various other noncombatants.

Figure 38. Ammunition Train of the 3rd Division U.S. Cavalry (Old-pictures.com 2007b).

Following Kilpatrick’s Raid, Union POWs

Dornblaser (7th Pennsylvania Cavalry) wrote:

Prisoners from Captain Schaeffer’s Company were Sergeants Hayes and Metzger who were sent to Andersonville, Georgia. When he was left Sergeant Hayes was standing among his fallen comrades. Confederates captured him and he was allowed to speak with George Caldwell who was badly wounded in the mouth and knew he would die in a short amount of time. Foster, Else and McDonald were dead. Officers at Andersonville had a special grudge against cavalry raiders and they received rough treatment. Hayes volunteered as a nurse in the prison hospital (Dornblaser 1884).

Major General J. M. Schofield wrote to Major General Sherman, “Nothing of importance has occurred on this flank. A negro who came in last night reports that Ross’ brigade and battery were captured by Kilpatrick on the 20th; says he saw the captain of the battery yesterday and heard him make the statement” (OR, Vol. 38(5):630). Confederate deserters gave a similar report.

of importance has occurred on this flank. A negro who came in last night reports that Ross' brigade and battery were captured by Kilpatrick on the 20th; says he saw the captain of the battery yesterday and heard him make the statement and Sherman was also informed that, “Rebel deserters repeat the report that Ross’ brigade of rebel cavalry was captured by Kilpatrick.” On the evening of August 22, 1864, Schofield received word at Sherman’s Headquarters in the field near Atlanta that, “General Thomas reports from General that Kilpatrick is at Decatur”, which indicated that Kilpatrick had successfully avoided capture in his raid around the south side of Atlanta. Sherman informed General Steedman, whose headquarters were in Chattanooga, Tennessee, on August 22, 1864 that,

General Kilpatrick is back all right; had pretty hard fighting with cavalry and infantry, but brought in 3 captured flags and 1 extra gun. Captured a whole battery, which he broke up. He destroyed enough road to last ten days, by which time I will reach it again (OR Volume 38(5):630-634).

On August 23, 1864, Captain J.C. Van Duzer telegraphed to Major T.T. Eckert, who was in Chattanooga, Tennessee, noting Kilpatrick’s successes in his raid around Atlanta (OR Volume 38(5):647):

General Kilpatrick has returned, having destroyed a few miles of the Macon road, and fought Ross' cavalry, capturing a battery and 3 stand of colors. Wheeler has thrown part of his command to north bank of the Tennessee, and yesterday captured men, mules, and wagons within ten miles of here. I think Steedman is too late with his movement, and ten Wheeler will strike Nashville road. Too much rain.

Military events in late August at Jonesboro overshadow those in the Lovejoy area. On August 31 both armies faced off in a two day battle that decided the fate of Atlanta and probably that of the entire Civil War.

Colonel Israel Garrard, 7th Ohio Cavalry Regiment, filed a brief report with Major Campbell, which advised the Union high command (Major General Schofield) of Confederate troops in the Lovejoy vicinity on September 3, 1864 (5 p.m.) (OR Volume 38(2):923-924):

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that I went across on to the McDonough and Fayetteville road, striking it between three and four miles from Lovejoy’s Station. Citizens report that infantry from Atlanta, said to be Lee’s corps, was moving all the morning, and that the stragglers were still passing when we reached the road. A large wagon train was moving on Thursday night and yesterday to Lovejoy’s Station. Last night Ross’ brigade of cavalry camped just this side of the road, and moved on this morning to Bear Creek Station, below Lovejoy’s. The people speak of there being a great deal of artillery, and of the infantry being very great in quantity, but as near as I could ascertain it took the regular column some three or four hours to pass.

Colonel Garrard filed another report with Major Campbell from his headquarters near Atlanta on September 9:

...On the following day [August 30, 1864] I scouted the country between the left of the Twenty-third Corps and East Point. During the subsequent movements I covered the trains by a position on the right rear of the Twenty-third Corps, and then took position on the left of the corps in front of Lovejoy’s Station. I picketed and scouted the country toward McDonough, and the roads traveled by the rebel army on its march from Atlanta, capturing some 70 prisoners, most of them stragglers, who had broken down on the march. In charging into a cavalry camp near McDonough, the First Ohio Squadron lost a sergeant, killed. On the 11th day of August I was placed in command of the cavalry in the field with the Army of the Ohio. The Ninth Ohio Volunteer Cavalry was ordered to report to me. The command was divided into two brigades, one mounted, the other dismounted. The mounted brigade, whose operations I have reported above, has been about 1,000 strong, and has been composed as follows: Ninth Michigan Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Way; Seventh Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Miner; Ninth Ohio Volunteer Cavalry (detachments), Captain Bowlus; First Ohio Squadron, Major Rice-Colonel Acker, Ninth Michigan Cavalry, being the brigade commander. A portion of the dismounted brigade was on duty as infantry with the Twenty-third Corps, another portion of it en route to Nashville, to be remounted, and the remainder on guard duty at Turner’s Ferry, under Colonel Capron, commanding the brigade.

I have the honor to submit herewith a detailed statement of the casualties* in the mounted brigade during the operations which I have reported....

*Nominal list (omitted) shows 3 men killed, 1 officer and 8 men wounded and 1 officer and 16 men captured or missing.
UNION, PERSONAL ACCOUNTS

At least seven personal accounts by U.S. soldiers of the August 20th Cavalry action near Lovejoy are published and doubtless others remain unexplored in various archives. Captain Henry Albert Potter (Figure 41), Company H, 4th Michigan Cavalry, wrote this personal letter home to his father four days after Kilpatrick's Charge. Captain Albert Potter (4th Michigan Cavalry) eloquently details the line up, wait and charge in this letter:

Head Quarters 'H' Camp near Atlanta Ga. Aug. 24th

Dear Father;

Since writing we have been in another 'raid' and it has been the hardest one, we ever were on. The expedition was commanded by Gen. Kilpatrick, the 1st and 2nd Brigades of the 2nd Cav Division(note 1) were along -- Marched all night the 17th and reported to Kilpatrick in the morning -- laid in camp all day the 18th and rested. At 8 PM moved out, it was a beautiful night the moon at its full -- and a clear sky. At daylight we struck the Montgomery RR below Atlanta and commenced tearing up track, but as the column was not closed up as it should have been, a brigade of rebels cut us in two for a short time. They opened on us with artillery and shelled us rather too close for comfort. We had to cross over where the bullets were flying thick and fast. We charged over it without any loss and formed up at a church to protect the Ambulances. The rebels had got possession of the road which we wanted and the 3rd battalion was ordered to advance in line and retake it -- which we did in good style but I lost my 1st sergeant Cole he was shot through the lungs, is alive yet, but I have no hope of his recovery. The other Co's had several wounded and horses shot. From there we moved on across to the Macon RR towards Jonesboro, where drove out about 400 rebels and burnt the depot and took up the track for a mile -- had orders to stay there until 11PM about that time were attacked by a division of rebel cavalry. They charged our lines twice but were unsuccessful both times. After the first charge our regiment was ordered out as a support for our line and everything again was quiet. You must know we were all very tired -- when you march all night in your saddle without any sleep -- you would be tired wouldn't you? Well we were resting, I was asleep on a lot of 'shake' spread over two logs when they charged again. It was like a thunderbolt I jumped and you ought to have seen the shake fly as did everyone else to our horses -- but our line stood like a rock unyielding and now to show his contempt for the rebs, Kilpatrick brought out his band out to the line and they played Yankee Doodle, Hail Columbia and a number of others for the johnnies -- no doubt to their supreme disgust -- it was as much as to say come and take us if you can, but you can't -- they thought the had us tight but they were mistaken, for we dived out of a hole before they knew it and were gone to the east and soon as they found it out they followed us. Overtook us about 10 AM next day. Here the general, who by the way is about a match for any body I ever seen in coolness and impudence, left colonel Murray with his division to fight and hold them back while he made another drive for the RR about ten miles below to Fayetteville -- our Brigade in advance -- we struck and charged their pickets killing some and drove them back -- when the 4th was ordered in the night to make a big show as possible and tear up a few rails while the attack was to be made by the 7th Penn and 4th Regulars. They advanced and charged the enemy's line but were repulsed with loss and our boys were obliged to fall back hastily. We had struck two divisions of infantry, which had been sent there to take us— you see we had struck a snag -- the 7th Penn lost about 40 and the Regulars 36 in that fight -- they charged dismounted. Well they drove us back so we had to leave one piece of Artillery in the ground but not so far but that our skirmishers covered it with their fire and with some loss we got it back. A number volunteered to retake it and they rushed down and pulled it off with their hands. Well shortly we began to hear firing in our rear. It increased and soon we found we had their cavalry in our rear and Infantry in front -- in fact we were surrounded. They were forming to play Stoneman(note 2) on us 'Yanks' too -- but Kilpatrick held a consultation with his officers and a decision was agreed at which we soon found out we were to charge! through their cavalry and cut our way out -- and here I must say -- there was no time to be lost either -- for their infantry were moving up and extending their line and every minute made the matter worse. Col. Minty volunteered to charge with his Brigade. The offer was accepted. We formed in column of regiments facing to the rear -- the 7th Penn on the Right, the 4th Mich in the center and the 4th Regs on the left. We held a hill yet in our rear which hid our movements from the enemy. The 2nd Brigade was to support us then was to come the command, Artillery, and Ambulances etc. with Pack mules and all. While we stood there waiting the order a man in the Regulars was shot dead by a bullet. He stood about 6 feet from me and although it misses even shot there by random shots, there is a certain feeling which I cannot tell you of -- when a man stands waiting the wind which perhaps will send him to Eternity in an instant. You never will know or feel it until you are there yourself (and I hope you will never be) there is a sort of instinctive bracing of the nerves and an air of sternness in a brave man's looks which soon tells you his calibre. There is the place to detect a coward --I pity them -- they dodge at every sound and sight they see like a turkey looking for bugs. It is laughable as well as sober. Presently you hear the command Draw Saber! and then the command Charge! -- and away we went. As we raised that hill a shower of shot greeted us -- but with a yell enough to wake the dead -- we spurred on to their line. Their artillery belching forth grape and canister into
our line. The regulars were directly in front of the battery and suffered badly. Capt. McCormick and Lt. Sullivan and a file of men in their van were mowed down by one shot. The ground grew rough and stony. On we pressed -- keeping up that deafening yell -- our Sabers flashing in the sun a thousand rays of light -- and as we got within 30 rods of their works they threw their arms down and run -- but on we go dashing over their works. The work commences -- they surrender by dozens - but many of them were cut down without mercy, for my part I could not strike them after they had given up and but very few did hit them in our regiment -- but the Regulars slashing right and left and many a poor devil's brains lay scattered on the ground. From there it was nothing but a panic, their Battery we got , spiked the guns except the 12 LB Howitzer which we brought along. The rest after spiking we tumble into a ditch. They had but one Inf. Brigade got in position in our rear but they were hurrying up and we were just in time -- as we got the order to charge , a flag of truce we seen coming from the Infantry for our surrender -- but we didn't wait . Well we only picked up 100 of them the rest got away. We were getting away ourselves and didn’t stop to pick up much. The brigade we run over was Texans. We captured their battle flag. Well we marched nearly all that night -- camped about 3 AM the next evening. It rained nearly all night and we were wet as rats. Soon we came to a creek which was swollen so we had to swim across. Two of our men were drowned there and some negroes. I came very near losing a man there. He was on a mule which floundered and kept him under some time but he at last got out all right -- were out five days and nights and went entirely around the whole rebel Army going out on the right and coming in on the left. In all that time I got about nine hours sleep as I calculated We received orders to be ready to move out again and the rumor is current through the camp that the rebels are evacuating Atlanta -- at least I believe our whole ......(?).. either they are running or Sherman is going for them with a vengeance

I received my commission as Captain yesterday. I’ll be mustered tomorrow to date from the 23rd --You must consider the matter well this fall before you cast your vote for Uncle Abe -- I must admit that things look different than they did six months ago -- to me. I will write you my ideas and thoughts about matters and things before long -- I must close --

Love to all,
affectionately
Albert

-- I am commanding the 3rd Battalion and probably will be for a month or so. Major Mix was wounded and the Battalion commander take......[text missing] (Ruddy 2007).

Captain Albert Potter (4th Michigan Cavalry) noted “a flag of truce we seen coming from the Infantry for our surrender – but we didn’t wait” (Ruddy 2007). Also Sergeant T. F. Dornblaser wrote in 1884 of Kilpatrick’s Raid and the Capture of Atlanta that he may have recalled a flag of truce being sent in prior to their charge:

Kilpatrick was now almost surrounded by the enemy, and if I mistake not, a flag of truce was sent in, demanding his surrender... Henry Yearick, a member of company “E,” lost his horse and his hat in a ditch; but holding on to his carbine, he mounted one of our caissons, and came out bare-headed and a little shaken up, but the same night he reported to his commander for duty. Lewis Catherman, another comrade, had his horse shot, and rolling into a fence-corner, a “reb” on the other side of the fence said, he should just lie still and he would not get hurt. But Lewis watched his chance, and seeing a riderless horse near by, he mounted and rode away in triumph... the writer saw Captain McIntyre, commanding the Fourth Regulars, leading his regiment against the battery. His white horse struck an artillery carriage in the road, throwing horse and rider against the fence, behind which a number of rebel horsemen were sitting in their saddles, with revolvers in hand, but too badly frightened to do any shooting. The Captain called for some one to catch his horse, which having regained his feet, shot like an arrow after the flying fugitives... (Dornblaser 1884).
Captain Joseph G. Vale, Captain Heber S. Thompson, and Sergeant Thomas F. Dornblaser. Colonel Sipes, who commanded the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry, wrote his account in 1905. Another regimental history of the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry was published by Sipes in 1906. Sergeant Dornblaser, Company E, wrote a personal account of his experiences as a corporal in the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry in August 1864, which was published in 1884. Dornblaser also published another account in 1930.

Captain Joseph G. Vale, Company K, 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry, wrote an account of the cavalrymen commanded by Robert Minty, entitled, Minty and the Cavalry in which he discusses at length, “The Great Saber Charge at Lovejoy” (Vale 1886:337-365). Minty’s brigade was composed of the 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry, 4th U.S. Cavalry, the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry, and members of the 9th Pennsylvania Cavalry. Minty’s account of the battle is included in Vale’s book. Captain Vale described in some detail the initial U.S. Cavalry charge,

After forming, his command faced to the rear, Kilpatrick directed Minty to lead the charge with his, the Second, division. Minty formed, placing the First brigade in the advance; on the right or west side of the road, in regimental columns of fours, the Seventh Pennsylvania, under Major Jennings, on the right, the Fourth United States, under Captain McIntyre, on the left and the Fourth Michigan, under Major Mix, in the center; the distance between the columns being about one hundred and fifty yards. Two companies, B and M, of the Seventh Pennsylvania, were deployed in front as skirmishers, and directed, covering the whole front, to throw down the first of the intervening fences.

As soon as the skirmishers reached this fence, the advance was sounded, followed, after passing the fence, by the ‘gallop’ and the ‘charge,’ and Minty hurled his three columns, in a terrific burst of flashing steel, upon three points of the rebel lines. In anticipation of something of this kind being attempted, the rebel infantry had formed in three lines, about fifty yards apart, in double rank; the first and second lines with fixed bayonets and the third line firing; in both the first and second lines the front rank knelt on one knee, resting the butt of the gun on the ground, the bayonet at a ‘charge.’

Immediately on the charging columns showing themselves, the enemy opened with shell from four pieces of artillery in our front, and from six pieces on our right front, canister was, after the first or second discharge, substituted for shell, by the battery in our front. After the columns had passed the first fence, the infantry and cavalry opened a fire of musketry. Through this storm of shell, canister, and musketry, the charging columns, closely followed by the gallant Long and his brigade of intrepid Ohioans, in column of regiments, swept over the fields, broken though the ground was with deep gulleys or washouts, leaping over three sets of out-lying rail barricades, and, without firing a shot, reached the rebel first line, posted slightly in the rear of a fence. The rebel cavalry broke and fled in the wildest panic, just before we struck them, but the infantry stood firm. Leaping, in maddened rush at the top of speed, our horses over the fence, and where this could not be done, dashing with impetuous force against it, the impediment was passed, without drawing rein, and, with their keen blades, the brigade in an instant cut the rebel front line to pieces! rode over and destroyed it! and assaulted with renewed vigor their second line. Between the first and second lines, the columns obliged slightly to the left, and striking it thus on a half left turn, presented somewhat the appearance of a movement by platoons in ‘echelon,’ assaulting it in many places in quick succession, penetrated and saber it to pieces as quickly as they had the first! The third line now broke and ran in utter confusion and rout, but we were soon among them, riding down and saber hundreds as they ran.

The formation of the brigade led the Seventh Pennsylvania squarely against the left center of the infantry, the Fourth Michigan against its right, and the rebel battery, and the Fourth United States against the battery, and that part of the rebel line held by their cavalry. After cutting the enemy’s lines to pieces, the Seventh Pennsylvania and Fourth Michigan, making a full left wheel, dashed upon the artillery, saber the gunners beside their pieces the while. Three of these, the all we had horses for, were brought off, and the other one was disabled by spiking; blowing up the caissons and chopping to pieces the wheels. The race and slaughter among the fleeing rebels was then continued for three miles, when Minty halted and re-formed his command, now badly scattered. It was understood that the Second brigade of ours, and the Third division, should follow the charge of Minty’s brigade in line, thus securing the full fruits of the conflict, but by some mistake, Colonel Long formed in column of companies, or battalions, and joined in the charge, following rapidly through the rebel lines, while the Third division, holding the column of fours, followed the road; hence the masses of the enemy, which had been run over by the First brigade, were not gathered up, nor was any effort made to ascertain the number of killed and wounded. Minty’s task being simply to crush and destroy the rebel lines, he made no effort to take prisoners, only requiring the enemy to destroy their guns as he passed through. This much is, however,
Captain Heber Samuel Thompson, Company I, 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry, kept a diary in 1864 of his involvement with the 7th Pennsylvania (Fryer 2001a). Captain Thompson participated in the engagement of August 20th, where he was captured and taken prisoner by the Confederates. His diary account for August 20 is presented below:

August 20th—Saturday. About 10 o’clock Col. Murray was attacked from the south by a Brigade of Infantry under General Reynolds. Some little fighting but of no importance. About 3 o’clock at night moved off to the east, then south again toward Lovejoy Station. When within a mile of the railroad, met some pickets who retired, drawing on our advance. Capt. Vale was ordered to charge but met by a terrible fire, his company was driven back in confusion. Several companies were then dismounted and sent into the woods and immediately after, the 4th Regulars formed line, dismounted and had not tied their horses before a terrible fire was opened on them and the companies of the 7th in the woods, driving all back quite a considerable distance.

A number of the 7th Penna. And 4th U.S. Cavalry were killed and wounded and a few taken prisoners. Kilpatrick supposing that a large force of Infantry had come up, concluded to go back and break through the Cavalry (Ross’) which had come up in our rear. The 4th Mich. Was formed in column of fours about eighty yards on the right of the road, the 7th Penna. about forty yards, in columns of fours, the 4th U.S. in the road in columns of fours. In the rear of the 1st Brigade Long’s Brigade was formed. Murry’s command was formed on the left of the road. Just before the command was given to charge, I was sent back by Col. Minty to order Col. Long to keep his Brigade close up behind the 1st. I found him on the gallop and rode beside him for some time, while I gave my mare the rein and went ahead. The shells from Rebel Artillery exploded in the air and did no damage that I saw; just as we were on the left flank of the artillery, it opened with grape and canister, but I didn’t see what damage was done. Passing around the rear of the artillery I found myself with Lt. Fitzgerald of the 4th U.S. Cavalry leading the 4th Mich. Cavalry. Charging down a road through the woods we came into an open field directly in rear of the Rebel Artillery. As soon as I came out into the open field a rebel not more than fifty yards in front fired; the ball struck my mare full in the breast, when she reared up on her hind legs and fell over backwards dead. I extricated myself from the saddle and started for the rebel rear, here, however, I came upon about a dozen rebels. Turning back I had gone but a few steps before several bullets came whistling close by me, at the same time three or four Rebels ordered me to halt. Looking around I saw I was surrounded by Rebels and so surrendered at discretion. The Rebels, however, were more scared than I was and every minute expected our Cavalry upon them. Going at a double quick a couple of miles and picking up a rebel here and there, we hid in a thicket of woods, about an hour, the rebels fearing every minute that their whole party (now about twenty) would fall into the hands of our men. Finally after much creeping through the woods and reconnoitering in various directions, they discovered that our forces had gone. Then they took me to Lovejoy Station where they robbed me of my hat, boots and watch. Capt. Baglan, Inspector Genl. On Genl. Reynold’s Staff, took my boots, giving me his old shoes in their stead. Here I met Capt. McCormick, 4th U.S. Cav. Who introduced me to Capt. Thompson and Lt. White, 4th Ohio Cav. captured in the first fight with the Infantry. Met also quite a number of our Brigade prisoners. Lt. Herman and Capt. White both wounded and prisoners in same train with me, but I could not get to see them. Moved up to Jonesboro (Fryer 2001a:18-20).

Private Robert M. Wilson, Company M, 4th U.S. Cavalry, related his account of Kilpatrick’s Raid to his friend Samuel B. Barron, a former Confederate officer whose own account of the battle is presented in the following section.

AFTER the war ended I made a friend of Robert M. Wilson of Illinois, who served in the Fourth United States Cavalry, and he kindly wrote out and sent me his account of this raid, and by way of parenthys I here insert it, as it may be of interest: The following account of the Kilpatrick Raid, made in August 1864, written partly from memory and partly from a letter written August 28, 1864, by Captain Robert Burns, assistant adjutant-general of the First Brigade, Second Cavalry Division, I acting as orderly for him part of the time on the raid. I was detailed at brigade headquarters as a scout during the Atlanta Campaign and until General Wilson took our regiment as his escort. On the 17th of August, 1864, at one o’clock, AM, ours and Colonel Long’s Brigade (The First and Second), of the second Cavalry Division, all under command of Colonel Minty, left our camp on Peach Tree Creek, on the left our army northeast of Atlanta, at seven o’clock next morning, reported to General Kilpatrick at Sand Town on the right of our Army, having during the night passed from one end or flank of our Army to the other. We remained in Sand Town until sundown of the 18th, when we started out to cut the enemy’s communications south of Atlanta. Two other expeditions, Stoneman’s and McCook’s, well equipped, before this had been ruined in attempting the
same thing. We, however, imagined we were made of sterner stuff, and started off in good spirits.

The command consisted of Third Cavalry Division (Kilpatrick's), under Colonel Murry, about 2700 men, and two brigades of our division (the Second), under the command of Colonel Minty, about 2700 men also—the whole commanded by Kilpatrick (or Kill Cavalry as we always called him) & away we went, Third Division in advance. The night was beautiful moonlight one, and we would have enjoyed it more if we had not been up all the night preceding. We did not go more than three miles before we ran into the enemy's pickets, when we had to go more slowly, the division driving them before us, dismounting to feel the woods on both sides, etc. etc. Consequently it was morning when we reached the Atlanta & West Point Railroad near Fairburn. At Red Oak we had torn up about a half mile of track when the rear battalion of the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry was suddenly attacked by a force of dismounted men and artillery. Just back of where our column was struck were the ambulances, the darkies leading officer's horses, pack mules, etc. etc. Several shells dropped among them, and they thought kingdom had come, sure. The Fourth United States Cavalry, being near the ambulances, soon drove the enemy away. All this time the head of the column kept moving on, as time was precious and we could not stop for slight skirmishes. General Kilpatrick, not being satisfied with the progress made by his advance, ordered our brigade to take the front and Murry the rear. (We had learned before starting that it was expected we, our division, would do all the fighting.) Long's brigade, in advance, had not gone more than half a mile when he found a strong force of the enemy in his front. He had to dismount his men to drive the enemy from the rail barricades they had made, but he would find them in the same position half a mile farther on. Long kept his men dismounted, having number 4 lead the horses. I was close up with the advance with Colonel Minty. We drove the enemy steadily but slowly back, until we came to the valley through which Flint River runs, when they were reinforced by Ferguson's brigade of cavalry (we had been fighting Ross' brigade thus far), and opened on us sharply with artillery when we commenced descending the hill, the shells and bullets rattling lively around us. Two guns of our battery—we had with us four guns of Chicago Board of Trade which belonged to our division, and Murry had with him four guns of the Eleventh Wisconsin Battery—were soon brought up and succeeded in silencing the enemy's artillery, the first striking an artilleryman and blowing him to pieces. Our division were then all dismounted and moved forward at the double quick under fire of our eight guns, and drove the enemy clear through Jonesboro, crossing the bridge on the stringer. Our brigade (First) had the advance, being nearly all deployed as skirmishers. When we seized the railroad for which we had started, and we commenced to smash things generally. The track was torn up for about two miles, the depot and public buildings burned, and destruction was let loose. While this was going on the enemy returned to the attack, and our division was sent to meet them. The Third Division turning the rails. The enemy were driven southward and we were pushed that way, to shove them farther back. Before was darkness and death, behind the burning buildings and smoking ruins, and now it began to thunder, lightning, and pour down rain in torrents. All this time General Kilpatrick had one of his hands behind us playing Yankee Doodle & other patriotic airs. It appeared as if defeat was comming, for we could hear the whistle of the cars in front of us and knew that the enemy was being reinforced from below. We then determined to flank them, so about midnight our brigade, followed by the Third Division, moved southeasterly direction about seven miles, Long's brigade being left to cover the rear. When seven miles out we stopped to feed, close to 6 AM, about a mile from Murry's Division, but were little protected, as both hills were cleared and the valley had but few trees in it. Our brigade was ordered to mount and move forward when Colonel Long's brigade was attacked by the cavalry that followed us from Jonesboro. The enemy's forces consisted of the brigades of Ross, Ferguson, and Armstrong, about 4500 men. Our brigade moved on and turned sharply to the right, in a southwesterly direction, to strike the railroad again about eight miles below Jonesboro. I stayed on the hill with captain Burns, for a short time, to witness the skirmishes between Long and the enemy. From where we were all our maneuvers could be distinctly seen, as also the enemy, who would advance upon our men, only to be driven back. It was a beautiful sight. "By Heaven, it was noble sight to see—by one who had no friend or brother there." & Captain Burns, myself following, now galloped off to over take our brigade, which we soon did. Colonel Long had orders to follow as quickly as possible, Colonel Murry to come after. We halted for the rest of the command to join us. About a mile from the railroad the road forks, the two prongs striking the railroad about a mile apart. A few hundred feet in front of and parallel to the railroad another road ran. The Fourth Michigan was sent by the righthand road to the railroad, which it reached without any trouble; the rest of the brigade took the left-hand prong of the road, having the last mile or two been driving off about a dozen cavalrymen. As we neared the railroad the firing became hotter and hotter. The seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry was dismounted and sent forward to the woods—one battalion, four companies, of it had been advance guard. Hotter grew the firing, and the horses of the advance who had been dismounted came hurrying back. The Fourth United States (Regulars) were then dismounted and sent in. Captain Burns was sent back to hurry up two of
Long's regiments, but before this could be done the Seventh Pennsylvania and Fourth Regulars were driven from the woods in some confusion. We had run on a brigade of infantry who were lying in the woods behind barricades at the side of the railroad, and a force of the enemy was also pushed in on the right, where the Fourth Michigan were at work. Long's brigade was put in position to check the advancing Confederates, and our battery brought up, as the woods before us were swarming with enemy, the Forth Regulars and Seventh Pennsylvania were placed in support of the battery. Poor fellows, they were badly cut up.

One of Long's regiments was formed near the fork of the road, the Fourth Michigan was being placed there, and the enemy tried again and again to take our battery. It fought magnificently, and the guns were made to radiate in all directions and did splendid work, our men supporting them well. One of the guns, by the rebound, had broken its trail off short, so that it could not be drawn from the field. When the rest of the pieces had been withdrawn Colonel Minty called for men to draw off the piece by hand. Captain Burns took about twenty men of the Fourth Michigan Cavalry down and helped pull it off, though the enemy were very close to us. While this was taking place, heavy firing was heard in our rear, for the cavalry with which we had been fighting had followed us, and had us in a pretty tight box, as follows: a brigade of infantry in our front and a party on our left, a division moving on our right and but a short distance off, three brigades of cavalry in our rear. Stoneman and McCook threw up the sponge under like circumstances. We decided we must leave the railroad alone, and crush the enemy's cavalry, and consequently withdrew from fighting the infantry, who now became very quiet, probably expecting to take us soon.

The command was faced to the rear as follows: Our brigade was formed on the right hand side of the road, each regiment in columns of fours (four men abreast); the fourth Regulars on the left, fourth Michigan center, Seventh Pennsylvania on the right, Long's brigade formed in close columns with regimental front, that each regiment formed in line, the men side by side, boot to boot, thus:

MINNY'S BRIGADE
FOURTH U. S.
FOURTH MICHIGAN
SEVENTH PENNSYLVANIA
LONG'S BRIGADE FIRST OHIO
THIRD OHIO
FOURTH OHIO (Barron 1964).

Bates (2007) provides this summary of the losses of the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry, commanded by Colonel Sipes, at Lovejoy; “On the 17th [August, 1864], it moved with Kilpatrick on his raid; on the 19th had a skirmish at Fairburn and Jonesboro; and on the 20th, a sharp engagement at Lovejoy Station, in which Captain James G. Taylor, and Lieutenant Chauncey C. Hermans were among the killed. The loss in this raid was five killed, twenty-four wounded, and fifteen missing. Captain Taylor was in Company K and 1st Lieutenant Hermans was in Company C of the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry (NPS 2007).

CONFEDERATE ACCOUNTS

Official Confederate records of military events south of Atlanta in August through November, 1864 are relatively scarce. Most correspondence in this period is concerned with the battle at Jonesboro. Direct mention of action at Lovejoy and nearby areas is exceeding brief. One modern author summarized the situation:

On May 7, 1864, Sherman moved forward, starting the Confederates on a two-month-long retreat. Each time they made a stand, the Union troops slipped around a flank and it all started again. Wheeler did some of his best work during that period. Time after time his scouting and screening warned Johnston of Union moves before they could spring the trap on him. In spite of that, Wheeler felt the wrath of the Southern press once more. They did not want retreats, no matter how well handled. They wanted victories. And they wanted Wheeler raiding in the Union army’s rear, not reconnoitering.

The Confederate government, like the press, wanted more action. As the Union army crossed the Chattahoochee River, word came from Richmond that Johnston was being relieved of his command. John Bell Hood, promoted to the temporary rank of general, took his place.

Hood’s mandate was to attack. Wheeler’s cavalry and one corps of infantry guarded the right, while the rest of the army hit the left at Peachtree Creek on July 20 . . . (HistoryNet.com 2007).

General J. B. Hood, Brigadier General F. C. Armstrong and Brigadier General Jackson were in communication on August 19, 1864. Jackson’s scouts saw Kilpatrick on the right bank of the Chattahoochee. He informed General Hood that Kilpatrick’s targets were Fairburn and Jonesboro. Hood ordered the infantry brigade of Brigadier General Alexander W. Reynolds from Atlanta to defend Jonesboro. On the 19th, at 2:00 a.m., Brigadier General L. S. Ross sent a message to the Brigadier General Division that he was convinced
he had been fighting Kilpatrick’s division. At this time Ross sent the 3rd Texas to get in at the Union’s front and Ross followed behind. Hood commanded them to move ahead with their force and beat the enemy.

At 9:00 a.m., Ross reported he was following the Union troops on the Fairburn and Jonesboro road, and Kilpatrick’s division had divided. The largest column was moving rapidly on the Fairburn and Jonesboro road and the other column was moving on the Fairburn and Fayetteville road. Ross’ ammunition was nearly exhausted some of his companies had only a few rounds left so Ross requested a wagon “lightly loaded with ammunition with haste.”

Brigadier General Francis A. Shoup, C.S. Army, Chief of Staff of operations July 25-September 7 wrote of the Union,

. . . Enemy’s raiding party tore up half a mile of railroad track at Jonesborough; burned depot and cut telegraph wire; they did not burn the cross-ties. Raiders tore up track and burned cross-ties five miles below East Point; enemy’s raiders reported retreating. We killed and captured a number of them; are now pursuing (OR, Vol. 38(3):692).

Brigadier General W.H. Jackson’s Confederate Cavalry Division, which consisted of Armstrong’s, Ross’, and Ferguson’s brigades, was aware of Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick’s Cavalry Corp’s movement to the southwest of Atlanta and they rode to shadow, dog, and confront the U.S. Cavalry at every opportunity. On August 19, 1864, Brigadier General F.C. Armstrong wrote two short notes from Jonesboro to Major General Hood informing him that, “I am moving down toward Lovejoy’s Station. General Ross is between here and Fairburn. Ferguson is behind me”, and later Armstrong advised, “I will move on below Lovejoy’s Station and in direction of Griffin. A scout from Fayetteville reports that 500 of the enemy passed through that place en route to Griffin one after sunrise” (OR Volume 38(5):976).

Official Confederate correspondence from Brigadier General L.S. Ross was terse during August, 1864, but several informative messages leading up to the battle of August 20th have survived. Writing from his Brigade headquarters at Sewell’s House, Brigadier General Ross advised Brigadier General Jackson at 1:30 a.m. on August 19, “The enemy is advancing on Sandtown and Fairburn road in force. Scouts from their flanks and rear report at least a brigade of cavalry, followed closely by infantry. My pickets are now fighting them between Bethel and Enon Church”, and a few minutes later Ross again wrote to Jackson stating, “I am convinced the enemy I have been fighting is Kilpatrick’s division on a raid. It has passed our flank and gone on in the direction of Fairburn. Scouts from their rear now report the column two miles and half long and all cavalry. I have sent the Third Texas across to get in their front, and will move on after with the rest of my command at once. We had a severe skirmish with the enemy’s advance and have lost several men”. By 9 a.m. on August 19, General Ross was traveling when he notified Jackson,

I am again moving on the flank of the enemy on Fairburn and Jonesborough road. Their force has been divided. One column, the largest, is moving rapidly on the Fairburn and Jonesborough, and the other column on the Fairburn and Fayetteville road. My supply of ammunition has been nearly exhausted. Some companies of my command have only a few rounds left. Cannot you hurry forward to me a wagon lightly loaded with ammunition? (OR Volume 38(5): 977-978).

Brigadier General Ross wrote two letters to Brigadier General Jackson on August 20 (OR Vol 38(5):981-982). The first letter, written at 8:30 a.m. stated, “We came upon the enemy halted to feed, and have driven his rear guard from two lines of rail works. He is now formed, a brigade strong, on the hill at the far side of an open field some three quarters of a mile in my front, and has artillery in position and at work. We are on the road Leading toward McDonough, and from the direction the enemy has chosen I infer his raid be continued on farther down the country.” The second letter, written at 10:30 a.m. from Ross’ headquarters at Mrs. Carnes’ Gin-House, advised Jackson,

The enemy's whole force has been formed near Lee's Mill, on the south side of Cotton Indian creek, and is now just commencing to withdraw. The direction they are moving will lead them into the Jonesborough and McDough road, about half a mile from Lee's Mill, but whether they will continue straight across that road to Lovejoy's Station, or will go on through McDonough, is yet undecided, their force is large. I have had a plain view of at least 4,000 formed in line. The road they are moving on intersects the Jonesborough and McDonough road at Noah's Ark Church.

At 6 a.m. on August 19th, General J.B. Hood’s Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Francis A. Shoup,
notified Brigadier General William H. Jackson that, “Ferguson has been ordered to you at Rough and Ready. The general has a brigade of infantry to sent at any moment. Keep us constantly advised”, and two hours later General John Bell Hood sent word from his headquarters in Atlanta to Brigadier General Jackson, who was in East Point, ordering his Cavalry, “Brigade of infantry will start to Jonesborough without delay. Ferguson has been ordered to Rough and Ready. Go ahead with your force”, and about four hours later Hood ordered Jackson, “A cavalry force of the enemy is reported moving on the Fayetteville road from Decatur, and also on the McDonough road. On the former road their advance at Mrs. Ailston’s. On the McDonough road their advance at Ousley Chapel. Look out for them and use your discretion” (OR Volume 38(5):796). At 3:50 p.m. that same day, Chief of Staff, F.A. Shoup notified Brigadier General Jackson, who by that time was in Jonesboro, that, “General Hood desires me to say that a great deal depends upon your exertions. You must beat the enemy, if possible”, and less than two hours later Shoup again wrote to Jackson stating, “The forces reported to be moving out from Decatur gone back. The general desires you to be careful not to divide your force too much; better make sure of one party” (OR Volume 38(5):796). At 6 a.m. of the same day, General Hood sent word to Brigadier General Wright, who was in Macon, Georgia, notifying him that, “A raid has been started this morning from our left in the direction of Fairburn; will probably strike Macon road. Look out for it. Take means to ascertain the point of attack and report” (OR Volume 38(5): 977-978).

Hood wrote from his headquarters Atlanta to J.A. Seddon, Major General Cleburne, and Brigadier General Jackson on August 21, 1864. Hood’s letter to J.A. Seddon stated, “In the evening of the 19th the enemy’s cavalry struck the Macon railroad near Jonesborough, tearing up the track a short distance. Brigadier-General Jackson’s cavalry command and Brigadier Gen. D. H. Reynolds’ infantry brigade met the enemy at Lovejoy’s Station yesterday evening, routed them, capturing a number of prisoners, 2 stand of colors, and 1 piece of artillery”. Hood’s letter to Major General Patrick Cleburne, who was in East Point, Georgia at that time, stated, “Jackson says there are four guns on the left reporting to you, two 3-inch at Armstrong’s wagon train. Please send order to lieutenant Young at Ross’ wagon train near East Point to proceed at once to Jonesborough with two steel guns and one caisson”. Apparently Hood was unaware that Lieutenant Young’s battery had been destroyed by Kilpatrick’s Cavalry at Nash Farm the previous day. Hood’s letter to Brigadier General W.H. Jackson, who was in Jonesboro, Georgia at the time inquired, “Do you think you have broken the enemy sufficiently to spare a regiment for our left? The cavalry serving with the several corps probably annoy us. What has become of the raiders?"

Brigadier General Shoup kept a journal of operations in the Atlanta Campaign from July 25-September 7 (OR Volume 38(3):688-696). Shoup’s entry on August 18 began:

August 18.-No change in our lines to-day. One of our scouts sent a lady in enemy’s lines to-day to gather information of enemy’s movements, &c. She reports having seen …

August 19.-The Federals, from 3,000 to 5,000 strong, struck the West Point railroad at 3.30 a.m. Kilpatrick (Federal) has started on a raid, supposed to be making for the Macon railroad, &c. General Ross has engaged raiders near Fairburn. Enemy’s cavalry occupied Fairburn at 3.30 a.m. All quiet along our lines. There was some little skirmishing this morning. Enemy have thrown but few shell to-day.

August 20.-No change in our lines to-day; all quiet along our lines. Enemy threw a few shell into the city, killing 2 men. Enemy continue to complain of short rations; enemy in and around Decatur have stolen every particle of provisions they could find in hands of citizens. Their excuse for this conduct was that they have not had meat for ten days and were now living on quarter rations, coffee and crackers. They have succeeded in getting 100 hogs and 1,000 bushels of green corn. Prisoners taken report desertions are more frequent than at any other time during the war. Enemy’s raiding party tore up half a mile of railroad track at Jonesborough; burned depot and cut telegraph wire; they did not burn the cross-ties. Raiders tore up track and burned cross-ties five miles below East Point; enemy’s raiders reported retreating. We killed and captured a number of them; are now pursuing.

August 21.-All quiet along our lines. Enemy threw a few shell in the city, but no casualties have been reported. The raiders are still being pursued by General Jackson’s cavalry. They are retreating rapidly toward their lines, endeavoring to pass between Decatur and Covington. A force of the enemy are reported moving down the Tallapoosa River. It is supposed they will try to reach Opelika. A train came through on the Macon road at midnight. …

August 28.-The enemy have made their appearance at Fairburn, on West Point railroad,
in quite a large force, consisting of cavalry, artillery, and infantry. Generals Armstrong and Ross have been skirmishing with their advance and watching their movements. General Morgan has been ordered to report to General Jackson at East Point. Reynolds’ and Lewis’ brigades of infantry (the latter of Brown’s division) and Colonel Hannon’s regiment of cavalry were ordered to Jonesborough to cooperate with General Armstrong in repelling raids coming in that direction. The remainder of Brown’s division was ordered to Rough and Ready, and instructions given General B[rown] to fortify that place and keep a good lookout on all roads for raiders from direction of West Point railroad. Every precaution has been taken by the commanding general to keep our line of communication from being cut by the enemy. Adjutant and Inspector-General Wayne has been directed to arm and send the militia up as rapidly as possible. The enemy are reported to be moving down the river; their wagons are going down on the opposite side. Official dispatches of the 19th instant were received from Major-General Wheeler. He reports having captured Dalton and a lot of supplies, 300 fine mules, and destroyed 35 miles of railroad with the loss of only 30 men since his departure from this place. On the whole the reports of his operations are very encouraging.

CONFEDERATE PERSONAL ACCOUNTS

At least five published accounts by Confederate soldiers of the August 20th Cavalry engagement near Lovejoy are known, and doubtless others unpublished records exist in various archives. A Civil War-era photograph of several Texas cavalrymen is shown in Figure 42. A colored photograph of Private Peter Acker, Company C, 3rd Texas Cavalry is shown in Figure 43. Private Acker may not have participated in the August 20th action, but his portrait provides clues to the general appearance of the enlisted soldiers in the 3rd Texas Cavalry (Acker 2007).

Figure 40. Unidentified Texas Cavalrymen (Terrystexasrangers.org 2007).

Figure 41. Private Peter Acker, Company C., 3rd Texas Cavalry (Scvlonestardefenders.homestead.com 2007).

Sergeant Victor M. Rose (1960:154-156) was a veteran of Company A, 3rd Texas Cavalry. Rose’s Texas Brigade, Rose was captured by Kilpatrick’s Cavalry on August 20 and spent the rest of the war in a Union prison. In the late 1880s, Rose recounted the battle from the Confederate’s perspective:

Not being fully satisfied with the result of McCook’s failure, General Sherman dispatched General Kilpatrick on a similar mission. The Legion was on picket. This brave old regiment, handled by its gallant Colonel, John H. Broocks, contested the ground to the last, but was compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers, and Kilpatrick turned the flank of the Confederate position, and proceeded to the rear; but the vigilant Ross soon had his men in the saddle and in pursuit. A little after daylight, Ross struck the enemy in the flank, and inflicted considerable loss on him. But the innumerable attacks made on this raiding column by Ross’ Brigade, are now impossible of description. Suffice it to say, that no opportunity for attack was allowed to go unimproved. Finally, Kilpatrick attempted to enter Lovejoy Station, and finding a division of infantry there, retired. General Ross had formed his brigade in the enemy’s rear, expecting to be supported by the brigades of
Cosby and Ferguson—neither of which put in an appearance. Finding the infantry too strong for him, and meeting with an unexpected attack from Ross in the rear, Kilpatrick attempted to intimidate the Texans by a furious shelling, and then charged through the line—a feat by no means remarkable, when we consider that Ross did not have exceeding five hundred men, and Kilpatrick as many thousands. Add to this the fact that the Texans were dismounted, and armed with short guns—not having a bayonet in the brigade—and it will not be wondered at that they did not repulse a cavalry charge of ten times their number. Ross lost two or three men killed and wounded, and about thirty prisoners, many of whom escaped the first night.

Scarcely had the charging column passed the line, when the indomitable Ross had his bugler to sound the rally, and, in an incredibly short space, renewed his unceasing attacks upon the enemy’s rear. From this time on, Kilpatrick found no rest, and, evidently, was bent upon the sole plan of making the best of his way out of a bad scrape. He was somewhat more fortunate than his predecessors McCook, and made Sherman’s lines in pretty good order. As the author was captured in the charge at Lovejoy Station, the remainder of the narrative is told as it was told to him. Nothing like a minute description has been attempted in the hasty tracing of the Georgia campaign. Each day was a battle, without characteristics to distinguish it from the battle of the day before, or that of the next day; and that campaign, being, as it was, one series of contests, will always defy the efforts of the conscientious historian. He may deal with it in the concrete—in the abstract, never. (Rose 1960:154-156).

2nd Lieutenant Samuel Benton Barron, Company C was another 3rd Texas Cavalry veteran, who provided this post-war description of the August 20 battle:

Just before night we passed through Jonesboro, which is ten or twelve miles from Fairburn, and allowed Kilpatrick to occupy the town for the night. Ross’ brigade occupied a position south of the town near the railroad, while Armstrong was west; General Ferguson, whose brigade was numerically stronger than either of the others, being directed to go out on a road leading east. As we afterwards learned, they failed to find their road, or got lost, and, so far as I remember, were not heard from for a day or two. Thus posted, or intended to be posted, the understanding and agreement was that we should make a triangular attack on Kilpatrick at daylight the next morning.

Our brigade moved on time and marched into the town, only to learn that, with the exception of a few stragglers who had overslept themselves, not a Federal soldier was to be found. The brigade followed them eastwardly from Jonesboro, and in due time came up with their rear-guard at breakfast behind some railworks near Lee’s Mill, and from this time until along in the afternoon we had a pretty warm time with their rear. They were moving on a road that intersects the McDonough and Lovejoy road, and when they struck this road they turned in the direction of Lovejoy Station.

We finally came up with the main force ensconced behind some heavy railworks on a hill near a farmhouse a short distance east of the station. We had to approach them, after leaving the timber, through a lane probably three-quarters of a mile in length. The farm was mostly uncultivated, and had been divided into three fields by two cross-fences, built of rails running at right angles with the lane, and these were thrown right and left to admit of the free passage of cavalry. In the eastern cross fence, however, a length some twenty or thirty yards, and but a few rails high, was left standing, when a ditch or ravine running along on the west side was too deep to be safely crossed by cavalry. In this lane the command dismounted, leaving the horses in the hands of holdfasts, and deployed in line in the open field, to the left or south side of the lane, and a section of Croft’s Georgia battery was placed on an elevation to the right of the lane. I had been sent back to Lee’s Mill to hurry up a detail left to bury one of our dead, so was behind when the line was formed.

Having, on the day we fought McCook, picked up a mule for my boy Jake to ride, I now had him leading my horse to rest his back, while I rode the mule. I rode up and gave my rein to a horse-holder, and was hurrying on to join the line when they charged the railworks, and when I got up with them they had begun to fall back. The brigade, not having more than four hundred men for duty, was little more than a skirmish line. During the day General Hood had managed to place General Reynolds’ Arkansas brigade at Lovejoy Station, which fact Kilpatrick had discovered, and while we were showing our weakness in an open field one side, General Reynolds managed to keep his men under cover of timber on the other. Thus Kilpatrick found himself between an unknown infantry force in front and a skirmish line of dismounted cavalry and a section of artillery in his rear. He concluded to get out of this situation—and he succeeded. Being repulsed in the charge on the railworks, by a heavy fire of artillery and small arms, we fell back and reformed our line behind the first cross fence. Three regiments of the enemy then rapidly moved out from behind their works, the Fourth United States, Fourth Michigan, and Seventh Pennsylvania, and charged with sabers, in columns of fours, the three columns abreast. As they came on us at a sweeping gallop, with their bright sabers glittering, it was a grand display. And Ross’ brigade was there and then literally run over, trampled under foot, and, apparently annihilated. Just before the charge they had shelled our horses in the lane, which, consequently, had been moved back
into the timber. What could we do under the circumstances? If we had time to hold a council of war and had deliberated over the matter ever so long, we would probably have acted just as we did; that is, acted upon the instinct of self-preservation, rather than upon judgment. No order was heard; not a word spoken; every officer and every man took in the whole situation at a glance: no one asked or gave advice: no one waited for orders. The line was maintained intact for a few seconds, the men emptying their pieces at the heads of the columns. This created a momentary flutter without checking their speed, and on they came in fine style. There was no time for reloading, and every one instinctively started for the horses a mile in the rear, a half mile of open field behind us, and all of us much fatigued with the active duties performed on the sultry summer day. Being very much fatigued myself and never being fleet of foot, I outran only two men in the brigade, Lieutenant W. H. Carr, of Company C, and W. S. Coleman, of Company A, of the Third Texas, who were both captured, and I kept up with only two others, Captain Noble and Lieutenant Soap, also of the Third Texas. We three came to the ravine already described, at the same instant. Soap dropped into it, Noble jumped over and squatted in the sage grass in the corner of the fence. I instantly leaped the ravine and the rail fence, and had gone perhaps ten or fifteen steps when the clatter of horses' hoofs became painfully distinct, and "Surrender, sir!” rang in my ear like thunder.

Now, I had had no thought of the necessity of surrendering, as I had fondly hoped and believed I would escape. Halting, I looked up to ascertain whether these words were addressed to me, and instantly discovered that the column directly in my wake was dividing, two and two, to cross the ravine, coming together again just in front of me, so that I was completely surrounded. This was an emergency. As I looked up my eyes met those of a stalwart rider as he stood up in his stirrups, his drawn saber glittering just over my head; and, as I hesitated, he added in a kind tone: "That's all I ask of you, sir." I had a rifle in my hand which had belonged to one of our men who had been killed near me during the day. Without speaking a word, I dropped this on the bare ground in token of my assent. "All right," said he, as he spurred his horse to overtake some of the men who had been killed near me during the day. The first shell our men threw after I fell came near killing me, as a large piece plowed up the ground near enough to my back to throw dirt all over me. Their ammunition, however, was soon exhausted, the guns abandoned; and that danger at an end. As things grew more quiet the awful fear seized me that my ruse would be discovered and I be abused for my deception, and driven up and carried to prison. This fear haunted me until the last. Now, to add to the discomfort of my situation, it began to rain, and never in my life had I felt such a rain. When in my fall I struck the ground my hat had dropped off, and this terrible rain beat down in my face until the flesh was sore. But to move an arm or leg, or to turn my face over for protection was to give my case completely away, and involved, as I felt, the humiliation of a prison life; than which nothing in the bounds of probability in my life as a Confederate soldier was so horrible, in which there was but one grain of consolation, and that was that I would see my brother and other friends who had been on Johnson's Island for some months.

The last danger encountered was when some dismounted men came near driving some pack mules over me. Finally everything became so quiet that I ventured to raise my head, very slowly and cautiously at first, and as not a man could be seen I finally rose to my feet. Walking up to a wounded Pennsylvania cavalryman I held a short conversation with him. Surveying the now deserted field, so lately the scene of such activity, and supposing as I did that Ross' brigade as an organization was broken up and destroyed, I was much distressed. I was left alone and afoot, and never expected to see my horse or mule any more, which in fact I never did, as Kilpatrick's cavalry, after charging through the field, had turned into the road and staped our horses.

I now started out over the field in the hope of picking up enough plunder to fit myself for service in some portion of the army. In this I succeeded beyond my expectation, as I found a
pretty good, completely rigged horse, only slightly wounded, and a pack-mule with pack intact, and I soon loaded the mule well with saddles, bridles, halters, blankets, and oil cloths. Among other things I picked up a Sharpe’s carbine, which I recognized as belonging to a messmate. While I was casting about in my mind as to what command I would join, I heard the brigade bugle sounding the assembly! Sweeter music never was heard by me. Mounting my newly-acquired horse and leading my pack-mule, I proceeded in the direction from which the bugle notes came, and on the highest elevation in the field, on the opposite side of the lane, I found General Ross and the bugler. I told my experience, and heard our gallant brigadier’s laughable story of his escape. I sat on my new horse and looked over the field as the bugle continued to sound the assembly occasionally, and was rejoiced to see so many of our men straggling in from different directions, coming apparently out of the ground, some of them bringing up prisoners, one of whom was so drunk that he didn’t know he was a prisoner until the next morning.

Near night we went into camp with the remnant collected, and the men continued coming in during the night and during all the next day. To say that we were crestfallen and heartily ashamed of being run over is to put it mildly; but we were not so badly damaged, after all. The horse-holders, when the horses stampeded, had turned as many as they could out of the road and saved them. But as for me, I had suffered almost a total loss, including the fine sword that John B. Long had presented me at Thompson’s Station, and which I had tied on my saddle. My faithful Jake came in next morning, and although he could not save my horse, he had saved himself, his little McCook mule and some of my soldier clothes. My pack-mule and surplus rigging I now distributed among those who seemed to need them most. Including officers, we had eighty-four or eighty-five men captured, and only sixteen or eighteen of these were carried to Northern prisons.

Among them were seven officers, including my friend Captain Noble, who was carried to Johnson’s Island, and messed with my brother until the close of the war. Captain Noble had an eye for resemblances. When he first saw my brother he walked up to him and said, “I never saw you before, but I will bet your name is Barron, and I know your brother well.” The other prisoners who escaped that night and returned to us next day included my friend Lieutenant Soap, who brought in a prisoner, and Luther Grimes, owner of the Sharp’s carbine, already mentioned, who had an ugly saber wound in the head. I remember only two men of the Third Texas who were killed during the day—William Kellum of Company C, near Lee’s Mill; and John Hendricks, of Company B, in the charge on the railworks. These two men had managed to keep on details from one to two years, being brought to the front under orders to cut down all details to increase the fighting strength, and they were both killed on the field the first day they were under the enemy’s fire. Among the wounded was Captain S. S. Johnson, of Company K, Third Texas, gunshot wound, while a number of the men were pretty badly hacked with sabers. Next day General Ross went up to General Hood’s headquarters and said to him: “General, I got my brigade run over yesterday.” General Hood replied, “General Ross, you have lost nothing by that, sir. If others who should have been there had been near enough to the enemy to be run over, your men would not have been run over.” This greatly relieved our feelings, and the matter became only an incident of the campaign, and on the 22d day of August Ross’ brigade was back in its position ready for duty (Barron 1964:162-169).

Barron also provided some information about the weary condition of the 3rd Regiment at the time of battle. “Our duties, until the 18th of August, were about the same as they had been formerly—heavy picketing and daily skirmishing. The casualties, however, were continually depleting our ranks: the dead were wrapped in their blankets and buried; the badly wounded sent to the hospitals in Atlanta, while the slightly wounded were sent off to take care of themselves; in other words, were given an indefinite furlough to go where they pleased, so that a slight wound became a boon greatly to be prized. Many returned to Mississippi to be cared for by some friend or acquaintance, while some remained in Georgia” (Barron 1964). Barron’s account suggests that the Texas Brigade consisted of only about 400 able bodied men on the battle line and some of those may have been horse tenders (William K. Nolan personal communication June 27, 2007).

9th Texas Cavalry, Commanded by Colonel Dudley W. Jones (1842-1869)

Several soldiers in the 9th Texas Cavalry left written accounts of their involvement in Ross’ Texas Cavalry Brigade in the Atlanta Campaign.

Lieutenant George L. Griscom, Adjutant, 9th Texas Cavalry, kept a diary account of the events at Lovejoy, which has survived. His entry for August 15 noted that the 9th Texas Cavalry was preparing to interdict the U.S.
raiders, and he noted skirmishes on August 16 and 17. On August 18, the 9th Texas remained in camp and on August 19, the Texas brigade saddled up. On that day Colonel Dudley W. Jones, commander of the 9th Texas, was wounded when his horse fell on him and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas G. Berry assumed command. Griscom’s entries for August 19-22, 1864 are presented below:

19th – Brigade saddles up at 12-1/2 AM moves out to support 6th on Picket. Col. Jones leads ½ regiment charges, makes them recoil, Legion comes to 9th assistance

Col. Jones wounded when horse falls on him (Aug. 19, 1864).

Smith Co. H & Lee Perkins Co. D wounded.

Lt. Col Berry assumes command (9th throughout raid) Regiment ordered to detour (conduct a movement to regain contact from the front or flank) across Jonesboro & Fayetteville Road. Engage them and are repulsed or rather flank back. 3rd Fights them on the RR. 9th makes another detour and join Brigade which goes to Bucks Crossroads, charge them with pistols in two battalions, repulsed by dismounted line & again move to front on the Jonesboro & Fayetteville road and wait their approach. 9th forming in a column of squadrons and feed our horses. When skirmishing begins the 9th dismounts and builds works, but they come with such force that we fell across the Flint River and skirmish again with the Legion on line. We fall back to Jonesboro, and are shelled out of town. We fall back with the 9th east of the RR and the Brigade west. 9th and 27th Skirmish nearly all night. Federals occupy Jonesboro. Capt. A. R. Wells Killed B Co. 1 wounded by shell in Jonesboro, Lt JE More, Co a wounded, W.P. Reece Co D & J.A. Vines, Co I wounded.

August 20, 1864 – Moved up at light through Jonesboro & camp there – out about 100 – 4 men 30 horses lost in 9th Texas Cav.


28th Arty(Sloan&M. Miller] – Loss Kilpatrick [Brig.Gen. Judson Kilpatrick](56) raid 2 killed, 20 wounded, 4 captured – The captured were D. S. Alvey (Bugler), T. Butler & Sgt L. A. Porter Co. “E” M. King Co. “A” Capt. – After running over us He [Kilpatrick] was persuadeed by Armstrong (200), ran him via McDonough capturing much plunder, horses &c – we get many horses (all his pack train) many prisoners & plunder & kill about 100 – 4 men 30 horses lost in 9th Texas Cav.

August 22, 1864 – Move via the RR to the vicinity of Eastpoint & camp – report of Killed and wounded on raid shows 1 officer] 1 man killed, 2 officers 18 men wounded & 10 missing (7 of whom afterwards come in)”. (Griscom 1976).

Private A.W. Sparks (1901), who was a veteran of Company I, 9th Texas Cavalry, wrote a history of the 9th Texas Cavalry. Sparks provided another Confederate’s description of the August 20, 1864 action from the perspective of an enlisted man:

The Legion was on picket. This brave old regiment, handled by its gallant Colonel, John H. Broocks, contested the ground to the last, but was compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers, and Kilpatrick turned the flank of the Confederate position, and proceeded to the rear; but the vigilant Ross soon had his men in the saddle and in pursuit. A little after daylight, Ross struck the enemy in the flank, and inflicted considerable loss on him. But the unnumerable attacks made on this raiding column by Ross’ Brigade, are now impossible of description. Suffice it to say, that no opportunity for attack was allowed to go unimproved. Finally, Kilpatrick attempted to...
enter Lovejoy Station, and finding a division of infantry there, retired. General Ross had formed his brigade in the enemy’s rear, expecting to be supported by the brigades of Cosby and Ferguson - neither of which put in an appearance. Finding the infantry too strong for him, and meeting with an unexpected attack from Ross in the rear, Kilpatrick attempted to intimidate the Texans by a furious shelling, and then charged through the line - a feat by no means remarkable, when we consider that Ross did not have exceeding five hundred men, and Kilpatrick as many thousands. Add to this the fact that the Texans were dismounted, and armed with short guns - not having a bayonet in the brigade - and it will not be wondered at that they did not repulse a cavalry charge ten times their number. Ross lost two or three men killed and wounded, and about thirty prisoners, many of whom escaped the first night.

Scarcely had the charging column passed the line, when the indomitable Ross had his bugler to sound the rally and, in an incredibly short space, renewed his unceasing attacks upon the enemy’s rear. From this time on, Kilpatrick found no rest, and, evidently, was bent upon the sole plan of making the best of his way out of a bad scrape. He was somewhat more fortunate than his predecessor, McCook, and made Sherman-like lines in pretty good order. As the author was captured in the charge of Lovejoy Station, the remainder of the narrative is told as it was told to him. Nothing like a minute description has been attempted in the hasty tracing of the Georgia campaign. Each day was a battle, without characteristics to distinguish it from the battle of the day before, or that of the next day; and that campaign, being, as it was, one series of contests, will always defy the efforts of the conscientious historian. He may deal with it in the concrete - in the abstract, never (Sparks 1901).

Sparks (1901) also provides us with unique information about the disposition of those members of the Texas Brigade, who were captured by Kilpatrick’s troops and eventually sent to prison at Camp Chase, Ohio.

Kilpatrick succeeded in getting away from Lovejoy Station with about thirty or forty of the Texas Brigade, among whom are now remembered: Captain Noble; Lieutenants Teague, Moon and West; Privates Crabtree, Pirtle, Nidever, Mapes, "Major" White, Reuben White, Fluellen, and Ware. The march of the prisoners to the lines of General Sherman was fatiguing in the extreme. The Confederates had been in the saddle for three consecutive days, during which time they had partaken of not one regular meal; and the Union troopers were almost as destitute of rations, though what little they had was generously divided with their famished prisoners. The prisoners were well treated by their captors. It was only the "home guard" who delighted in misusing these unfortunates of war, just as the professional politician on either side refuses even now to be placated. The men who confronted each other in battle were too brave to feel pleasure in inflicting pain on a prisoner. The braves of Hancock, Custer, McClellan, and Rosecranz are not the men who have kept the "bloody shirt" waving; nor are the men of Joe Johnston, Beauregard. Maxy, and Ross, found among the impracticables, who, like his excellency, the late President Jeff. Davis, imagine the Confederacy still exists. General Sherman’s convention with General Johnston expressed the sentiments of the soldiers on either side. Arriving at Sherman’s quarters the prisoners were placed in the "bull-pen," and given a "square" meal of "hard-tack" and "sow-belly," as crackers and bacon were called by the Federals. In the "bull-pen" were a number of whining, canting, oath-seeking hypocrites and sycophants, who, with the characteristic zeal of new converts, employed their time in maligning everything connecting with their suffering section, and in extolling the superior civilization of the North. The fiery and impetuous Crabtree could not brook this despicable servility, and he undertook to do battle, singly and alone, in vindication of the South. A lively "scrimmage" was on the tap, Crabtree knocking his opponents right and left, when the guard interposed on behalf of the new converts, whom every brave Unionist secretly despised. After a day or two spent here, the prisoners were placed on the cars and conveyed to Nashville (Sparks 1901).

The diary and letters of Lieutenant Colonel James Campbell Bates, Company H, 9th Texas Cavalry pertaining to his service in the Texas Cavalry Brigade are published (Lowe 1999). Bates suffered a severe facial wound in the war but he continued to serve in the cavalry. He served with Ross’ Brigade in the Atlanta Campaign. His account provides an excellent understanding of the men who served in the Texas Cavalry for the Confederacy.

The Memphis-Atlanta Appeal published in Macon, Georgia, September, 1864 noted specific locations of the Confederate soldiers: “Ross and Ferguson’s commands, on foot, were in front and on each side of the battery, behind rail breast-works. A brigade of Cleburne’s division was on the left of the road, in three lines, the last one in a piece of woods, about one hundred yards in rear of the position of the battery. On the right of the road [east side] the State troops were formed in line” (Vale 1886:357).
Based on this newspaper description the troop positions on the battlefield would have looked something like this:

A brigade of Cleburne’s ROAD On right of road, state troops
Division (on left of road formed in a line
In three lines)

WOODS

___________________
___________________
___________________

Approximately 100 yards

Confederate Battery

Additional sources provide clues and information of Confederate positions. Union Officer Lieutenant W.S. Scott of the 1st U.S. Cavalry wrote, “The rebels had formed two or three lines with infantry behind barricades of fence rails and logs, as it seems they had anticipated a charge, and they were not disappointed in their expectations. When our troops [Union] were forming, two batteries opened up on our lines from the front and the [Confederate] infantry was closing up from our now rear from the railroad” (Curry 1984:179-181).

The following excerpt from All Afire to Fight The Untold Tale of the Civil War’s Ninth Texas Cavalry brings individuals and events to life from the Confederates’ perspective:

At first light the next morning, August 20, the brigade cautiously moved back through Jonesboro, stopping only long enough to bury the captain who had been killed the day before. Six miles south at Lovejoy Station, they found Confederate infantry and artillery and Jackson’s other cavalry regiments attacking the front of Kilpatrick’s column. Near noon, Ross spotted the rear of the Federal column in woods thick with undergrowth. He reported to Jackson from Mrs. Carnes’s Gin House, “I have a plain view of at least 4,000 formed in line.” Ross dismounted his 400, put his artillery to work and attacked.

Kilpatrick was getting low on ammunition, and when Ross attacked his rear, the Yankee general realized he was surrounded. He gathered his forces behind the crest of a hill and prepared to cut his way out. In order to reach a road that led to safety, he decided to ride through Ross’s Brigade with his advantage of ten to one. Kilpatrick formed three regiments abreast in column of fours and three in close columns with regimental front, each regiment in line, the men side by side, boot to boot. They drew their sabers to avoid firing into their own men.

The Federal cavalrmen trotted to the crest of the hill, then charged at a gallop, leaping fences, ditches, and barricades, seeking safety beyond Ross’s dismounted men. Ross’s battery fired into them, but they rode straight into the Texans. For an instant Sam Barron watched in astonishment, then realized each man was on his own in the melee of plunging horses and slashing sabers. “No order was heard; not a word spoken; every officer and man took in the whole situation at a glance,” he said. The men remained in line only long enough to empty their guns. There was no time to reload. They instinctively ran for the horses. Rebel artillerymen fired into the horde of Federals until their last shell was spent before sprinting toward cover. The deafening roar of canister and small arms exploding down a lane caused splinters on the fences to vibrate like the noise of a Jew’s harp. John Dunn was sure “the whole of us would go up.” On came the Yankees, swinging sabers at everyone within range. Ross’s horse holders drove as many horses into the brush as possible. The rest stampeded.

Jesse was running for cover when a Yankee galloped by and swung his saber at Jesse’s head. Jesse ducked, but the saber caught him, laying open his scalp. He ran through the brush and across gullies, blood pouring down his collar. His company comrades E. J. Brown and J. E. Moore were wounded. E. M. King was captured. The three Perkins boys of Company D were all wounded.

Sam Barron, Capt. S. E. Nobel, and Lt. Tom Soape of the Third ran for a ravine. Nobel jumped across and squatted in tall grass in a fence corner. Soape dropped into the ravine. Sam leaped the ravine, then the fence. Nobel and Soape were captured. Sam had gone fifteen steps when a mounted Yankee was on him. “Surrender, sir!” rang in Sam’s ear. The Yankee was standing up in his stirrups with his saber glittering just over Sam’s head. Sam hesitated. The man said in a quiet voice, “That is all I ask of you, sir.” Sam dropped the carbine he was carrying. “All right,” the Yankee said, and spurred his horse to join his friends.

Sam stood still. Columns of Yankees galloped past on each side of him. Artillery burst overhead. When a shell exploded nearby, Sam grabbed his abdomen above his right hip and fell “as long a fall as I could toward the center of a little space between the columns.” He was careful to fall on his right side to hide his
pistol. He lay still, playing the dead man as best he could while Yankee cavalrmen raced past. Sam could hear their voices, could feel the pounding of hooves near him. He did not move.

The action eventually moved off. In the silence, an awful fear came over Sam that he would be discovered and carried away to prison, “a most horrible consequence.” Rain began to fall. rain so hard it made the flesh on his face hurt. Yankee soldiers drove a train of pack mules so near they almost stepped on Sam. He dared not move. Finally, it became so quiet Sam opened his eyes. He slowly raised his head and looked around. Not a man was in sight. He stood. Kilpatrick was gone.

Sam was “no stranger to hardships of a soldier’s life.” He had “endured the coldest weather with scant clothing, marched day after day and night after night without food or sleep” until his power of endurance was “well-nigh exhausted,” but never did he “find anything quite so tedious as playing dead.”

Sam started out over the field in search of enough plunder to fit himself out. He was sure Ross’s Brigade as an organization was broken up, but he would find another place to serve. He found a completely rigged horse, only slightly wounded, and a pack mule, which he loaded with saddles, bridles, blankets, and oilcloths. Sam even picked up the Sharps carbine he had dropped when he surrendered.

While thinking of which command he would join, a bugle call rent the air, a bugle call Sam instantly recognized. It was Ross’s bugler sounding assembly, the sweetest music Sam had ever heard. He rode toward the bugle and found General Ross and his bugler on the highest elevation in the field, calling in the scattered men.

From the dark clouds that had gathered, torrents of rain again began to pour on the exhausted men. Out of the wet timber and brush Texans struggled into camp from every direction, “seeming to come out of the ground.” Tom Soape had captured his captors and marched them into the Texans’ camp at gunpoint. Other men brought in a prisoner [Union] who was so drunk he did not know he had been captured until the next morning. Many of the horses had been saved by being turned into the brush by the holders. Bivouacking on the field that evening, the Texans were “crestfallen and heartily ashamed” of being run over, but they were not seriously damaged.

The next morning men scoured the battlefield for Yankee plunder: horses, saddles, guns, clothing, cooking utensils, food, and most of Kilpatrick’s pack train. John’s mess gathered enough rations to last a week. Sam’s slave came in on his mule, bringing a few of Sam’s clothes. The train and “much plunder” were taken by Frank Anderson’s Mississippi cavalrmen, who took up the chase after the Federals ran over Ross’s men.

Gris and the other regimental adjutants tallied their casualties. Gris discovered that sixty men in the Ninth had been captured, but only four failed to return to the regiment before the week was out. No one in the Ninth was killed when the brigade was run over, but the chase from Owl Creek to Jonesboro had been costly. In addition to the four men captured in the Ninth, two men were killed by shells, another man died of wounds, and twenty-three others were wounded. In the Third, eighty-five men were captured, twenty-three failing to escape. Sgt. Victor Rose, who was wounded during the action, was among those taken north to prison.

From the battlefield the brigade followed the railroad north to West Point the next day. Ross rode to headquarters to report. “General,” he told Hood, “I got my brigade run over yesterday.”

“General Ross, you have lost nothing by that, sir.” Hood assured Ross. “If others, who should have been there, had been near enough to . . . he run over, your men would not have been run over.” Ross’s conversation with Hood buffed a bit of the tarnish off the Texans’ pride. In addition, the men would have been surprised at their fame among the Federals. A courier had raced to Sherman’s headquarters to report that Ross’s Brigade was broken up. Sherman immediately notified his commanders in the field and wired the food news to Chattanooga and on to Washington.

In spite of the wire to Washington, Sherman was disappointed in the raid, yet Kilpatrick and his troopers had done all they could. Sherman reported that Kilpatrick “had a pretty hard fight” and that the Macon & Western would be disabled for ten days at the most. The raid convinced Sherman that cavalry could not do the job. “I expect I will have to swing around to that road in force to make the matter certain,” he told Washington. He soon learned that Hood had sent Wheeler’s cavalry north to harass the Federals’ only railroad. Sherman report, “I could not have asked for anything better,” and started six corps south down the Sandtown road. Kilpatrick’s cavalry led the advance (Crabb 2000:246-250).

3rd Texas Cavalry, Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jiles S. Boggess

The 3rd Texas Cavalry website provides additional insight:
On the morning of the 20th, Union General Kilpatrick’s cavalry was now facing an Arkansas infantry brigade that had dug itself in to defend the railroad at Love Joy station. Pursuing them and now behind them were the four hundred horsemen of Ross’s Cavalry Brigade. Caught between the Arkansas and the Texans, three regiments of Kilpatricks [sic] Cavalry drew sabers and charged the cavalry hitting the 3rd Texas Cavalry Regiment. The 3rd Texas quickly dismounted and formed a firing line. They fired volley’s hoping to halt them and then with drew [sic] to their horses. The [sic] failed to make [it] to their horses before the Union Cavalry rode over Ross’s brigade and scattered men and horses . . . the 3rd Texas was hit the hardest and lost three company commanders, four lieutenants, two sergeants, three corporals and eleven privates killed or captured. The captured officers were sent to Johnson’s Island on Lake Erie and the enlisted men were sent to Camp Chase near Columbus, Ohio. A number of the 3rd Texas Cavalry failed to survive the Camp Chase interment. Several died from chronic diarrhea and bronchitis. The remainder of the captured officers and men of the 3rd Texas were furrowed and allowed to go home in May and June of 1865 (Mark Pollard Papers).

**The Third Texas Cavalry in the Civil War** by Douglas Hale noted: Kilpatrick lined the men, ordered Minty to lead and they charged the nearest Rebel line the 3rd Texas Cavalry who had left their horses in the woods in the rear. The Texans shot one volley and ran. “Every officer and every man took in the whole situation at a glance: no one asked or gave advice: no one waited for orders,” recalled Sam Barron. “Every one instinctively started for the horses a mile to the rear” (Hale 1993:240).

Dr. George Fish (4th Michigan Cavalry) [Union] said, “The enemy’s [Confederate] cannon were so placed as to enable them to command the whole field” (Letters of Dr. George W. Fish p89-90).

Colonel Minty wrote in his report dated August 24, 1864:

> The rebels held their position, behind their works, until we [Minty’s Brigade] were almost on them, when they turned and fled in confusion. We were soon among them, and hundreds fell beneath our keen blades. The race and slaughter continued, through woods and fields, for about three miles, when I [Minty] collected and reformed my command (OR, Vol. 38(2):825-26).

**Historian Douglas Hale noted:**

Miraculously, however, the Third Texas survived to fight another day, although many of its members were captured. For one thing, Kilpatrick was short of ammunition and in too much of a hurry to extricate himself from his still perilous situation to follow through after the blow his troopers had dealt the Rebels . . . Some of the East Texans merely played dead in the rain until Kilpatrick’s horsemen had moved off down the road to the east. Others, like Captain Jesse Wynne, Lieutenant Tom Soape, and Sergeant Nathan Gregg, fought their way out of captivity and seized their own guards. Just before dark, when Ross and his bugler appeared on the opposite side of the field to reassemble his troops, muddy stragglers streamed in from all directions. Though humiliated by the rout and minus a precious battery of artillery. Ross had lost but two killed, twenty wounded, and thirty captured (Hale 1993:241).

**1st Mississippi Cavalry, Commanded by Colonel R. A. Pinson**

Although they are listed in the Order of Battle for the August 20th engagement at Nash Farm, the 1st Mississippi Cavalry actually arrived on the scene after the main action had ended. Nevertheless, members of the Mississippi Cavalry left accounts of the battle. Weigley (2006:66-67) provides this post-war account from a J.G. Deupree of the Nuxee Squadron of the First Mississippi Cavalry (J. G. Deupree 1918:104-105):

General Ross had thrown his brigade across Kilpatrick’s path while our brigade under Armstrong was pressing him in the rear. As the Texans were between Kilpatrick and safety by flight, he withdrew the force fighting us, formed his troops into column by companies and charged through Ross’ thin line that had been stretched out to cover Kilpatrick’s front. The heroic Texans, firing first in the faces of the advancing Federals and then at their backs after they had passed on, inflicted heavy losses on them. Likewise, the men of King’s battery, right in the road of Kilpatrick’s charging column, fired into it one or two rounds as it came on, then, dodging under their guns around and again fired into the retreating column. Afterwards, Armstrong followed rapidly on the heels of Kilpatrick and brought him to bay. Pinson was ordered to dismount his regiment and begin to attack. This he did promptly and furiously. We routed Kilpatrick’s rear-guard and drove it pell-mell a mile or more, though for awhile they put up a stout resistance (Weigley 2006:66-67).
From this perspective of the 1st Mississippi Cavalry, the troop locations on the battlefield would have looked something like this (viewed from East to West):

ROAD
Ross – Texans
King’s Battery
Kilpatrick’s men
Armstrong

2nd Mississippi Cavalry, Commanded by Major John J. Perry

The 2nd Mississippi Cavalry is listed in the Order of Battle for the August 20th action at Nash Farm. This cavalry regiment arrived on the scene, however, after most of the hostilities had ended. On August 19th, J. A. Biggers (2nd Mississippi Cavalry) wrote in his diary,

The Brig. was mounted. Moved out after a Raid that was on the R.R. below Atlanta. My horse having lung fever I stayed with wagon train. The command caught up with Kilpatricks Brigd. of Cavalry at Lovejoy station and running over Ross’ Brigd. escaped by leaving many of their men dead on the field. Our wagon train moved south of the West Point and Atlanta R.R., and stayed there until [sic] 22nd.

(Biggers 1864).

1st Arkansas Mounted Rifles, Commanded by Brigadier General Evander McNair

The 1st Arkansas Mounted Rifles surprised General Kilpatrick’s Cavalry Division at Lovejoy. As a result Kilpatrick envisioned his Cavalry Division as surrounded by infantry and it was this factor that led Kilpatrick to make the decision to charge over Ross’ Texas Cavalry Brigade (McReynolds 2007; Allen 1988; NPS 2007). Private Robert H. Dacus, Company H, Surgeon with the 1st Arkansas Mounted Rifles, provides this account:

On August 20, just as he was ready to strike the road with his brigade of cavalry, our brigade charged him and ran him over to the Ninth Texas Cavalry, who were deployed behind him and watching his movements. The entire movement had been so quietly made that he was not aware of any infantry being nearer than Atlanta. When he found it was infantry in his front, he supposed he was surrounded by infantry, and forming his men in columns of four, he told them they were surrounded by infantry and unless they cut their way out they would be captured, as Stoneman was on a similar raid before this, in this same country. So saying, he ordered his men to draw sabers, and heading the column himself, made a dash for the near. When he struck the Ninth Texas Cavalry, who were dismounted and deployed as skirmishers, dashed through their line without paying attention to them; but when they run onto their horse holders with the horses they saw their mistake. They knew there was no line behind the horses, so they let into cutting and slashing among them. I saw one of the men not long after, who had two saber cuts on his head (Weigley 2006:70).

Columbus Flying/Light Artillery, Commanded by Captain Edward Croft (1815-1896)

Captain Edward Croft, a wealthy merchant and lawyer from Columbus, Georgia, founded the Columbus Flying/Light Artillery December 23, 1861. He recruited men from Georgia and Alabama counties. A war advertisement shows Croft recruiting for 150 men. It was a light artillery battery known as the “Flying Artillery” using 12 pound Howitzers and rifled cannons enabling them to move around the battlefield quickly.

Christopher Daniel (Croft’s Artillery) was captured August 20, 1864, near Jonesboro, Georgia. He was a POW at Camp Chase, Ohio, September 1, 1864, and paroled for exchange at Camp Chase February 25, 1865. Also, Private Nathan W. McLane, (of Croft’s Artillery) was captured and listed as a POW.

Haulin’ Brass Capt. Croft’s Flying Artillery Battery, Columbus, Georgia by William Forbes II, describes the Confederates’ position as follows: “Ross dismounted his troopers in a lane and deployed them ‘in line in the open field to the left or south side of the lane and a section [sic] of Croft’s Georgia Battery was placed on an elevation to the right of the land’ ” (Forbes 1993:211).

Alfred Young stated that his brother George was within thirty feet of the charging column. A correspondent with the Griffin Georgia Rebel,
described George B. Young’s actions (son of William H. Young) as follows:

It was in this charge that the old belching 12-pounder under Lieutenant George B. Young from Columbus, Ga., did noble and effective work. As a column would charge down on him, he would open so wide a break in it that it would pass him without running over his gun. He fired rapidly, turning his gun in three or four directions. The enemy made desperate attempts to take it, and twice General Ross sent word to Lieutenant Young that he had better leave his gun and try and save his men. His reply was, “Not while I have a shot left!” Then General Ross took thirty men and went up to the piece and said, “Well, Young, if you are determined to stay with your gun, we will stay with you.” And, they did stay there ‘til they had fired every round of ammunition he had. Next to the last round, a double charge of grape, cracked the gun but it did not frighten them from firing the last shot. General Ross says, “Lieutenant Young is one of the coolest and bravest man I ever saw under fire. Every one of his men stood by the piece. He lost one killed and five wounded (Forbes 1993:212-213).

A Howitzer is “a type of artillery piece that is characterized by a relatively short barrel and the use of comparatively small explosive charges to propel projectiles at trajectories with a steep angle of descent . . . the howitzer stood between the "gun" (which was characterized by a longer barrel, larger propelling charges, smaller shells, higher velocities and flatter trajectories) and a "mortar" (which has the ability to fire projectiles at even higher angles of ascent and descent) . . . In the mid-nineteenth century, some armies attempted to simplify their artillery parks by introducing smoothbore artillery pieces that were designed to fire both explosive projectiles and cannonballs, thereby replacing both field howitzers and field guns. The most famous of these “gun-howitzers” was the Napoleon 12-pounder, a weapon of French design that saw extensive service in the American Civil War (wikipedia.org 2007).

Interestingly after the battle, Jackson thanked generals Armstrong and Reynolds in their performance, but left out General Ferguson for not capturing Kilpatrick on the previous night of August 19th (Forbes 1993:214).

In Ross’ Texas Brigade by Victor M. Rose, (originally published in 1881), it was noted the Texans were dismounted and armed with short guns. Also of interest it was noted there was not a bayonet in the brigade and they were outnumbered by the cavalry charge ten to one. “Ross lost two or three men were killed or wounded, and about thirty prisoners, many of whom escaped the first night” (Rose 1960:108). This information is conflicting with Fighting With Ross’ Texas Cavalry Brigade C.S.A. Diary of Lieut. George L. Griscom, Adjutant, 9th Texas Cavalry Regiment where Griscom notes “finally fall back to the timber & as soon as their column passed again took the field & commenced assembling – gathering up nearly all the men & horses – loosing but few & not a man killed in the charge." (Griscom 1976:166).

The following description of the Confederates from a Union officer does not match what Rose wrote in Ross’ Texas Brigade:

. . . the rebel infantry had been formed in three lines, about fifty yards apart, in double rank; the first and second lines with fixed bayonets and the third line firing; in both the first and second lines the front rank knelt on one knee, resting the butt of the gun on the ground, the bayonet at a “charge (Vale 1886:347-349).

Confederate Ambulances

The Confederate Army began by taking the several state militias into service, each regiment equipped with a surgeon and an assistant surgeon, appointed by the state governors. The Confederate Medical Department started with the appointment on May 4 of Daniel De Leon, one of three resigned United States surgeons, as acting surgeon general. After a few weeks he was replaced by another acting surgeon general, who on July 1, 1861, was succeeded by Samuel Preston Moore. He took the rank of colonel and stayed on duty until the collapse of the Confederacy . . . There was some debate with the quartermaster general about ambulances, but this was generally over the lack of them. Farm wagons most often constituted the ambulances of the Confederacy (civilwarhome.com 2007).

T. F. Dornblaser (7th Pennsylvania Cavalry) noted the Confederate ambulances in his writings:

In the road we met a number of wagons and ambulances belonging to the enemy [Confederate]. The boys took the hatchets from their saddle-pockets, and cut the spokes, letting the sick and wounded in the ambulances remain undisturbed. The mules were unhitched and taken with us (Dornblaser 1884).
Confederate Prisoners of War (POW)

In an account from *Four Years in the Saddle History of the First Regiment Ohio Volunteer Cavalry*, it was noted “Many of the [Confederate] prisoners had saber cuts on their hands, arms and heads, and it is estimated that from six to eight hundred prisoners were sabered” (Curry 1984:182). The following were POWs from the 3rd Texas Cavalry:

Kilpatrick’s raiders bagged twenty-three members of the Third Cavalry as prisoners of war, the heaviest toll in captured levied on the regiment since Iuka. The list of captives included three company commanders, four lieutenants, two sergeants, three corporals, and eleven privates (Hale 1993:241).

The captured Confederate officers were sent to Johnson’s Island on Lake Erie and the enlisted men were sent to Camp Chase near Columbus, Ohio. A number of the 3rd Texas Cavalry failed to survive the Camp Chase internment. Several died from chronic diarrhea and bronchitis. The remainder of the captured officers and men of the 3rd Texas were furloughed and allowed to go home in May and June of 1865 (Mark Pollard’s Papers).

When captured, Confederate soldiers had a choice to take the oath of allegiance to the United States or remain a captive. The following is a description of what happened to captives and especially “traitors” within the prison camps:

Kilpatrick’s captives . . . having ridden around the entire Rebel army, the Yankee cavalry commander hurriedly withdrew his raiders along a route east of Atlanta and turned his prisoners over to Sherman’s headquarters. The Federal locked their exhausted captives in a guarded enclosure for several days prior to trans-shipment, and fed the famished Rebels on hardtack and bacon. The crowded bull pen contained some disaffected Southerners who were understandably anxious to get out of the war as soon as possible. One of the easiest means to that end was to take the oath of allegiance to the United States provided under Lincoln’s amnesty proclamation of the previous December. Though none of the Third Cavalry prisoners defected, some of the other soldiers were eager to impress their captors with their new-found loyalty to the Union and consequently gave vent to violent imprecations against the South and all it stood for. Resenting these insults to his embattled homeland, Jim Crabtree, a hot-tempered private from Greensville, tore into the turncoats of the bull pen singlehandedly and wrought general havoc until restrained by the guards (Hale 1993:241).

The POWs from the Battle of Nash Farm were shipped to different camps based on officers and enlisted:

From the Atlanta front, the East Texas prisoners of war were conveyed by rail first to Nashville, and then to the transfer point at Louisville, from which they traveled on to their assigned prison camps. To maintain control over the inmates, the Federal authorities separated officers from enlisted men. The Third Cavalry officers were sent to Johnson’s Island, a wind-swept spit of sand in Lake Erie, three miles north of Sandusky, Ohio. There the government had built thirteen two-story barracks enclosed within a plank stockade. When the East Texas officers arrived at their new home on September 2, they found that it contained more than 2,500 inmates . . . The enlisted men captured at Lovejoy’s Station were interned at Camp Chase, a former training facility for Union volunteers near Columbus, Ohio. Among the largest of the twenty-three principal United States military prisons, it held almost 9,500 inmates at the height of its expansion . . . A number of the men from the Third Cavalry failed to survive the Camp Chase experience. Private Reuben Chamberlain died of chronic diarrhea in November. Having once been discharged as under age, Private James Young, a farm boy from Rusk County, had reenlisted only to succumb to bronchitis at Camp Chase in December . . . among February’s toll were Corporal Allen Nidever and Private Burrell White of the Third Texas . . . (Hale 1993:242-244).

CIVILIAN ACCOUNTS

The contemporary press, including newspapers and magazines, were captivated by Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign and many articles about the various battles appeared in print. The present research effort made only a limited review of this line of evidence. The following article appeared in *Harpers Weekly* in March, 1864 and, while it is not specifically about the military action at Lovejoy, it does provide some insight into the public’s perception of General Kilpatrick:

GENERALS KILPATRICK AND CUSTER.

WE give on page 180 a Portrait of BRIGADIER GENERAL JUDSON KILPATRICK, whose late raid in the rear of Lee’s army is the most successful of the war. He was born near Deckertown, Sussex County, New Jersey, on January 14, 1836, and is therefore only 28 years of age. He was admitted to West Point, where he graduated in
1861, and entered the United States army as Second Lieutenant of Artillery on May 6, just after the war broke out. A week after he received a First Lieutenancy. He entered the war as Captain of a company in Duryea’s regiment (Fifth New York), and was severely wounded in the battle at Big Bethel, June 10, 1861. As soon as he recovered he was made Lieutenant-Colonel, and afterward Colonel, of the Harris Light Cavalry. In Pope’s Virginia campaign his regiment formed part of the late General Buford’s brigade. He took part in the Maryland campaign under General Pleasanton, and in Burnside’s campaign he particularly distinguished himself at Falmouth. He participated in Stoneman’s raid, commanding a brigade, and traversing 200 miles in less than five days, capturing over 300 prisoners. For this success he was made Brigadier-General of Volunteers, his commission dating from June 13, 1863. At Aldie, Middleburg, and Hanover, Kilpatrick distinguished himself in the movements preceding the battle of Gettysburg: he also commanded a division in that battle, and was engaged in the pursuit of the rebels to the Potomac. Afterward he came to New York city, where he commanded the cavalry forces during the riots of last summer. General Kilpatrick has lately lost both his wife and child, and is also without father, mother, brother, or sister (Harpers Weekly, March 19, 1864:168).

The following article, which appeared in Harpers Weekly in early September, 1864, contains a letter from General Sherman announcing his capture of Atlanta:

SHERMAN.

The following letter from General Sherman, published in Harpers Weekly, gives the details of the capture of Atlanta:

*ATLANTA, September 7.

*On the 25th of August, pursuant to a plan of which the War Department had been fully advised, I left the Twentieth Corps at the Chatahoochee Bridge, and with the balance of the army I drew off from the siege, and using some considerable artifice to mislead the enemy.

*I moved rapidly south, reached the West Point Railroad near Fairborn on the 27th, and broke up twelve miles of it. When moving east my right approached the Macon Railroad near Jonesborough, and my left near Rough and Ready. The enemy attacked the right wing of the Army of the Tennessee, and were completely beaten.

* On the 31st, and during the combat, I pushed the left of the centre rapidly to the railroad above, between Rough and Ready and Jonesborough.

* On the 1st of September we broke up about eight miles of the Macon Read, and turned on the enemy at Jonesborough, assaulted him and his lines, and carried them, capturing Brigadier-General Gorman and about 2000 prisoners, with eight guns and much plunder. Night alone prevented our capturing all of Hardee’s corps, which escaped south that night. That same night, Hood, in Atlanta, finding all his railroads broken and in our possession, blew up his ammunition, seven locomotives and eighty cars, and evacuated Atlanta, which, on the next day, September 2, was occupied by the corps left for that purpose, Major-General Slocom commanding, we following the retreating rebel army to near Lovejoy’s station, thirty miles south of Atlanta, where, finding him strongly intrenched, I concluded it would not pay to assault as we already had the great object of the campaign, viz., Atlanta. Accordingly the army gradually and leisurely returned to Atlanta; and it is now encamped eight miles south of the city, and tomorrow will move to the camps appointed. I am now writing in Atlanta, so I could not be uneasy in regard to our situation.

*We have as the result of this quick, and, as I think, well executed movement, 27 guns, over 3000 prisoners, and have buried over 400 rebel dead, and left as many wounded; they could not be removed.

*The rebels have lost, besides the important city of Atlanta and stores, at least 500 dead, 2500 wounded, and 3000 prisoners, whereas our aggregate loss will not foot 1500.

*If that is not success, I don’t know what is.

(Signed) “SHERMAN, Major-General.” It was Hardee’s corps, together with General S. L. Lee’s and Cleburne’s commands, which fought the battle of Jonesborough on the rebel side. The rebel Generals Anderson, Patten, and Cummings were wounded. The capture of Atlanta renders useless any of the rebel attempts on Sherman’s communications (Harpers Weekly, September 24, 1864: 651).

CARTOGRAPHIC RECORD

The cartographic record of the military events and battlefield landscape at the Nash Farm vicinity is scanty (The National Archives 1986). The most detailed map of the study area was prepared by U.S. Engineer, Edward Ruger. It shows topography, road systems, streams, houses, and Union and Confederate military entrenchments. Detailed views of Edward Ruger’s 1864 manuscript map of the “Fifth Epoch” of the Atlanta
A few other military maps of the Lovejoy vicinity were identified and examined. One is a manuscript map of “Parts of Fayette, Crofton [sic Clayton] & Henry Cos.”, which was, “copied from a defaced Map brought by Lieutenant H.H. Russell September 5th 1864 by J. Rziha Capt. 19th U.S. Infty” (Rziha 1864). This map, which was presumably a captured Confederate map, depicts portions of three counties, including Fosterville and the study area. This map shows the Union and Confederate lines, as of September 2, 1864, south of Jonesboro, but several miles north of Lovejoy and well to the north of the study area. No troops are shown in the study vicinity on this map. The information shown suggests that the map was drafted early on September 2, 1864, since by later that day, the two armies were engaged in battle in the Lovejoy vicinity.

Figure 42. Portion of Ruger’s 1864 Manuscript Map Showing the Nash Farm Vicinity (Ruger 1864).
Another manuscript map, which shows the U.S. and C.S. troop positions in the Lovejoy vicinity was located at the NARA. This map, which is undated and unattributed, was probably drafted sometime after September 3, since it depicts extensive troops and entrenchments at Lovejoy.
This map is interesting because it also indicates which sections of the railroad had been destroyed, which probably indicates that the map was drafted by a U.S. soldier. A portion of this map is shown in Figure 46.

Figure 44. Portion of Unattributed and Undated Map Entitled Lovejoy Station (NARA n.d.).

The only field sketch discovered thus far, which pertains particularly to the August 20th engagement, is a post-war sketch by Captain Robert Burns (n.d.). This sketch, which is shown in Figure 47, is a schematic diagram showing the troop locations in Minty’s charge.
Later maps of the study area provide important information about the road system and the communities in the study vicinity. The 1883 and 1885 Cram maps of Georgia show the Central and Southern Railroad and Lovejoy’s Station. It also depicts the Babb community and Walnut Creek (Cram 1883, 1885). A map of the area, published by the Hammond Map Company in 1904, shows Lovejoy Station, the railroad, and an unidentified stream (likely Walnut Creek). It also shows the location of the Henry-Clayton County boundary, but no other details of the study area. A map of the area was published by the Hudgins Map Company of Atlanta in 1915. This map shows the railroad, Lovejoy’s Station, Babb, and “Factory Walnut Cr.” (Hudgins Map Company 1915). None of these maps show sufficient details of the study area for an precise and accurate reconstruction of the battlefield landscape.
The earliest aerial photographs of the study vicinity were taken in the late 1930s by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Coverage from this period is incomplete for Clayton and Henry Counties, although the Nash Farm property in Henry County is covered by the 1938 series of aerial images. Later U.S.D.A. aerial imagery was flown in Henry County in 1940, 1950, 1955, 1958, 1964, 1971, and 1978. Later U.S.D.A. aerial imagery was flown in Clayton County in 1949, 1955, 1958, 1964, 1971, and 1978.

**Battle Flags**

Other tangible reminders of the Civil War battles at Lovejoy are the battle flags flown by the two armies. Civil War soldiers and officers “made a big deal” about captured flags, since these flags were objects of honor and tradition. In addition to the Union and Confederate battle flags, each regiment flew its own battle flag. These were typically adorned with embroidered references to the regiments service in important battles or campaigns. Individual companies within each regiment usually brandished their own flag or standard. Because of their organic composition, flags do not normally survive in the archaeological record. Fortunately, many Civil War era flags are curated in museums, archives, and statehouses.

Images of several battle flags that would have flown in the August 20th battle were presented earlier in the report. The Confederate battle flag is an icon that continues to create controversy, inspire, or invoke hatred in the modern-era. The emotional power that was embedded in battle flags is an important point to consider when interpreting past military events to the public. The standard battle flag of the Confederacy was,

... usually square, of various sizes for the different branches of the service: 48 inches square for the infantry, 36 inches for the artillery, and 30 inches for the cavalry. It was used in battle beginning in December 1861 until the fall of the Confederacy. The blue color on the saltpire in the battle flag was navy blue, as opposed to the much lighter blue of the Naval Jack.

The flag's stars represented the number of states in the Confederacy. The distance between the stars decreased as the number of states increased, reaching thirteen when the secessionist factions of Missouri and Kentucky joined in late 1861. ... For some time during the Reconstruction period, public display of any of the Confederate flags was forbidden and treated as contraband in the states occupied by Federal troops. It was also illegal to wear Confederate uniforms or military insignia. On January 25, 1867, federal troops in Rome, Georgia arrested four former Confederate soldiers for participating in a "tableau depicting an officer's funeral", and briefly wearing Confederate uniforms and draping a Confederate battle flag over a casket. The men were imprisoned for three weeks (wikipedia.org 2007).

Historian Hale provides us with a good description of the battle flags captured:

Of all Ross’s regiments, the Third Texas Cavalry suffered the most. Minty’s thundering horsemen bore off their regimental battle flag, proudly inscribed with “Oak Hill,” “Elk Horn,” and the names of other engagements they had so far survived. Privates Will Kellum and John Hendrick, both of Rusk County, were killed (Hale 1993:241).

Important symbolic vestiges from the August 20th Cavalry raid at Nash Farm may exist in a northern museum. From the book, *Ten Years in Washington*, Mary Clemmer Ames (1873:461-463) describes two Confederate battle flags, Benjamin Infantry and Zachary Rangers, which were captured in Kilpatrick’s charge of August 20, 1864 and displayed in Washington, D.C. The present whereabouts of these two flags was not determined, but should be the subject of future exploration. These flags would make a useful addition to the Nash Farm Battlefield Museum and would be an important tool for interpreting the site to the public. Mark Pollard’s research indicates that neither the Benjamin Infantry nor the Zachary Rangers were in the Lovejoy vicinity in the summer of 1864, and he surmises that these flags were taken from the home of a Confederate officer, who lived in the vicinity, where they had been stored for safekeeping. Ms. Ames wrote this about the captured flags,

The war of the Rebellion greatly increased these trophies. The Rebel flags taken in battle, and in surrender, and the Union flags, recaptured from the Confederates, now occupy large apartments in two buildings belonging to the War Department; and are all placed under the supervision of the Adjutant-General. In “Winder's Buildings” hundreds of these flags are deposited, and many hundreds more in the Adjutant-General's office on Seventeenth street. The front and back rooms on the lower floor of the latter house are exclusively devoted to
their preservation. A polite “orderly” is in waiting, with a record-book, which gives the name and history of every flag in the building. The front room is devoted to the Union colors which were re-taken from the rebels. The back room is filled with Confederate flags of every device and hue. Here is the first Confederate flag adopted—an ugly rag, thirteen stars on a blue field, with white and red bars. Its motto: “We will collect our own revenues. We choose our own institutions.”

The colors of the Benjamin Infantry, organized April 24, 1861, bear the inscriptions: “Crown for the brave.” “Strike for your altars and your fires.”

An Alabama flag, of white bunting, with broad cross-bars of blue, sewed on by women’s hands, is inscribed: “Our Homes, our Rights, we entrust to your keeping, brave Sons of Alabama.”

“Sic Semper Tyrannis,” says a tattered banner of fine silk, presented in the first flush of rebellion-fever, with the confidence of assured victory, “by the ladies of Norfolk, to the N. L. A. Blues.” Again, says Virginia: “Our Rights we will maintain.” “Death to Invaders covered with blood.” “Death or Victory,” cries the Zachary Rangers—and again: “Tyranny is hateful to the gods.” (Ames 1873: 461-463; American Memory 2007).

Union officers accounts of the prizes taken on August 20th by Kilpatrick’s U.S. Cavalry included the battle flags for the Benjamin Infantry and the Zachary Rangers. Historian Mark Pollard’s research indicates that neither of these two Confederate units were present in Henry or Clayton counties, Georgia during the summer of 1864. Thus, the capture of these two flags is enigmatic. Pollard offers an explanation in that these flags were taken from the nearby residence of a Confederate officer, where they had been stored for safekeeping.

The Zachary Rangers State Cavalry Company was part of the 27th Georgia Volunteer Infantry. The commander of this regiment at the time of its organization in 1861 was Colonel Levi B. Smith and his second in command was Lieutenant Colonel Charles T. Zachry. The Zachary Rangers were formed as Company H of the 27th Georgia and all were from Henry County. Lieutenant Colonel Zachry’s home was in McDonough, Georgia. His home was recently located to the Nash Farm Battlefield Park. Griffin noted that the Zachary Rangers served in Petersburg, Virginia the latter part of 1864, so they could not have participated in the Lovejoy action. A quick review of the OR shows that Colonel Charles T. Zachry served as a brigade commander in Virginia in August, 1864, and the 27th Georgia was also active in that theatre (Griffin 2003; Mark Pollard personal communication June 1, 2007; OR, Volume 17:1166).

The Benjamin Infantry, or Randals’ (Benjamin) Infantry, was probably the same as the Confederate, 16th Regiment, which was a Tennessee unit.

What happened after the Battle of Nash Farm?

Immediately after the charge at Nash Farm it stormed heavily, a torrential downpour. T. F. Dornblaser (7th Pennsylvania Cavalry) wrote, “While Kilpatrick’s column was moving northward on the McDonough road, at this break-neck speed, the thunder and lightning was terrific, the rain was falling in torrents, the lurid clouds flashed and flamed with the wrath of ten thousand furies” (Dornblaser 1884). Colonel Minty (4th Michigan Cavalry) also recorded, “Immediately after the charge the rain came down in torrents, and it continued to pour without cessation until about 4 o’clock in the morning” (Minty 1891).

An account from the 3rd Texas Cavalry “... no sooner had the Yankee cavalry swept across the ground than a torrential deluge inundated the field, obscured visibility, and prevented the Federal force from pressing its advantage. Some of the East Texans merely played dead in the rain until Kilpatrick’s horsemen had moved off down the road to the east” (Hale 1993:241). The diary of Private Samuel Metz (92nd Illinois Cavalry), currently for sale at horsesoldier.com (Item 217-32), notes general information concerning the Battle of Nash Farm, but something of interest is August 21st and 22nd the pages were wet and water stained providing physical evidence of eyewitness accounts of heavy rain.
A few weeks later, the Battle of Lovejoy Station occurred on September 2-5, 1864, between Union Major General Sherman against Confederate Major General William Bell Hood and all of their armies. In addition to the rugged terrain, the armies had the addition of rotting corpses and carcasses that still littered the ground.

Diagram of Troop Positions at Nash Farm, August 20, 1864

CONFEDERATE TROOPS

A brigade of Cleburne’s ROAD On right of road, state troops
Division (on left of road) formed in a line
3rd Texas Cavalry Regiment (dismounted)
3rd line (in a piece of woods)
2nd line (kneeling w/ butt of gun on ground)
1st line (kneeling w/ butt of gun on ground)
Approximately 100 yards
Confederate Battery

CONFEDERATE CAVALRY

Martin and Jackson Ross and Ferguson
(approaching from rear left) + 1,000 state troops
In rear
The Battle of Lovejoy Station was the final massive engagement of the Atlanta Campaign. Immediately after the Confederate defeat at Jonesboro on September 1, 1864, the Confederate troops retreated southward to Lovejoy Station. The Union army was fast on their heels but by the time the first U.S. troops arrived in the vicinity, the Confederates had already established entrenchments. Both armies dug in as they waited for additional troops to arrive. The Union troops were entrenched just north of Lovejoy Station and the Confederates were entrenched around Lovejoy Station and east along the McDonough Road. Intense skirmishes occurred along the battle front and particularly on the eastern and western flanks. Historian Mark Pollard has compiled an order of battle for this engagement, which is shown below. Although this battle received very little press at the time, and even less attention from military historians in the ensuing decades to the present, it was, nevertheless a major undertaking. The index to the Official Records of the Rebellion list reports of 45 officers (OR Vol. 38(5):772, 778, 779-780, 785). Davis’ 14th Army Corps was headquartered at Jonesboro on that date. Also on September 3, the Chief of Cavalry, Department of the Cumberland, commanded by Brigadier General K. Garrard, had established its headquarters at a, “camp two miles and a half from Lovejoy’s” (OR Volume 38(5):782-783). On September 6, Sherman’s Left Wing, the 16th Army Corps was headquartered near Lovejoy’s Station (OR Volume 38(5). By that time, however the other Union army commands had removed to Jonesboro and other locations.

Correspondence from Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick to Brigadier General Whipple, Chief of Staff, Department of the Cumberland, on September 3, 1864 reveals that Kilpatrick continued to have an interest in the whereabouts of Armstrong’s and Ross’ Confederate Cavalry, who remained in the Lovejoy vicinity in the days after the August 20th engagement. Kilpatrick wrote:
Order of Battle, September 2-5, 1864

Union
23rd Army Corps---Brigadier General John M. Schofield
   80th Indiana Regiment [Infantry?]---Major John W. Tucker
50th Ohio Infantry---Colonel Silas A. Strickland
   Hascall’s Division---Milo Hascall
Howard
   Wood’s Division
      Kneffler’s Brigade
   Kimball’s Division
      3rd Brigade--Grose’s Brigade
      Taylor’s Brigade
4th Army Corps---Major General Stanley [positioned well to the west of Nash Farm study area]

Confederate
Hardee’s---General William J. Hardee
   Lowrey’s Brigade---Colonel John Weir
Stephen D. Lee’s (formerly Hood’s) Corps---Lieutenant General Stephen D. Lee
   French’s Division---Major General S.G. French
Missouri Brigade---Brigadier General Francis M. Cockrell
Ector’s Brigade---Brigadier General William H. Young
General Brink has returned, bringing me information desired in reference to our army. I had a scout last night inside the enemy's lines. Portions of Armstrong's and Ross' commands, mounted and dismounted, watch the enemy's left flank directly opposite me. The enemy, so far as I can learn, unless he has moved during the night, is intrenched about Lovejoy's Station his lines crossing the Jonesborough road and extending to this point. Several car-loads of wounded passed down the road yesterday. Did not stop at but passed through Griffin. Scouts report the enemy's wagon trains to be moving toward Griffin, many of them loaded with green corn. At 2 p.m. yesterday large trains were passing through Fayette Station. As soon as the enemy is forced back beyond Lovejoy's Station I will cross and press in toward Griffin, communicating with our army to the left (OR Volume 38(5):784-785).

Kilpatrick's dateline for this letter to General Whipple was "Glass' bridge, Flint River" and Kilpatrick's Acting Assistant Adjutant General David F. How, identified Kilpatrick's Cavalry headquarters on September 3rd as "Camp near Lovejoy's, Ga." wrote:

The general commanding directs me to inform you that the army will move back tomorrow in the direction of Atlanta. One day's rations have been issued from supply train at these headquarters to some sixty sick and wounded of your division in hospital near Jonesborough. Send ambulances to get them to-day, with a supply of rations (OR Volume 38(5):784-785).

Brigadier General J. M. Schoefield and the 23rd U.S. Army Corps were concentrated on the eastern lank of the Union line. At 9 a.m. on September 3, Schoefield sent this message from the headquarters of the Army of the Ohio, which was "Near Lovejoy's Station, Ga." to Major General Sherman.

Later that day at 6:15 p.m., writing from the same location, Schoefield informed Sherman,

General Garrard added this post note, “My party from Atlanta has returned.” (OR Volume 38(5):783).

At 5 p.m. on September 3, Colonel Israel Garrard, Commander of the Cavalry Division for the Army of the Ohio, wrote to Major J.A. Campbell, Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Ohio, MAJOR: I have the honor to report that I went across on to the McDonough, and Fayetteville road, striking it between three and four miles from Lovejoy's Station. Citizens report that infantry from Atlanta, said to be Lee's corps, was moving all the morning, and that the stragglers were still passing when we reached the
road. A large wagon train was moving on Thursday night and yesterday to Lovejoy’s Station. Last night Ross’ brigade of cavalry camped just this side of the road, and moved this morning to Bear Creek Station below Lovejoy’s. The force that moved on the road this morning had artillery. The people speak of there being a great deal of artillery, and of the infantry being very a great in quantity, but as near as I could ascertain it took the regular column some three or four hours to pass. (OR Volume 38(5):785-786). Major Campbell wrote from the headquarters of the Army of the Ohio, which was “In the Field” to Colonel Garrard that same day.

COLONEL: The commanding general directs me to inform you that the enemy's cavalry is reported formed on his right, threatening our trains, and he desires you to extend your right so as to connect with our infantry's left and protect our trains. Watch the country well on what will be your front and report any movement you may observe (OR Volume 38(5):785-786).

Lieutenant Colonel Fielder A. Jones, Commander of the 2nd Brigade, 3rd Cavalry Division, wrote from his headquarters at a “Camp in the Field” on September 4th to Captain Estes, Assistant Adjutant-General,

I have the honor to report that scouting parties sent out from my command report my front strongly picketed by the enemy, apparently cavalry, on the right, and infantry or dismounted cavalry on the let. Several of their posts were driven in developing quite a strong force in position behind a swampy ravine running nearly parallel to the Glass road. The scouts also report a plantation road, extending from near James Bull's house, on the Glass road, through the plantations of Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Crawford. I also learn from citizens that the same road extends to Lovejoy's Station. The Glass road appears to be open from my position to Flint River, except small patrols of the enemy (OR Volume 38(5):797).

On September 3, Assistant Adjutant-General R.R. Townes conveyed the orders of Major General John A. Logan, Commander of the 15th Army Corps, from the 15th Corps headquarters, which were “In the Field, near Lovejoy’s, Ga.”, to Brigadier General William Harrow [Hazen?], who commanded the 4th Division, which read, “GENERAL: You will be prepared in the morning to construct a barricade on the most defensible ground in rear of the cotton gin, with the by Captain Reese, engineer officer of department staff” (OR Volume 38(5):785-786).

On September 4, 1864, Brigadier General W.B. Hazen, Commander of the 2nd Division, issued Special Field Orders No. 93 from the headquarters of the 15th Army Corps near Lovejoy’s, Georgia. His order read,

I, Brigadier General W. B. Hazen, commanding Second Division, will commence the construction of a barricade on the most defensible position north of the cotton-gin, with the left resting on the railroad, and extending to a point on the right to be designated by Captain C. B. Reese, engineer officer of department staff (OR Volume 38(5):802).

Confederate General John Bell Hood withdrew his troops from Atlanta on September 1, 1864 and retreated to Lovejoy Station. When Major General Sherman received word that the Confederates had withdrawn from Atlanta, he was most elated. On September 3, Sherman sent a telegraph to President Lincoln from Major General Schofield’s headquarters at the McVicker’s house, northeast of Lovejoy, which read, “Atlanta is ours and fairly won” (American Memory 2007; Mark Pollard personal communication February 10, 2007). That same day Major General Sherman’s Aide-de-Camp, L.M. Dayton issued Special Field Orders Number 62 from the headquarters of the Military Division of the Mississippi, which was “In the Field, near Lovejoy’s”. That order read,

The general commanding announces with great pleasure that he has official information that our troops under Major-General Slocum occupied Atlanta yesterday at 11 a.m., the enemy having evacuated the night before, destroyed vast magazines of stores, and blowing up, among other things, eighty car-loads of ammunition, which accounts for the sounds heard by us on the night of the 1st instant. Our present task is, therefore, well done, and all work of destruction on the railroad will cease (OR Volume 38(5):789).

At 9 a.m. on September 4, Sherman wrote from his headquarters, “In the Field, near Lovejoy’s, twenty-six miles south of Atlanta” to Major General Halleck (OR Volume 38(5):791-794):

MY DEAR FRIEND; I owe you a private letter, and believe one at this time will be acceptable to you. I appreciate your position and the delicate responsibilities that devolve on you, but believe you will master and surmount them all. I confess I owe you all I now enjoy of fame, for a I had allowed
myself in 1861 to sink into a perfect "slough of despond," and do believe if I could I would have run away and hid from the dangers and complications that surrounded us. You alone seemed to be confident, and opened to us the first avenue of success and hope, and you gradually put me in the way of recovering from what might have proved an ignoble end. When Grant spoke of my promotion as a major-general of the regular army, I asked him to decline in my name till this campaign tested us. Even when my commission came, which you were kind enough to send, I doubted its wisdom, but now that I have taken Atlanta as much by strategy as by force, I suppose the military world will approve it.

Through the official bulletins you are better acquainted with all the steps of our progress than any other man in the country, but I will try and point out to you more clearly the recent achievement. By the rapid falling off of my command, by expiration of service, I found myself reduced in number, close up against Atlanta, which was so protected by earth-works that I dared not assault. Fortunately Hood detached 6,000 of his best cavalry to break the Macon road, over which his provisions and supplies me. I knew my cavalry was the superior to his, but he managed skillfully to send a brigade of infantry, which, in connection with his cavalry, about 4,000, managed to occupy mine that though Kilpatrick reached the road he could work but little. The damage was soon repaired, and nothing was left me but to raise the siege, and move with army. I moved one corps by night back to the bridge, which had been intrenched, using mostly old rebel works, then withdrawing from the left I got my whole army over on the West Point road, from Red Oak to Fairburn, with the loss of but one man. There I spent one day and broke twelve miles of that road good. I then moved rapidly so that my right flank was within half a mile of the Macon road at Jonesborough, and the left two miles and a half from Rough and Ready. Hood had first sent Lee's corps to Jonesborough and Hardee's to Rough and Ready, but the Army of the Tennessee (my right) approached Jonesborough so rapidly that Hardee's corps was shifted at night also to that flank. Seeing his mistake I ordered Howard rapidly to intrench and hold his position, "threatening," and threw the balance of my army on the road from Rough and Ready to within four miles of Jonesborough. The moment that was done, I ordered Thomas and Schofield to rapidly break up that road, and without rest to turn on Jonesborough and crush that part. My plan was partially, but not thoroughly, executed. Hardee assaulted Howard, but made no progress; left his dead, about 400, and wounded in our hands, and feel behind his own works. I expected Thomas to be ready by 11 a.m., but it was near 4 when he got in; but one corps, Davis', charged down and captured the flank with 10 guns and many prisoners, but for some reason Stanley and Schofield were slow, and night came to Hardee's relief, and he escaped to the south. Hood finding me twenty miles below him on his only railroad, and Hardee defeated, was forced to abandon Atlanta, and retreated eastward, and by a circuit has got his men below me on the line to Macon. I ought to have reaped larger fruits of victory. A part of my army is too slow, but I feel my part was skilful and well executed. Though I ought to have been taken 10,000 of Hardee's men and all his artillery, I must content myself with 500 dead, 2,000 wounded, 2,000 prisoners, 10 guns on the field and 14 in Atlanta, 7 trains of cars captured and burned, many stragglers fleeing in disorder and the town of Atlanta, which after all, was the prize I fought for.

The army is in magnificent heart, and I could go on, but it would not be prudent. Wheeler is still somewhere to my rear, and every mile costs me detachments which I can ill spare. This country is so easily fortified that an enemy can stop an army every few miles. All the roads run on ridges, so that a hundred yards of parapet, with abatis, closes it and gives the wings time to extend as fast as we can reconnoiter and cut roads. Our men will charge the parapet without fear, but they cannot the abatis and entanglements, which catch them at close range. I stay here a few days for effect, and then will fall back and occupy Atlanta, giving my command some rest. They need it. The untold labor they have done is herculean, and if ever your pass our route you will say honestly that we have achieved success by industry and courage. I hope the administration will be satisfied, for I have studied hard to serve it faithfully.

I hope anything I may have said or done will not be construed unfriendly to Mr. Lincoln or Stanton. That negro letter of mine I never designed for publication, but I am, honest in my belief that it is not fair to our men to count negroes as equals. Can't we at this day drop theories, and be reasonable men? Let us capture of course, and use them to the best advantage. My quartermaster now could give employment to 3,200, and relieve that number of soldier who are now used to unload and dispatch trains, whereas those recruiting agents take them back to Nashville, where, so far as my experience goes, they disappear. When I call for expeditions at distant points, the answer invariably comes that they have not sufficient troops. All count the negroes out. On the Mississippi, where Thomas talked about 100,000 negro troops, I find I cannot draw away a white soldier, be- cause they are indispensable to the safety of the river. I am willing to use them as far as possible, but object to fighting with "paper" men.
Occasionally an exception occurs, which simply deceives. We want the best young white men of the land, and they should be inspired with the pride of freemen to fight for their country. If Mr. Lincoln or Stanton could walk through the camps of this army and hear the soldiers talk they would hear new ideas. I have had the question put to me often, "Is not a negro as good as a white man to stop a bullet?" Yes, and a san-bag is better; but can a negro do our skirmishing and picket duty? Can they improvise roads, bridges, sorties, flank movements, &c., like the white man? I say Numbers Soldiers must and do many things without orders from their own sense, as in sentinels. Negroes are not equal to this. I have gone steadily, firmly and confidently along, and I could not have done it with black troops, but with my old troops I have never felt a wavering of doubt, and that very confidence begets success. If I could fix the army, I could not have it where I do. We have good corporals and sergeants and some good lieutenants and captains and those are far more important than good generals. They all seem to have implicit confidence in me. They observe success at points remote, as in this case of Atlanta and they naturally say that the old man knows what he is about. They think I know where every road and by-path is in Georgia, and one soldier swore that I was born on Kenesaw Mountain. George Thomas, you know, is slow, but as true as steel; Schofield is also slow and leaves too much to others; Howard is a Christian elegant gentleman, and conscientious soldier. In him I made no mistake. Hooker was a fool. Had he staid a couple of weeks he could have marched into Atlanta and claimed all the honors. I therefore think I have the army on which you may safely build. Grant has the perseverance of a Scotch terrier. Let him alone, and he will overcome Lee by unerring and unceasing efforts. The Mobile column is the one that needs a head, and no time should be wasted on the city. The river Montgomery and Columbus, Ga., are the strategic points. The latter has a double line by Montgomery and the Appalachicola River. It will not be safe to push this line farther until that is done, but stores and supplies may be accumulated here, and the country behind Chattahoochee purged a little more.

To-morrow is the day for the draft, and I feel far more interested in it than any event that ever transpired. I do think it has been wrong to keep our old troops so constantly under fire. Some of those old regiments that we had at Shiloh and Corinth have been with me ever since, and some of them have lost 70 per cent. in battle. It looks hard to put those brigades, now numbering less than 800 men, into battle. They feel discouraged, whereas if we could have a steady influx of recruits the living would soon forget the dead. The wounded and sick are lost to us, for once at a hospital they become worthless. It has been very bad economy to kill off our best men and pay full wages and bounties to the drift and substitutes. While all at the rear are paid regularly, I have here regiments that have not been paid for eight months, because the paymaster could not come to them. The draft judiciously used will be popular, and will take as many opponents of the war as advocates, whereas now our political equilibrum at the North seems disturbed by the absence of the fighting element, whereas the voting population is made up of sneaks, exemptions, and cowards. Any nation would perish under such a system if protracted.

I have not heard yet of the Chicago nominations, but appearances are that McClellan will be nominated. The phases of "Democracy" are strange indeed. Some fool seems to have used my name. If forced to choose between the penitentiary and White House for four years, like old Professor Molinard, I would say the penitentiary, thank you, sir. If any committed would approach me for political preferment, I doubt if I could have patience or prudence enough to preserve a decent restraint on myself, but would insult the nation in my reply.

If we can only carry our people past this fall, we may escape the greatest danger that ever threatened a civilized people. We as soldiers best fulfill our parts by minding our own business, and I will try to do that.

I wish you would thank the President and Secretary for the constant support they have given me, and accept from my personal assurance that I have always felt buoyed up by the knowledge that you were there.

On September 7, Sherman wrote from his headquarters, "In the Field, Atlanta, Ga.", to his friend, Tyler in Louisville, summarizing his conquests over the past several weeks and also explaining his most recent retreat from Lovejoy.

On the 25th of August, pursuant to a plan of which the War Department had been fully advised, I left the Twentieth Corps at the Chattahoochee bridge, and, with the balance of the army, I drew off from the siege, and using some considerable artifice to mislead the enemy, I moved rapidly south, and reached the West Point railroad, near
Fairburn, on the 27th, and broke up twelve miles of it; then moving east my right approached the Macon railroad near Jonesborough, and my left near Rough and Ready. The enemy attacked the right, Army of the Tennessee, and was completely beaten on the 31st, and during the combat I pushed the left and center rapidly on the railroad above between Rough and Ready and Jonesborough. On the 1st of September we broke up about eight miles of the Macon road, and turned on the enemy at Jonesborough, assaulting him in his lines, and carried them, capturing Brigadier-General Govan and about 2,000 prisoners, with 8 guns and much plunder. Night alone prevented our capturing all of Hardee's corps, which escaped south that night. That same night Hood, in Atlanta, finding all his railroads broken or in our possession, blew up his ammunition, 7 locomotives, and 80 cars, and evacuated Atlanta, which, on the next day, September 2, was occupied by the corps left for that purpose, Major-General Slocum, commanding. We followed the retreating rebel army to near Lovejoy's Station, thirty miles south of Atlanta, when, finding him strongly intrenched, I concluded it would not pay to assault, as we had already gained the great object of the campaign, viz, Atlanta. Accordingly, the army gradually and leisurely returned to Atlanta, and it is now camped eight miles south of the city, and to-morrow will move to the camps appointed. I am now writing in Atlanta, so you need not be uneasy. We have as the result of this quick and, as I think, well-executed movement 27 guns, over 3,000 prisoners; have buried over 400 rebels dead, and left as many wounded that could not be moved. The rebels have lost, besides the important city of Atlanta, immense stores, at least 500 dead, 2,500 wounded, and 3,000 prisoners, whereas our aggregate [loss] will not foot up 1,500. If that is not success, I don't know what is (OR Volume 38(5):821-822).

Sherman would later write in depth about the Atlanta Campaign in his personal memoirs, although he spared very few words regarding the events at Lovejoy Station, despite the several battles and skirmishes that were fought there and the extent of Union losses (Sherman 1990:577, 582).

Many individual service records of the Union soldiers who served in the Atlanta Campaign will undoubtedly shed new light on the events that transpired in the Lovejoy vicinity. The present research effort did not pursue these avenues because of the limited fiscal resources. Some Civil War military records are available online at various state archives, however, such as this example from the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry roster, which noted that Captain Percy H. White, Company A, 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry was wounded and captured on August 20, 1864 at Lovejoy Station, Georgia. He was discharged from the U.S. Army on a Surgeon’s Certificate on February 10, 1865.
IV. November 16th Action

The final action at Lovejoy, which possibly included the Nash Farm locale, came on November 16, 1864 as Sherman’s Army launched their March to the Sea. Brigadier General Kilpatrick once again led his Cavalry division and engaged the Confederates at Lovejoy, where the Confederates had reoccupied their trenches from the previous battle.

Kilpatrick summarized the activities of the 3rd Cavalry Division in the March to the Sea in his December 27th report. He described the composition of the 5,500 troops and six pieces of artillery under his command at the beginning of the campaign,

Several regiments had been added to the old regiments and organized into two brigades, each numbering upward of 2,500 men. The First Brigade, Colonel E. H. Murray, Third Kentucky Cavalry, commanding, was composed of the following regiments, viz: Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Colonel Jordan; Fifth Kentucky Cavalry, Colonel Baldwin; Third Kentucky Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel King; Second Kentucky Cavalry, Captain Forman, and Tenth Wisconsin Light Artillery, Captain Beebe, commanding, amounting to 2,800 men. The Second Brigade, Colonel Atkins, Ninety-second Illinois Mounted Infantry, commanding, was composed of the following regiments, viz: Ninety-second Illinois Mounted Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Sanderson; Ninth Ohio Cavalry, Colonel Hamilton; Fifth Ohio Cavalry, Colonel Heath; Squadron First Ohio Cavalry, Captain Dalzell, and Ninth Michigan Cavalry, Colonel Acker, amounting to 2,700 men (ehistory.com 2007, OR Volume 44(1):362).

Kilpatrick noted in his report on the property captured or destroyed in the November 16th action, which included, “…2 cannon, Rodman, with carriages, and 100 rounds ammunition… 175 stand small-arms, captured at Lovejoy's Ga. … - 4 boxes fixed ammunition for 3-inch regulation gun, destroyed….” (ehistory.com 2007, OR Volume 44(1):367).

Colonel Eli H. Murray, who commanded the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Cavalry Division later wrote in his report commending the valor of several cavalry officers under his command in the August 20th action. Murray wrote,

… Captain A. G. Sloo and Lieutenant Kelly, Third Kentucky Cavalry, for their gallant conduct in the charge at Lovejoy's, which resulted in the capture of two pieces of artillery. I also take pleasure in commending the gallantry of Captain E. V. Brookfield, commissary of subsistence, Third Cavalry Division, in this charge (ehistory.com 2007, OR Volume 44(1):369).

Colonel Murray recorded the action in his report written on December 25, 1864,

…November 16, marched at 8. 30 a. m.; struck the enemy two miles from Lovejoy's Station, in force, behind intrenchments with artillery. The Eighth Indiana and Third Kentucky, dismounted, moved upon the works, which were taken possession of by the Eighth Indiana. The Third Kentucky, mounting, made a most brilliant and successful saber charge, resulting in a total demoralization of the enemy, and the capture of two pieces of artillery. The engagement also furnished us with 42 prisoners. The Second Kentucky, Captain Forman, coming up after the charge, pushed on, but only to find the enemy straggling… (ehistory.com 2007, OR Volume 44(1):368-369).

Lieutenant Colonel Fielder A. Jones, 8th Indiana Cavalry, described it in his report of December 21, 1864,

…On the 16th [November], being in the advance of the division, we struck the enemy a few miles north of Lovejoy's; dron them into the old rebel works at that place. One battalion of the Eighth, dismounted, under Major Gordon, charged and quickly carried the works. This was followed by a charge of the entire brigade. Our route was blockade by fallen trees and other obstructions, causing us to fail to be “in at the death”, yet we captured some prisoners. Thence marched south by easy marches, capturing a few horses and mules, destroying cotton and other public property… (ehistory.com 2007, OR Volume 44(1):374).

Captains Joseph T. Forman and Robert M. Gillmore, 2nd Kentucky Cavalry offered this description of the engagement in their report (filed jointly) on December 21, 1864,

…November 16, the First Brigade, having the advance, came in contact with a body of rebel at Lovejoy's Station on the West Point railroad. Here my regiment was ordered to support a section of artillery. Afterward I was ordered with my command to move forward at double-quick to support the Third Kentucky, which in the meantime had
charged the rebels, capturing their artillery and chasing them some four or five miles. My regiment then took the advance, skirmishing with the rebels as far as Bear Creek Station, where it was ordered to halt, rest our horses, and let the Second Brigade take the advance. (ehistory.com 2007, OR Volume 44(1):376).

Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. King, 3rd Kentucky Cavalry gave this account of the November 16th action in his report dated December 16, 1864,

…On the 16th we passed through Jonesborough, following the railroad. About three miles from Lovejoy's Station the advance encountered the enemy. My command was immediately deployed in line of the left of the road, and moved on the enemy for a short distance, when I received an order from General Kilpatrick to advance rapidly and drive the rebels from the station, the general supposing, from a dense smoke arising in front, that they were destroying their stores. I immediately ordered two battalions forward at a trot (Major Wolfley, with his battalion, having been sent in another direction to destroy a bridge over Flint River), and a moment afterward ordered a charge. Never did men obey an order with more alacrity or enthusiasm. They rushed upon the rebels with drawn sabers and a shout that scattered them in the wildest disorder. They fled in every direction of escape, leaving in our hands two splendid Rodman guns and a number of prisoners. The rout of the enemy was complete, and they have since acknowledged it to be disgraceful. Lieutenant Griffin, of the Fifth Kentucky Cavalry, and his brave scouts, were with my command in the charge, and rendered gallant and valuable service in routing the enemy and securing the trophies of the chase. After a short halt we moved forward. (ehistory.com 2007, OR Volume 44(1):379).

Colonel Oliver L. Baldwin, 5th Kentucky Cavalry, provided a brief account of the November 16th action in his report, dated December 17, 1864,

…November 16, moved in the rear of the brigade to near Lovejoy's Station. The regiment was here placed in position to participate in an engagement then going on with Hanna's rebel brigade. Before we could join in the fight, however, the enemy was routed. (ehistory.com 2007, OR Volume 44(1):381-382).

Colonel Thomas J. Jordan, 9th Pennsylvania Cavalry, gave this extremely brief description in his report, dated December 17, 1864, “…on the 16th participated in the action against Wheeler at Lovejoy's Station, on the Macon and Atlanta Railroad…” (ehistory.com 2007, OR Volume 44(1):386).

Captain Yates V. Beebe, 10th Wisconsin Battery, described the actions of his artillerymen on November 16th, in his report, dated December 18, 1864,

…On the 16th day of November the battery was in action at Lovejoy's Station and at Bear Creek Station. At Lovejoy's Station the battery silenced the enemy's guns and took possession of two of them after the cavalry had run them down. (ehistory.com 2007, OR Volume 44(1):405).

CONFEDERATE ACCOUNTS

Lieutenant General Stephen D. Lee, commander of Lee's Corps (formerly John B. Hood's Corps) filed his report on January 30, 1865 detailing the operations in Georgia from July 27 through September 19, 1864. Lee’s account was written to Lieutenant Colonel A. P. Mason, Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of Tennessee, while Lee was at Columbus, Mississippi on January 30, 1865 (OR Volume 38(3): 762):

COLONEL: Owing to my temporary absence from the army and to the movement of troops, it would be impracticable to procure detailed reports from my subordinate officers, and I cannot, therefore, make a full report of the operations of my command during the recent campaign, but deem it proper to offer this, until one more complete may be substituted:

I assumed command of Hood's old corps, consisting of Stevenson's Clayton's, and Hindman's divisions (the latter commanded by Brigadier General John C. Brown), on July 27, 1864. The army was then in position and intrenched around Atlanta, daily shifting its position to meet the flank movements of the enemy. On the 27th Hindman's and Clayton's divisions were withdrawn from the trenches and massed on the Lick Skilled road. On the 28th, about 11 a. m., I received orders to move out on the Lick Skilled road and check the enemy, who was then moving to our left, as it was desirable to hold that road, to be used for a contemplated movement. I soon found that the enemy had gained the road, and was gradually driving back our cavalry. Brown's division was at once formed on the left of and obliquely to the road, and Clayton's division on the right, connecting by a line of
assault. The skirmishing along Patton determined to push his lines more closely to our left was gradual, and he seemed movements after this affair. His extension to the enemy was exceedingly cautious in his and his division for their conduct. The repulsed. Much credit is due General Bate which was signally and handsomely his lines, at once moved a corps to attack, only a slight impediment to the extension of the enemy on the 6th, findings as he supposed night constructed a very strong skirmish perpendicularly to our main line and along Atlanta), took position on my left almost in position immediately in front of Atlanta. The enemy had two corps engaged in this affair; still I am convinced that if all the troops had displayed equal spirit we would have been successful, as the enemy's works were slight, and besides they had scarcely gotten into position when we made the attack.

From the 28th of July to the 5th of August the enemy cautiously pushed forward his lines toward ours, erecting new lines of works as he advanced. Several severe attacks were made upon the works of my skirmish line, but no assault was made upon the main intrenched line. The enemy in almost every instance was severely repulsed. On the 6th Major-General Bate's division, of Hardee's corps (which had reported to me temporarily in place of Stevenson's division, which had been detached from my corps and put in position immediately in front of Atlanta), took position on my left almost perpendicularly to our main line and along the Sandtown road. This division in one night constructed a very strong skirmish line, and with such little display that the enemy on the 6th, findings as he supposed only a slight impediment to the extension of his lines, at once moved a corps to attack, which was signally and handsomely repulsed. Much credit is due General Bate and his division for their conduct. The enemy was exceedingly cautious in his movements after this affair. His extension to our left was gradual, and he seemed determined to push his lines more closely to our in my front, with the view of making an assault. The skirmishing along Patton Anderson's (formerly Hindman's) and Clayton's divisions amounted to almost an engagement for a week. Hardee's corps had been placed on my left to check the enemy, who continued extending to the left. About the 2nd the enemy retired from his position in front of Atlanta, making quite a detour to the left of my corps, which extended to the West Point and Atlanta Railroad, three-quarters of a mile beyond East Point. Stevenson's division reported to me by 11 a. m. on the 30th of August. Hardee's corps was on my left, and was gradually relieved by my corps in order it might extend farther to the left. About 4 p. m. on the 30th I was notified that General Hardee would probably move to Jonesborough, and that it was desired that my corps should followed and support him. At army headquarters, in Atlanta, about 9 p. m., it was decided that the column of the enemy which was marching on Jonesborough from the direction of the West Point and Atlanta Railroad should be attacked early on the morning of the 31st, and crushed. I accordingly reported to General Hardee at General Hood's headquarters. According to my recollection, the column marching on Jonesborough was the only column of the enemy well defined and in motion, and that it consisted of about three army corps. I was advised that General Hardee's corps, the left of which rested at Rough and Ready, four miles below East Point, on the Macon railroad, commenced moving about 4 p. m. Orders were extended for my corps to move immediately after General Hardee's. The rear of Hardee's corps was in motion about 11.30 p. m. My corps was well closed up to it and immediately following. Our progress was very slow, and the head of my column did not reach Rough and Ready till daylight. I ascertained that the delay was caused by a portion of Hardee's corps encountering the enemy about 12 p. m. August 30 on the road on which they were marching, which made it necessary for the line of march to be changed to a neighborhood road. In consequence of this delay my corps did not arrive at Jonesborough till near 10 a. m. on the 31st, but it reached there immediately in rear of General Hardee's last division. The last three brigades of my corps, in consequence of the distance they had marched, and having been on picket, arrived about 1.30 p.m.

The enemy had during the previous evening and night effected a crossing of Flint River and made a lodgment on the east bank. The preliminaries for the attack were arranged. My corps was formed almost parallel to the railroad and immediately to the right of Jonesborough, connecting with the right of Hardee's corps, which extended toward Flint River, and making almost a right angle with the railroad. It was found that Hardee's corps
did not cover as much ground as was expected, and I was instructed to extend my troops so as to fill up the interval, and my command was moved almost two divisions from to the left. The instructions given me were to attack as soon as Cleburne, who commanded Hardee's corps, should become hotly engaged, he being ordered to swing to his right and my corps to advance directly against the enemy, and, if possible, swing to the left. The firing to my left (on Cleburne's line) did not indicate a serious engagement until the right division of Hardee's corps became engaged. Being satisfied that the battle had commenced in earnest, I at once gave orders for my corps to move against the enemy. The attack was not made by the troops with the spirit and inflexible determination that would insure success. Several brigades behaved with great gallantry, and in each brigade many instances of gallant conduct were exhibited by regiments and individuals, but generally the troops halted in the charge when they were much exposed, and within easy range of the enemy's musketry, and when they could do but little damage to the enemy behind his works, instead of moving directly and promptly forward against the temporary and formidable works in their front. The attack was a feeble one and a failure, with a loss to my corps of about 1,300 men in killed and wounded. The enemy being behind works, and apparently no impression having been made him by the attack on my left, where his line was supposed to be weakest, and Brigadier-General Ross, commanding a cavalry brigade on my immediate right, having reported the enemy moving to my right, I was induced not to renew the attack.

During the night of the 31st, about 1 p.m., I received an order from Lieutenant-General Hardee to march at once to Atlanta. My corps was at once put in motion, and was halted by Major General M. L. Smith, chief engineer of the army, about six miles from Atlanta, and there put in position to cover the evacuation of the city. On the morning of September 1 I was ordered to move my command toward Lovejoy's Station, which place I reached on the 3d. The army remained at Lovejoy's till September 18, when it commenced moving toward Palmetto Station, on the West Point and Atlanta Railroad, where it arrived on the 19th.

Not having received the reports of my division commanders, it is impossible to notice those officers and commands deserving especial mention. It is my purpose to refer to their gallant deeds in a subsequent of my division commanders-Major-Generals Stevenson, Clayton, and Brown, and afterward Patton Anderson, commanding Hindman's old division. They always displayed great gallantry and zeal in time of battle. I regret to state that Major-General Patton Anderson and Brigadier-General Cumming were severely wounded in the action of the 31st while nobly leading their troops upon the enemy's works, and their services were lost to us during the remainder of the campaign.

I take pleasure in making especial mention of the gallantry of Brigadier General (now Major General) John C. Brown during the engagement of the 28th on the Lick Skilled road, and of Major-Generals Stevenson and Clayton during the battle of Jonesborough on August 31.

The officers of my personal staff, as also of the corps staff, behaved at all times with gallantry, and were energetic in the discharge of their duties.

Lee included this addenda in his report to Lieutenant Colonel Mason:

GENERAL ORDERS

HEADQUARTERS LEE'S CORPS, Numbers 62.

In the Field, August 7, 1864.

The lieutenant-general commanding takes pleasure in announcing to the officers and men of this corps the splendid conduct of a portion of Bate's division, particularly Tyler's brigade, in sustaining and repulsing on yesterday three assault of the enemy, in which his loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was from 800 to 1,000 men, 2 colors, and 300 or 400 stand small-arms, and all of his intrenching tools. Our loss was from 15 to 20 killed and wounded. Soldiers who fight with the coolness and determination that these men did will always be victorious over any reasonable number.

By command of Lieutenant-General Lee:

J. W. RATCHFORD,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Confederate Major General S.G. French provided this account to Captain W.D. Dale, Assistant Adjutant General, of events, in the Lovejoy vicinity, in early September, 1864. French's report was written at French's division headquarters near Nashville, Tennessee on December 6, 1864 (OR 38(3):903):
Sir; In compliance with orders I have the honor to report the operations of my division in and around Atlanta from time General Hood was placed in command of the Army of Tennessee until we left Lovejoy's Station, ... September 1, to-day order for the evacuation of the city was received. I caused preparations to be made to spike the heavy guns on my line, and to have their carriages burned when the skirmishers should be withdrawn, at 11 p. m.; but to my astonishment they were sent on fire without my knowledge, by orders of the chief of ordnance of the army, during the afternoon, which I could not but consider rather a premature signal. After dark, and after Generals Loring and Walthall and the State troops—when all were gone but stragglers—this division moved out of the city, forming the rear guard. Taking the McDonough road, we marched all night, all day of the 2d, and came into camp late at night.

September 3, resumed the march this morning. From the sound of the guns in front, we knew that General Hardee alone was still holding the enemy in check, for we had passed the corps of General S. D. Lee on the road. On arriving at Lovejoy's Station, on the railroad, my division was detached and sent to relieve General Bate's division, in line of battle in the center of Hardee's corps, and after dark it was ordered to relieve his left division, which held a miserable line and salient that was enfilade on either face by the enemy's artillery. Did not, however, make the change.

September 4, considerable artillery firing on the lines to-day. Labored all night on a new line to cut off part of the salient, which improved it very much.

September 5, my division is now in the line of the division of Hardee's corps, which it has relieved, and so completely is the old part of it enfilade that about 40 men were killed and wounded from shells.

September 6, at 4 o'clock this morning information was sent me by the officers of the day that the enemy had left my front. I directed the skirmishers to advance and occupy the works of the enemy, and reported the fact to Lieutenant-General Stewart. General Cockrell asked permission to follow the enemy, which was granted, and he purposed them beyond Jonesborough. Coming up with the enemy south of this village, he drove them to their works just this side of the town. From these works they were driven by a charge of four companies, under the command of Captain Canniff, to their main line on the north side of Jonesborough, where they were discovered in force. A number of prisoner were captured and many killed and wounded. Our casualties were 2 officers (Lieutenants Welch and Strong) and 8 private wounded. The enemy falling back toward Atlanta, afforded some rest to our forces....

Major General French's casualty report include those in his division who were killed or wounded at Lovejoy Station in the September 2-5 action. These included: 8 killed and 18 wounded from Cockrell's Brigade, 12 wounded from Ector's Brigade, and 4 killed, 9 wounded and 7 missing from Sear's Brigade (OR Volume 38(3):908-909).

Brigadier General William H. Young, C. S. Army, commanding Ector's Brigade, filed his report on September 17, from his headquarters at Lovejoy's Station, in which he details his operations July 17-September 4:

MAJOR: In compliance with circular orders from corps headquarters of the 16th instant, I have the honor to submit the following report of the action this brigade since the General Hood took command of the army, about July 17 [18]:... By September 1 the brigade had almost completed along its entire front a palisade work eight feet above the ground. At 9 p. m. on this day took in advance of the division the march from Atlanta. After a tedious march reached Lovejoy's Station about 3 p. m. on the 3rd of September and took position east of the railroad in reserve of the division. On the evening of the 4th took position in line on left of the division, connecting with Adams' brigade, Loring's division. Here built substantial intrenchments, and had in part covered them by stake abatis when, on the morning of the 6th, the enemy were found to have evacuated their works in front.

For the more particular operations of each regiment I would respectfully refer to the reports of regimental commanders, herewith inclosed.

The casualties of the brigade have been previously furnished in a separate report....

Brigadier General F.M. Cockrell, Missouri Brigade, filed his report with Major D.W. Sanders, Assistant Adjutant-General, on September 20, 1864, regarding the actions from July 17-September 7 below Atlanta (OR Volume 38(3):915-920):

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part borne by the Missouri brigade in the operations of the Army of Tennessee, under command of General J. B. Hood, from July 17 to September 7:....On the night of September 1
Atlanta was evacuated, and this brigade, in rear of the corps and division, marched through Atlanta and thence on the McDonough road, marching all night, all the day of September 2, and till 10 o'clock of that night.

On the evening of September 3 we arrived at the line of works north of Lovejoy's Station, and at once relieved a portion of the line occupied by Bate's division, Hardee's corps, with my left resting near to and of the railroad.

On the night of September 4 we moved to the left and occupied the line, with my right resting on the railroad. These works were indifferent and exposed to an enfilading, and in some places almost reverse, artillery fire of the enemy's batteries on my left. And during this day Captain S. A. Kennerly, of Company A, First and Fourth Missouri Infantry, and 4 men were killed and 3 wounded by two shells; 1 wounded from Second and Sixth, and 2 killed and 2 wounded from Third and Fifth. Captain S. A. Kennerly was a most fearless, cheerful, and determined officer, and on May 16, 1863, at battle of Baker's Creek, received a most severe wound, and was left on the field believed to be dead, from the effects of which he had never fully recovered; and notwithstanding this he had been on duty during the past arduous campaign.

Colonel John Weir, Lowrey's Brigade, Cleburne's Division, Hardee's Corps, filed his report regarding the action at Lovejoy Station in September with Lieutenant Milner from his headquarters on September 27, 1864 (OR Volume 38(3): 736-737):

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor, very respectfully, to make the following report as to the action of this brigade with the enemy upon the 2nd instant, near Lovejoy's Station:

I arrived one mile east of Lovejoy's Station, upon the McDonough road, at 6 o'clock on the morning of the 2nd of September. I formed line, with Mercer's brigade upon my left and Granbury's upon my right. The general direction of my line was east and west. At 10 a.m. I had my line formed in single rank, and went to throwing up breastworks. At 3 p.m. the enemy made their appearance in front of my pickets. A sharp skirmish commenced, which was kept up until 4 p.m. The enemy advanced upon my picket-line with a strong line of skirmishers and two lines of battle; drove in my pickets, broke the picket-line to my right, and captured some of my pickets. The ground was so situated that the enemy, after breaking my picket-line, they made a charge upon my works (they not being completed with their first line, coming within 250 yards of my works, but were handsomely repulsed. They attempted to bring up a second line, but with no better success than the first. From their graves, that were in my front, and from the report of two officers from the brigades that were captured upon the picket-line (who have since been exchanged, their loss was very heavy, considering the time that we were engaged. The officers captured report that their pickets wounded 1 brigadier-general and several line officer and privates.

The enemy's report confirms the brigadier-general being wounded; also 4 colonels and 1 lieutenant-colonel wounded, 1 assistant adjutant-general wounded and 1 killed, and 1 adjutant killed; besides a long list of line officers and privates were wounded. My pickets fought the enemy, driving back the skirmish line, and until their line of battle was within forty steps of their barricades and in rear of a part of my picket-line.

My loss was 1 killed, 9 wounded, and 39 missing.

I am pleased to state that the conduct of both officers and privates of this brigade was marked with great coolness and courage upon that occasion.
IV. Rest and Relaxation—The Confederate Encampments

By early September, 1864, both armies in the Atlanta Campaign were extremely fatigued. Atlanta was in ruins and what was left of it was in Union control. The entire countryside was busy with civilian refugees fleeing Atlanta and surrounding farms (Figure 48).

Figure 46. Scene of U.S. Troops and Civilians Evacuating Atlanta, 1864.

Following the U.S. Army’s retreat to Atlanta on September 6, the Confederate troops continued to mass in the Lovejoy vicinity, where they enjoyed a brief respite from the fighting. Historical accounts make passing reference to this large gathering, although its extent is best reflected by the myriad of Confederate encampments that have been identified by relic collectors and amateur historians. These camps were occupied from September 6 to 18, 1864. By September 11th, Ross’ brigade was headquartered at Fayetteville, Georgia. Generals Sherman and Hood had agreed upon a 10 day truce from September 12-21, which was, as A.P. Mason, Confederate Assistant Adjutant-General noted was, “only applicable to the thoroughfares and the country leading to and in the vicinity of rough and Ready, the object being the removal of citizens of Atlanta who shall desire to come South under the recent order of General Sherman” (OR Volume 39 (Pt. 2):830).

On September 18, Lee’s Corps of Confederates left Lovejoy for Palmetto, Georgia (Mark Pollard personal communication, February 10, 2007).

General John Bell Hood wrote several letters from his headquarters at Lovejoy’s Station on September 13, 1864. Hood wrote to Brigadier General A.R. Lawton, Quartermaster-General, in Richmond regarding the unrest among the troops because of their lack of pay,

It is very important that funds for the payment of this army should be sent without delay to prevent dissatisfaction and desertion in consequence of the non-payment of the troops” (OR Volume 39 (Pt. 2):833). In light of the recent loss of Atlanta and the series of Confederate failures of the Atlanta Campaign under Hood’s direction, the low morale among the Confederate troops is understandable. Adding to this burden, Hood noted in a letter to Georgia Governor Joseph E. Brown, in Milledgeville, that the U.S. troops had,
General Hood was not only dissatisfied with the demeanor of the troops under his command but was very dissatisfied with General Hardee. Hood wrote to Confederate President Jefferson Davis placing much of the blame for the failures in the Atlanta Campaign on Hardee, including the battles of July 20, 22, and August 31. Hood wrote, “It is the utmost importance that Hardee should be relieved at once. He commands the best troops of this army. I must have another commander” (OR Volume 39 (Pt. 2):832).

General Hood estimated his troop strength on September 11th to include about 26,000 infantry. A majority of these troops were camped at or near Lovejoy (OR Vol. 39 (2): 829). Confederate troop returns listed as present in Stewart’s Corps at 60,374 total, including 38,301 Infantry, 10,412 Cavalry, and 3,722 Artillery.

After that military action in Lovejoy was minimal. Military action took place on the McDonough Road on October 2, 1864 (Jones 1999:122). The exact location of this exchange is unclear from reading the official documents. Military engagement again occurred on the McDonough Road on November 6, 1864 (Jones 1999:122). The exact location of this encounter is unclear from reading the official documents. On November 16, 1864 Judson Kilpatrick’s Cavalry returned to the Lovejoy area on their journey south towards Savannah. At Lovejoy, the U.S. Cavalry met with Confederate resistance and a skirmish is recorded (Jones 1999:122). The Confederate troops consisted of, “two brigades of cavalry and two pieces of artillery, and holding the old rebel works”, and historian Moore noted, “The General [Kilpatrick] charged the works with dismounted cavalry, and carried them, driving back the enemy. Subsequently, the enemy’s artillery was overtaken by another changing column, and captured. He drove the enemy beyond Bear Station, capturing over fifty prisoners. He then moved to the left, and encamped on the Griffin and McDonough road” (Moore 1866:12). Kilpatrick’s report to Captain L.M. Dayton, Aid-de-Camp to Major General Sherman was written near Savannah in December, 1864, in which Kilpatrick briefly described the action of November 16th,

A portion of General Wheeler’s cavalry and the Georgia militia, under General Cobb, were reported to be at Lovejoy Station. I met and drove back Wheeler’s advance next morning, and found him in position, occupying the old rebel earthworks constructed by Hood’s army on its recent retreat from Jonesboro. Colonel Murray (First brigade) charged and carried their works, capturing two (2) three-inch rifled guns, (taken from General Stoneman) and killed and wounded a large number of the enemy. Wheeler now retreated in great confusion to Bear Creek Station, where he attempted to halt and make a stand (Kilpatrick, in Moore 1966:22).

Captain J.W. Beebe, 10th Wisconsin Battery, filed a brief report on December 18, 1864, in which he stated, “On the sixteenth day of November, the battery was in action at Lovejoy’s Station, and at Bear Creek Station. At Lovejoy’s Station, the battery silenced the enemy’s guns and took possession of two of them, after the cavalry had run them down” (Beebe, in Moore 1866:168).

The November 16th battle was likely centered located west and south of the Nash Farm property, nearer to the railroad tracks at Lovejoy Station, although some evidence of it may extend into the study area. It lasted less than one day and few other details were gathered about this brief engagement.

Sherman’s massive forces steadily moved to the southeast towards Savannah in late November and December 1864. Once the war was over, the residents of the study vicinity returned home and resumed their “normal” lives. Many of their dwellings and support facilities were probably in ruins, or badly damaged. Their croplands and livestock had been ravaged and plundered. In some instances their homesteads had been intentionally spoiled by the invaders, or by the accompanying “bummers”. Nevertheless, many farms resumed operation, although without the enormous benefit of enslaved labor. A system of tenancy emerged on many of the larger farms. Many smaller farms in the area were operated by the immediate family members and, consequently, some of the farming enterprises were scaled back from their former levels. Through all of these hardships the Nash Farm survived.
V. Artifacts from Nash Farm

The LAMAR Institute’s survey of the Nash Farm Battlefield Park yielded an impressive assemblage of relics from the battle, as well as other artifacts relating to the occupation at the Nash Farm. A complete inventory of the 1,345 artifacts that were recovered by the project is contained in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 includes more than 490 photographic images of many of these artifacts. Appendix 2 also includes artifacts contained in private collections, which were obtained from the Nash Farm property.

ARMS GROUP

Heavy Ordnance

Archaeological evidence of both Union and Confederate artillery ordnance was found by the present study. Additional evidence for artillery fire is also well represented in private collections from the vicinity (see Appendix 2). Several types of cylindrical artillery rounds were used by the Union and Confederate batteries in the Lovejoy vicinity. These include Hotchkiss, Parrott, Schenkl, and (possibly) James artillery. Thirteen artillery shell fragments are represented in the survey collection. One specimen was collected by TRC in their 2006 study (D’Angelo et al. 2006:79,89). The base of a Hotchkiss shell (Figure 48) was found by the LAMAR Institute team in the vicinity of the suspected first Cavalry clash. A local collector (name unknown) reported finding a complete Hotchkiss shell a short distance north of the Clayton County water tower, which is located several kilometers west of the Nash Farm property. Another collection, mostly from the Hastings farm area of Clayton County, includes one complete artillery shell and one complete explosive hollow shot, which are illustrated in Appendix 2.

While no Parrott shells were located by the present study team, Mark Pollard noted that at least two had been reported by collectors in the mid to late 20th century. One of these was found in the drip line of the Nash farmhouse roof, where it was discovered by a former homeowner. Another Parrott shell was reportedly found near the intersection of Babbs Mill Road and Jonesboro Road, just east of the Nash Farm property (Mark Pollard personal communication February 10, 2007).

The cannons used by the Union and Confederate artillery at Lovejoy included explosive, hollow, spherical shot. Explosive balls were filled with gunpowder and a variety of metal shrapnel. The balls often broke into polygonal bombshell fragments upon exploding. These distinctively shaped relics are recognizable in the archaeological record and several examples were identified on the Nash Farm property (Figure 49). Several members of the project team noted that this type of shell fragment is associated more with Confederate artillery than Union.
Solid “golf ball size” iron balls, or grapeshot, were used in 12 pounder or 32 pounder howitzers in the Civil War (Figure 50). This type of ammunition was used by both armies. Six examples are contained in the Nash Farm collection. These range in diameter from 28-35 mm and weigh from 67.5 to 147.5 grams. They may represent Union or Confederate artifacts. They were not found in any concentration, although several areas where they were located also yielded other evidence of battle action.

Cannister Shot. Three types of small iron canister shot were identified in the Nash Farm collection. These items were grouped into faceted, poorly faceted, and round categories. The weight, diameter, and grid location of each specimen was recorded, which allowed a careful study of their spatial distribution, as well as any relevant size or weight variations between the three groups. An example of a faceted canister shot is shown in Figure 51.

Sabot Fragments. Several large chunks of lead were discovered on the battlefield, which are likely lead sabots associated with artillery shells, such as the Hotchkiss projectile (McKee and Mason 1995:104-105). Both armies used the Hotchkiss artillery, so the presence of Hotchkiss shells on the battlefield denotes an unspecified origin. Examples of large lead objects from Nash Farm are illustrated in Appendix 2 (PP7, PP1091).

Fuses. Explosive artillery shells in the Civil War era employed a wide array of fuse mechanisms. Fuses and fuse fragments are familiar relics from the battlefield. Nash Farm has yielded only a few specimens. One probable fuse adapter was found on the southwestern part of the Nash Farm property, which is illustrated in Appendix 2 (McKee and Mason 1995:147, 152, Figures 51 and 52). Two small brass pieces, which may represent fuse components, are contained in the Nash Farm collection and these await definitive identification (Appendix 2, PP436, PP633).

Friction Primer. Friction primers were used to ignite the artillery pieces and these small objects are often recovered from Civil War battlefields. These primers consist of small brass tubes, formerly filled with explosive substances, and an attached, twisted brass wire. Friction primers were a disposable item, used once for a single cannon firing. At least three sizes of friction primers were produced (1.75 inches, 2 3/8 inches, 2.5 inches, and 2 5/8 inches). A number of friction primers were recovered from Nash Farm, although only one of these dated the the Civil War era (Appendix 2, PP281). The others were modern, reenactor’s debris from the past several years. These modern specimens were distinguished from the authentic ones by their shiny appearance and black coating on one end. One unfired, recent specimen was included in the collection. The one real example was found at 5176.6 North, 1765.51 East, which tentatively indicates the approximate location of one artillery piece that was fired in 1864. Archaeologists were not able to determine if this specimen was Confederate or Union, although its general location would indicate it was most likely used by the Confederate artillery.
Pollard noted at least three other areas near Nash Farm that have yielded friction primers in the past. One of these is located on the Nash Farm battlefield property, north of Jonesboro Road. Pollard suspects that area to be the location of Croft’s Columbus Artillery Battery that fired on August 20, and possibly re-used by a different Confederate battery on September 2-5, 1864. Pollard also noted one area, just northwest of the study tract on the Clayton County Water Authority property where several friction primers were discovered in the past. He suspects this may be the artillery battery position of the 10th Wisconsin battery on August 20th. A third location where Pollard reports friction primers have been found is on a hilltop, northeast of Nash Farm. He suspects this to be a Confederate battery, probably dating to the September 2-5 action. This latter firing position is quite some distance from the Nash Farm, but it may represent an artillery battery from the August 20th engagement.

**Personal Weapons**

The U.S. and Confederate Cavalries used more than 50 varieties of personal firearms used. Table 6 contains a chart of the more common weapons that were used, weapon attributes, and regiments known to possess these weapons. Repeating carbines were highly desired and more common in the U.S. Cavalry than in the Confederate Cavalry. Breech-loading weapons used by the troops included guns manufactured by Gallager, Maynard, Spencer, and Smith.

The Spencer was a repeating carbine and rifle that required a brass rim fire cartridge that was breech-loaded. Christopher Spencer received a pattern for his design on March 6, 1860. Most Spencers required a .56 caliber cartridge, although some .36 caliber were produced. Spencers were produced. Spencer carbines were loaded with seven cartridges, which could be loaded in a single step and it could easily discharge 15 shots a minute. The drawback to the Spencer carbine was its expense—$35.00 each, which was more than twice as costly as the Springfield muskets. The U.S. Army balked at purchasing this weapon, despite its obvious advantages over single shot weapons. Commanders of several U.S. Army regiments purchased these weapons with their own funds for their troops use. President Lincoln, who was quite impressed after test firing the weapon, instructed the Army Chief of Ordnance, General Ripley to purchase 10,000 of them in late 1861.

Approximately 144,500 Spencers were produced and 107,372 were purchased by the U.S. government. It was the most popular carbine of the U.S. Cavalry and was also quite popular with the Confederate Cavalry, when they were able to obtain them. Spencer carbines were issued to the 4th U.S. Cavalry, 8th Indiana Cavalry, 4th Michigan Cavalry, 3rd Ohio Cavalry, and 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry, all of whom participated in action in the Lovejoy area on August 20, 1864 (Flayderman 1980; McAulay 1997; Coates and Thomas 1990:35, 48, 93). The 92nd Illinois Infantry were part of Colonel John T. Wilder’s Lightning Brigade by September, 1863, and Wilder’s Brigade carried Spencer rifles in Virginia as early as June 24, 1863. Theirs is the first reported engagement where these weapons were used. The Spencer rifle, which was longer and heavier than the Spencer carbine, also fired a .56 caliber load and the rifles were popular among those troops who were lucky enough to possess them. By July 3, 1863, Confederate infantry in the 49th Virginia Regiment at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania were using captured Spencer repeating weapons. The Confederates captured more Spencer firearms than ammunition, however, and many weapons were stored in warehouses for the lack of proper cartridges (Bresnan 2007; Bilby 1996:199-200; Williams 1936:542-544; Jordan 2007; Robertson et al. 1992:Table 5; Baumgartner 1997).

The Sharps firearms, invented by Christian Sharps, were single-shot, breech-loading .54 caliber carbines and rifles that required a .52 caliber paper cartridge. Sharps could also be loaded with black powder and a loose bullet. Sharps were used by both armies, approximately 115,000 were made for the Union and the Confederate foundries produced about 15,000 copies of the Sharps carbine. Sharps weapons were the second most common breech-loader during the Civil War. Although the Sharps was only a single shot, compared to the multiple round Spencer carbine, its ease of use, simplicity, reliability, and durability insured its...
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Ammunition</th>
<th>Caliber</th>
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<td></td>
<td>36.50 Sharpshooters&amp;Picket duty</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Major Firearms Used in the Civil War.

place as a common cavalrymen’s firearm. Sharps carbines were issued to the 1st and 3rd Ohio Cavalry, both of whom participated in action in the Lovejoy area on August 20, 1864 (Flayderman 1980; McAulay 1997; Coates and Thomas 1990:34, 45-46, 94).

The Henry repeating rifle, invented by B. Tyler Henry in 1860, required a brass caliber rim fire cartridge. Approximately 14,000 Henry rifles were made and most of these were used in the

Civil War. The most common type of Henry rifle fired a .44 caliber cartridge, although a few .22 caliber varieties were produced. Henry rifles were not all that popular among the troops. Although it could fire 15 shots in about 12 seconds once loaded, it was difficult and slow to load (Flayderman 1980; McAulay 1997; Coates and Thomas 1990:32).

The Maynard carbine was a breech-loading gun that was used by both Armies in the Civil War. The Union variety, manufactured in
Massachusetts, required a .35 or .50 caliber metallic cartridge, which was discharged with a percussion cap. The Confederate version, which was manufactured in Danville, Virginia, fired a .54 caliber cartridge (Flayderman 1980; McAulay 1997; Coates and Thomas 1990:43).

The Smith carbine, which was produced by three companies in Massachusetts, was the fourth most popular Union carbine in the Civil War. More than 30,000 Smith carbines were manufactured from 1861 to 1865. The Smith carbine was a breech-loader and required a .50 caliber cartridge. Smith carbines were available early in the Civil War but their unique cartridge, which was an india rubber tube, restricted its popularity and it was soon surpassed by the Sharps and Spencers carbines. Smith carbines could also be loaded with loose black powder and bullet, although in the absence of the rubber seal it was dangerous to operate (Flayderman 1980; McAulay 1997; Coates and Thomas 1990:47).

The Burnside carbine was a breech-loading design manufactured from 1857 to 1865. It was the third most common carbine in the Civil War, approximately 53,800 were made and nearly all of these were for the Union. The Confederate Cavalry used many captured Burnside weapons. Burnside carbines fired a .54 caliber tapered metallic cartridge, which required a percussion cap. Burnside carbines were issued to the 5th Kentucky Cavalry, 1st, 4th and 10th Ohio Cavalries, and the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry, all of whom participated in action in the Lovejoy area on August 20, 1864 (Flayderman 1980; McAulay 1997; Coates and Thomas 1990:38, 93).

The Gallager carbine was a breech-loading weapon manufactured in Philadelphia and used by the Union. A .50 caliber version relied on percussion cap technology and approximately 18,000 of this type were produced. Approximately 5,000 of .56 and .52 caliber rim fire carbines were produced. This weapon was not popular because of the difficulty in removing the brass cartridge casing after firing Gallager carbines were issued to the 10th Ohio Cavalry, who participated in action in the Lovejoy area on August 20, 1864 (Flayderman 1980; McAulay 1997; Coates and Thomas 1990).

The Ballard carbine was a breech-loading weapon fired a .44 caliber bullet, which was in a metallic cartridge. This weapon was uncommon in the Civil War, although the State of Kentucky purchased nearly 20,000 and some of these may have been carried by the Kentucky Cavalry at Nash Farm. Although at least three Kentucky Cavalry regiments and four Kentucky mounted infantry regiments brandished these weapons, none are specifically linked to the regiments that were present (Coates and Thomas 1990:37, 93).

The Merrill carbine was a breech-loading .54 caliber weapon that fired a paper cartridge that was ignited with a standard musket cap. Over 15,000 of these firearms were issued to the Union cavalry in 1861 but by mid-1863, these unpopular weapons were mostly brandished by Union cavalry in the western theater. Many were captured by the Confederacy and they were used by Confederate cavalry. Coates and Thomas (1990:44) show a Confederate cavalry officer posing for a photograph with his Merrill carbine. This officer is identified elsewhere as Captain Samuel J. Richardson, 3rd Texas Cavalry (The 3rd Texas Cavalry-Company C 2007).

The standard long arm of the U.S. Army was the muzzle-loading rifle, which fired a paper caliber cartridge. Most of these were produced at the Springfield Armory in in Massachusetts or Harpers Ferry, Virginia. They include the Model 1855 musket and Model 1855 rifled musket, which required a .58 caliber paper cartridge discharged with a percussion cap. This was the first U.S. military weapon to fire a Minie ball. The Springfield Model 1861 rifle musket, which was also .58 caliber, replaced the Model 1855. Both the Model 1855 and 1861 weapons were reliable and sturdy and many thousands were produced during the Civil War (Flayderman 1980; McAulay 1997; Coates and Thomas 1990:14-18).

The standard long arm of the Confederacy was the Enfield British Pattern 1853 rifle musket. It was the primary firearm used by the infantry. Most of these were manufactured in England, where they were the standard arm of the British Army from 1853-1867, although similar weapons were made in Elmore and Tallasee, Alabama; Adairsville, Columbus, and Macon, Georgia; and Richmond, Virginia. The Enfield required a paper cartridge that was muzzle-loaded and discharged with a percussion cap. Although the Enfield was .577 caliber, it fired the same cartridge as the U.S. .58 caliber rifle.
Springfield muskets. Union infantry also used Enfield rifles. The 92nd Illinois Infantry, who were in the August 20th battle at Nash Farm, possessed 280 Enfield rifles in September, 1863 (Robertson et al. 1992:Table 5). The design of the Enfield bullet, which flared upon firing to create a good seal in the rifle barrel made this weapon to some other types of muzzle-loaders. Because of this design, Enfields were less prone to fouled barrels compared with the Springfields (Flayderman 1980; McAulay 1997; Coates and Thomas 1990:19-20; Albaugh 1993b).

Several parts of Enfield rifles were recovered from Nash Farm. These include a brass butt plate, iron butt plate, a brass trigger guard, and an iron stock brace. Each of these are illustrated in Appendix 2 and the trigger guard fragment is shown in Figure 52.

![Figure 52. Enfield Trigger Guard Fragment (PP1067), Nash Farm.](image)

The Model 1841 rifle, which was manufactured at Harpers Ferry, Virginia was another popular weapon that was used by both armies in the Civil War. Most were manufactured as .54 caliber guns, although many thousand were retooled for use with .58 caliber ammunition (Coates and Thomas 1990:25).

The Colt revolving rifle was issued to many units of the U.S. military, including several that were participants in the action around Lovejoy, Georgia. These included the 4th U.S. Cavalry, 3rd Kentucky, 4th Michigan Cavalry. This rifle, which was a breech-loading .36 caliber weapon, received mixed reviews from the soldiers. Although the length of the barrel was not advantageous for cavalry use, many of these weapons remained in cavalry service throughout the war (Coates and Thomas 1990:92).

Austrian imports followed the Enfield rifles in popularity in the Union and Confederate armies. The Lorenz Model 1854 rifle musket was popular in the Army of the Tennessee and significant numbers of these muskets were issued in 1864. The Lorenz was imported in several calibers (.54-.59 caliber), but the .54 caliber was most common (Coates and Thomas 1990:21).

The soldiers in the U.S. and Confederate Cavalries owned a variety of side arms. Models that were very popular in 1864 include the Remington M1858, the Colt M1860, and the Colt M1851 Navy models (3rd Texas Cavalry 2007). The Colt revolver was the most popular side arm in the Civil War. Colt revolvers were manufactured in .35, .36, .44, and .56 caliber versions. The Colt Model 1855, also known as the Root Model, was an early model produced in .28 and .31 calibers. It was loaded with paper cartridges, or loose black powder, and a bullet, and it required a percussion cap. The 1855 model was underpowered and was not commonly used in the Civil War (Flayderman 1980; Coates and Thomas 1990). The Colt Model 1860 Army and Model 1851 Navy were very popular in the Civil War. Both were .44 caliber (and .36 caliber) revolvers. Although it was initially made for the Navy, most Model 1851 Navy revolvers were issued to Union Cavalrymen. Three Confederate foundries made copies of the Colt revolver and approximately 7,000 of these copies were produced. Colt Army revolvers (.44 caliber) were issued to the 4th Ohio Cavalry, who participated in the August 20, 1864 action at Lovejoy, Georgia (Coates and Thomas 1990:54-57, 94).

The Remington .44 caliber revolver was the second most popular revolver in the Civil War. They were primarily used by Union soldiers, although Confederates captured many of them and placed them in service. Two styles of Remington revolver were made, a .44 caliber Army model and a .36 caliber Navy model. Both models were loaded with paper cartridges and fired with a percussion cap. Remington Army revolvers (.44 caliber) were issued to the 10th Ohio Cavalry, who participated in the August 20,
1864 action at Lovejoy, Georgia (Coates and Thomas 1990:61, 95).

The Smith and Wesson No. 2 model was a .32 caliber revolver introduced in 1861. Approximately 35,700 of this weapon, which used a metallic, rim fire cartridge, were made during the Civil War. This weapon was quicker to load than the cap and ball revolvers, but more difficult to load than the Remington .44 caliber pistol (Flayderman 1980).

The Whitney “Navy” revolver was a popular .36 caliber sidearm in the Union. More than 30,000 were produced and half of these were purchased by the U.S. government. Nearly all were issued to Union volunteer cavalry. This weapon was a six-shot, percussion revolver that used a paper cartridge (Coates and Thomas 1990:65).

The Starr Army revolver was manufactured in New York and most were issued to the Union cavalry. It was a six-shot .44 caliber weapon that required a paper cartridge and percussion cap. Starr Army revolvers (.44 caliber) were issued to the 4th Ohio Cavalry, who participated in the August 20, 1864 action at Lovejoy, Georgia (Coates and Thomas 1990:96).

Other older military issue muskets that saw service in the Civil War were the Model 1842 smoothbore and rifled musket and the Model 1842 “Palmetto” musket, which was a .69 caliber smoothbore weapon manufactured in Columbia, South Carolina (Flayderman 1980; Coates and Thomas 1990:8-9).

Shotguns were also popular among cavalrymen, particularly among the Confederates. Double-barreled guns, generally in the .69 caliber range, were used throughout the war. These were personal weapons and not military issue. Twin charges of buckshot in each barrel proved to be an effective weapon for the Cavalrymen (Coates and Thomas 1990:51). A contemporary photograph of Private Ben T. Roberts, Company E, 3rd Texas Cavalry, shows him in uniform, holding a double barreled shotgun and a Bowie knife (3rd Texas Cavalry-Company C 2007).

Many Confederate soldiers had antiquated muzzle-loading smooth bore muskets of many types. Most of these were .69 caliber. Some of these older weapons were flintlock weapons, such as the military issue Model 1816, which was manufactured at Harpers Ferry, Virginia and Springfield, Massachusetts. These older weapons were common in the arsenals of many state militias, which accounts for their use in the Civil War. By the time of the fighting at Lovejoy, however, most of these older Model 1816 muskets had been replaced by newer models. Many of them were modified for use with percussion caps and by August, 1864, few flintlocks remain in circulation (Coates and Thomas 1990).

The specific firearms used by the Texas Cavalry regiments of Ross’ Brigade are not well documented. Coates and Thomas (1990:86-96) have linked many Union and Confederate regiments with specific weapons, but their data is lacking for the 1st, 3rd, 6th, 9th and 10th Texas Cavalry Regiments. They do have some information on the firearms carried by the 8th and 11th Texas Cavalry Regiments. The 8th Texas Cavalry was issued Austrian Rifle Muskets (.54 caliber), Belgian or French Rifled Muskets (.69 caliber), Model 1841 “Mississippi” Rifles (.54 caliber), and double-barrel shotguns. The 11th Texas Cavalry was issued the Model 1841 “Mississippi” Rifles (.54 caliber) and double-barrel shotguns. One may surmise that the weapons of the other Texas Cavalry regiments were similar and that various types of .54 and .69 caliber bullets were associated with Ross’ Brigade.

**Percussion Caps.** Many long arms and fire arms in the Civil War-era required percussion caps. Percussion caps are small brass or copper casings that contain a small explosive charge of fulminate of mercury. This ignition system was invented in 1805, although they were not commonly employed until the early 1840s. Percussion caps were the dominant technology at the onset of the Civil War. Cartridge primers were in two sizes (0.175 inches (4 mm) for side arms and 0.210 inches (6 mm) for long arms). Many firearms required special percussion caps for their model.

Surprisingly few percussion caps were recovered from Nash Farm. Each of the 12 percussion caps recovered by the survey was measured by diameter and all fell near the size for long arms. One unusual example had longer sides than the others. Only one specimen appeared to be unfired.
It should be emphasized that several dozen modern percussion caps, used by re-enactors, are also found at Nash Farm battlefield. As of 2007 these items were easily distinguished from the Civil War-era specimens by their shiny appearance and by their recovery from the top of the ground but given a few years in the elements, they may be hard for both professional or amateur to tell them apart.

**Bullets.** Bullets can provide a wealth of information about the battles around Lovejoy, Georgia. The LAMAR Institute’s survey at Nash Farm recovered 203 bullets, which are summarized in Table 7. Many examples are illustrated in Appendix 2. At the initial level, bullets can be linked to particular brand and weapon class. From this information it is often possible to link bullets to the military units that were firing them with some degree of certainty. Previous researchers have identified a myriad of Civil War bullet types and various classification systems were created (McKee and Mason 1980; Coates and Thomas 1990).

Bullets for the Burnside carbine were .54 caliber projectiles with a flat or dish base. Burnside carbines were used predominately by the U.S. Cavalry. Two Burnside bullets were collected from the Nash Farm battlefield by Mark Pollard.

Colt pistols and Confederate imitations of the Colt model were used by both armies in the Civil War, so their presence on the battlefield cannot be used to absolute distinguish who were using these weapons. Colt pistols were very popular with the cavalry. Three sizes of bullets in paper cartridges were used with the Colt revolver pistol. These include .32, .36, and .44 caliber bullets. The Colt revolving rifle (.56 caliber) was another popular weapon used by Cavalry in the Civil War.

The Enfield rifle, which was manufactured in England, was the mainstay of the Confederate Infantry. Two sizes of bullets (.54 and .577 caliber) were used with the Enfield rifle. The Enfield (.577 caliber) is most closely attributed to the Confederates, although the Enfield (.54 caliber) was also brandished by Confederate troops. Many variations of Enfield bullets are recognized. One example, which was identified at Nash Farm, was a Enfield (.577 caliber) that was fitted with a boxwood plug on its base. This type of ammunition was produced in England is closely associated with Confederates.

Many U.S. troops also had Enfield rifles. The 92nd Illinois Infantry, who were in the August 20th battle at Nash Farm, had 280 Enfields, when an inventory of their arms was taken on September 30, 1863.

Maynard and Smith both made a .37 and .50 caliber version of their firearm and the ammunition for these two brands are difficult to distinguish. Smith weapons were carried by U.S. troops, whereas Maynards were used by the Confederates. Maynard also manufactured a .54 caliber firearm that was carried by Confederates.

Merrill required a .54 caliber cartridge. These weapons were used by Union and Confederate troops.

Sharps produced a .52 caliber firearm that was used by Union or Confederate troops. Sharps also produced a .54 caliber firearm that was used more by the Confederates. A “ringtail” minie ball was used with the .54 caliber Sharps, which is a distinctive Confederate battlefield relic.

The Spencer carbine (.52 caliber bullet with a .56 caliber shell case) was used primarily by the U.S. Cavalry, although some Confederate cavalry regiments had acquired them by 1864. The 92nd Illinois Infantry carried Spencer rifles and Enfields. On September 30, 1863, when their arms were inventory, the 92nd Illinois possessed 172 Spencer weapons (Bresnan 2007; Robertson et al. 1992; Table 5). Spencer bullets and their brass casings represent one of the most tell-tale indications of a cavalry engagement and their spatial distribution at Nash Farm offers tangible proof of Kilpatrick’s August 20th raid.

Archaeologists discovered one example of an unfired Spencer bullet still in its brass casing at Nash Farm, which is illustrated in Figure 53. This lead bullet in this specimen measured .56 caliber and it nearly identical to one shown in McKee and Mason (1995:88, Figure 124). The Nash Farm example has a small puncture hole on one side of the brass casing, which may have been intentional, perhaps to remove gunpowder for some purpose.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PP</th>
<th>Cal.</th>
<th>Grain</th>
<th>Rings</th>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Cavity</th>
<th>Groove</th>
<th>Point</th>
<th>Fired</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Modified</th>
<th>Weapon</th>
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<th>Unit</th>
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<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>0.50</td>
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Table 7. Bullet Summary.
Table 7 (Continued). Bullet Summary.
Figure 53. Spencer Cartridge (PP157), Nash Farm.

Starr weapons required a .54 caliber load. These were mostly used by Union troops.

Minie balls with three rings, often termed “three ringers”, are actually several distinct bullet types. Three ring minie balls are extremely common on Civil War battlefields. Many three ring .54 caliber loads were used by the Confederates. The more common .5477 to .58 caliber three ring minie ball was used primarily by the Union and is probably the most common Union bullet on Civil War battlefields. A number of sub-varieties of the .58 caliber three-ringer are known. These include ones with distinctive mold marks or other alterations at the base of the bullet. “swaged”, “star based” Washington Arsenal, “US” stamped

Cleaner Bullets. Three types of Williams Cleaner bullets have been identified. All three varieties were .58 caliber projectiles. Relic collectors in Georgia have observed that Williams Cleaner bullets were used heavily by the Union in the Atlanta Campaign and the March to the Sea. Under normal conditions, cleaner bullets were to be fired at specified intervals to clean the rifle barrel of debris. Their frequency on Georgia battlefields suggests that cleaner bullets were used more often than was prescribed. This may have been due to the low supply of regular ammunition or an over abundance of cleaner rounds. Bullet experts have identified several other brands of cleaner bullets on Civil War sites.

The buck and ball load had a long history in American warfare. Spherical .32 caliber buckshot and .69 caliber round balls were often used in buck and ball paper cartridge. This type of ammunition was more common among Confederates than Union troops. In many respects, the use of round ball ammunition was an antique technology, yet in some close combat situations it may have been quite effective.

Other conical bullets were used with “Country Rifles”, primarily by the Confederates but also by the Union. These firearms were individually crafted. Many were precision weapons that were prized by sharpshooters or soldiers on picket duty. These bullets appear in odd sizes (generally .36-.50 caliber) and were often crude, homemade projectiles (Coates and Thomas 1990:29).

One fired bullet from the Nash Farm battlefield was tentatively identified as fired from a Whitworth Sharpshooter Rifle. Whitworth rifles were .45 caliber precision weapons that were imported from England and were prized by Confederate marksmen (Häggman 2001). This weapon fired a hexagonal-sided bullet.

In addition to the most common types of Civil War bullets there are dozens of other types that are rarely found. These include bullets made in Europe by English, French, Italian, and other manufacturers and many of these were smuggled past the Union blockade for the Confederacy. Other rare bullets were used with weapons that were manufactured in North America, but were made in small quantities rendering the statistical probability of their discovery on any given battlefield as slight.

Other bullets at Nash Farm battlefield were deformed or otherwise modified and could not be identified by weapon type. These included carved, chewed, flattened, impacted, melted, and wormed bullets.

Carved bullets are occasionally encountered by relic collectors. Many soldiers were quite artistic in their tiny lead sculptures, while others were more simplistic. Some were casually whittled with no apparent sculptured shape in mind, while others were quite elaborate and undoubtedly
intended as a keepsake. Several bullets from Nash Farm had been carved but no elaborate artwork was evidenced.

Chewed bullets are often encountered by relic collectors. Common lore tells of bullets chewed by wounded soldiers as an outlet for pain caused by their wounds, or by the often more painful operations that followed. Bullets were given to wounded men so that they could bite down hard, and possibly to keep them quiet. Bullets chewed for these medical purposes, one would expect a correlation with hospital sites. Some soldiers also chewed bullets as a normal activity, unaware of the health hazards posed by the lead intake. In these cases, the bullets are analogous to chewing gum. Other animals, such as pigs and rodents, also chew on lead bullets, often years after the battle. The rodent teeth impressions are distinctive and easily distinguished from humans but the pig teeth impressions are quite similar to humans. Several examples of chewed bullets were recovered from Nash Farm.

Impacted bullets are common on battlefields. At a gross level, the laboratory analyst can determine what type of substance the bullet impacted. Bullets that hit soil have a sandy texture on the impact surface. Bullets that hit wood, or other organic material (including humans and horses) may have a similar appearance, particularly if the bullet struck the skeleton. In rare instances, relic collectors have found bullets that struck other bullets in mid-air. Many fired bullets, which did not immediately impact an object, may have traveled until their velocity landed them gently on the ground, which often left no visible impact evidence. In this latter instance, the rifling marks on the sides of the bullet and flaring of the base are the only clues to indicate that the bullet was fired. The analyst cannot tell with 100 percent certainty if a bullet was fired or a dropped, unfired cartridge.

Wormed bullets are frequently found by relic collectors. After these bullets were lodged in the barrel, an iron worm was used to remove the bullets. This action by the worm often left tell-tale marks on the bullets. Worming was necessary when a cartridge misfired, or when the soldier mistakenly placed more than one cartridge in the barrel and realized his mistake. Mark Pollard observed that bullets were extracted from gun barrels for a variety of reason and worm marks did not necessarily indicate that the weapon had jammed. Soldiers on picket duty, who carried a loaded weapon, were required to unload their weapons upon returning to camp. In many cases the bullets were extracted from the weapon rather than discharged by firing the gun, either to conserve ammunition or to maintain a degree of silence in the camp. Numerous bullets from Nash Farm displayed evidence of worming. Two techniques were used to remove bullets from the barrel. One method used a screw tool that drilled a hole down the center of the bullet. Another method was twisted into the barrel until it grabbed the outside of the bullet. Both types of extraction are represented in the Nash Farm bullet assemblage.

**Other Accoutrements.** Cartridges and bullets were kept in a leather cartridge box that was worn on a leather belt. The standard issue carbine cartridge for the U.S. Cavalry was the M1860 model. Cartridge boxes were secured shut with a small brass finial and one example was collected from the battlefield.

**Edged Weapons**

Sabers and swords were an important part of the military uniform in the Civil War era (Thillmann 2001; Albaugh 1993a; Peterson 2003). The standard issue sabers for Kilpatrick’s Cavalry were the M1840 style dragoon and the M1860 Light Cavalry model (3rd Texas Cavalry 2007). Several brass sword baskets, or counterguards, are known from the Nash Farm battlefield. One example was recovered by the present study and other examples are in private collections (see Appendix 2). As history records, the August 20th action was a saber charge by the U.S. Cavalry, so it is quite likely that most of the sword or saber fragments were Union weapons. Cavalry sabers were relatively blunt instruments, which
delivered a blunt-force trauma to its intended victim, rather than a slicing effect. Consequently, the results from the Cavalry’s saber charge probably resulted in a great many injuries, but relatively few deaths.

Bayonets were affixed for use with rifles by both armies in the Civil War. Bayonets were used mostly by the infantry. Cavalry carbines were too short for bayonet use.

Scabbards held the swords and bayonets when not in use (Reilly 1990). Scabbards were mostly fabricated from organic materials, which tend not to survive in the elements. The surviving parts include the brass scabbard tips and upper housing areas. Bayonet “frogs” are a distinctively-shaped brass artifact type, which were used to secure the bayonet sheath to the military uniform. Two scabbard tips were recovered by the survey of Nash Farm and one example is illustrated in Figure 55.

Knives were another important arms component of the Civil War soldier. These ranged in size from large bowie knives, which were either worn in sheaths or tucked into a waist belt. Folding clasp knives, or pocket knives, also were popular among the troops. Clasp knives were used in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries and are little changed during these centuries. Clasp knives were also popular with civilians, so their presence on the Nash Farm battlefield does not necessarily indicate a military presence.

Architecture Group

A minor amount of artifacts from the architecture group were recovered by the Nash Farm survey. These included one small brass doorknob, brick, window glass, nails, and other assorted building hardware. The brass doorknob came from the front yard of the Nash Farm house. Its location may indicate the site of an earlier building. Machine cut square nails were recovered from several shovel tests and these also may provide clues for the location of former buildings.

KITCHEN GROUP

Artifacts from the kitchen group were recovered in low frequency from the Nash Farm battlefield. The low representation of this artifact category reflects the sampling methods, since the most common kitchen-related artifacts, glass and ceramics, are not located by metal detector survey. Nevertheless, a sample of sherds, bottle glass, and kitchen hardware were discovered by the survey. Ceramics from Nash Farm included refined earthenware, ironstone, and domestic stoneware. Bottle glass and tableware glass were also observed.

Forks and spoons were among the kitchen metal artifacts discovered at Nash Farm. Examples are shown in Appendix 2. Metal cookware was a common utility item used by all branches of the Union and Confederate armies. Mess equipment was used communally when the soldiers were camped but was dispersed among the Cavalry, when the army was in motion. Probably much of this cookware was light-weight tin-ware, most of which has long since corroded on the battlefield. Cast iron pots, frying pans, and dutch ovens were more durable cookware used by the troops and broken fragments are likely represented in the Nash Farm collection. Several soldier’s who penned accounts of Kilpatrick’s Cavalry in...
motion remarked about the distinctive, distant clanking sound made by the canteens and cooking pots as they jangled against horse and rider.

CLOTHING GROUP

The clothing worn by the Union and Confederate troops in the Lovejoy vicinity are known from surviving examples, archaeological specimens, written descriptions, photographs and contemporary illustrations. Both armies had established minimum uniform requirements. By August, 1864, the clothing equipage of both armies was stretched thin and many deviations in the established requirements were tolerated. Sherman’s Army would not receive new supplies of uniforms until after they arrived in Savannah in January, 1865.

Soldiers in both armies were allowed some latitude in their wearing apparel. Those who could afford them had more elegant coats and other regalia. A variety of hats were worn by both armies, including the standard kepi cap and an assortment of broad-brimmed hats. A variety of brass insignia was worn on the caps and hats. These included crossed sabers, buglers, and other regimental or company designations.

Buttons

Distinctions of rank were clearly defined in military uniforms. Buttons were one way these distinctions were made. Standard issue U.S. Army buttons were the norm for the U.S. Cavalry. The Confederates also had standard issue buttons, as well as a variety of state militia buttons, and brass civilian buttons. Soldiers in both armies used an assortment of bone, shell, and porcelain buttons on their undergarments.

One U.S. General Staff Officer’s button was recovered from the heart of the Nash Farm battlefield (Albert 1997; Tice 1997). This button is shown in Figure 56. Other military buttons from Nash Farm include two U.S. Cavalry buttons and U.S. Infantry buttons. Ranking officers in the U.S. Cavalry wore uniforms adorned with eagle buttons with a “C” in a central shield. Examples of this button type have been recovered at Nash Farm (Appendix 2).

Figure 476. U.S. Staff Officer's Button (PP921), Nash Farm.

Interestingly, Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick’s complete uniform is preserved in the Kilpatrick collection at the Smithsonian Institution (United States National Museum 1906:88).

Buckles

Civil War belt buckles are highly prized by collectors. Historian Mark Pollard knew of one pre-war (1840s) U.S. buckle that was discovered by a collector, west of Nash Farm. Collectors have recovered three brass CSA belt buckles from Nash Farm, one of which is illustrated in Appendix 2. The exact geographic location of these specimens was not ascertained. No doubt other Civil War buckles have been removed from Nash Farm by collectors and the curious in past decades. Kilpatrick’s cavalry brigade wore a M1851 style saber belt. The buckle for these belts displayed an eagle. None of these distinctive buckles have been identified at Nash Farm.
One cast-brass Japanese-style buckle was recovered by the present study, as shown in Figure 59. It may represent a sash buckle. Research on this peculiar item is ongoing and many curious minds are eager to learn the pedigree of this clothing artifact (Suzukisan 2007).

Numerous smaller buckles were discovered on the battlefield by the present survey team, as well as previous collectors. These are shown in Appendix 2. The Nash Farm survey located one gold-plated brass suspender (or fob) buckle, identified in relief, “RH Guyot” (Figure 58). The Guyot Brothers Company began business in 1904. An inquiry to their company representatives resulted in no information about RH Guyot (Andrea Guyot Twombly personal communication March 29, 2007).

Military Insignia

Civil War soldiers, both officers and enlisted men, wore a wide variety of insignia on their uniforms. This find led to the tentative speculation that this buckle was worn by a military officer, who perhaps had accompanied Commodore Perry on one of his initial trips to Japan in the late 1850s. Japan was reluctant to open up its shores to the United States and only did so after Perry’s displays of U.S. Naval military might (Figure 60).
Epaulettes were worn by officers and enlisted men. This epaulette was worn on shell jackets by Artillery and Cavalry troops to ward off sword blows to the shoulder region (Civil War Antique Shop 2007). Several small fragments of stamped sheet brass bearing a fish-scale motif were discovered at the Nash Farm battlefield and two of these are shown in Figure 61 and other specimens are contained in Appendix 2 (PP831). At first these objects were suspected to be part of uniform epaulettes, but upon closer inspection they do not appear to be epaulette fragments. Still they may be military related decorations, possibly they pieces of horse jewelry worn by the charging U.S. Cavalry horses. The mangled state of these fragments and their dispersed spatial pattern suggests that the horse wearing them met a tragic end.

![Figure 61. Scale-style Brass Artifact (PP591), Nash Farm.](image)

**Foot-ware**

The standard footgear worn by the U.S. Cavalry was the 1861 pattern mounted high-topped boot. Confederate cavalrmymen wore a variety of footware. Cavalry boots were made of leather, wood, and some metal. Sheet brass or copper shoe taps were fashioned by the soldiers to extend the life of their footwear. These were typically crudely made and were secured to the boot with small steel tacks. Numerous examples of this type of shoe type have been found at Nash Farm. One example of a shoe tap from the present survey still had the small tacks attached.

![Figure 62. Shoe Tap, Nash Farm (PP 1027).](image)

Boot heel plates are commonly discovered by relic collectors on Civil War sites. Most of these items, which were a more substantial component of the boot than the heel taps, are made of cast brass. Some have excised designs in the center, including cross, heart or other simple geometric motifs. One crude, iron boot heel plate with hobnails intact was discovered on the Nash Farm battlefield. This specimen was recovered from very near where two brass spurs were found. The iron heel plate was simple in design, being nearly horseshoe shaped.

**Other Uniform Accoutrements**

Two U.S. cartridge box plates are contained in the Nash Farm collection. One example is shown in Figure 63. These items consisted of a stamped sheet brass front and lead back.

![Figure 63. U.S. Cartridge Plate (PP1066), Nash Farm.](image)
FURNITURE GROUP

The furniture group at Nash Farm is represented by several metal items including several trunk parts, lamp parts, and drawer escutcheons. Several crushed pieces of brass corner brace hardware from a trunk bore a stamped identification.

Metal lamp parts made from a cast white metal in a rococo design were found on the Nash Farm battlefield. Although these appeared to be from the same lamp, or multiple similar lamps, no cross-mends were made. These pieces almost certainly once graced the interior of the Nash Farm house. Their deposition on the battlefield may have occurred at the time of the battle, or these lamps may have been discarded once electricity was introduced to the farm and earlier forms of lighting were obsolete.

PERSONAL GROUP

Coins

An assortment of U.S. coinage is represented in the Nash Farm collection. Most of the specimens that were found post-date the Civil War but a few examples were probably associated with the battles there. Two pre-war dimes, which were found in close proximity in the heart of the battlefield, are shown in Figure 64.

![Figure 64. Pre-War U.S. Dimes (PP1028 & 1029), Nash Farm.](image)

One 1860 seated liberty dime, which was holed for suspension, was recovered from Nash Farm.

Jewelry

Numerous pieces of jewelry have been recovered from the Nash Farm property by collectors and from the present study. Most of these artifacts post-date the Civil War. Several are probably period pieces, and may be objects worn by soldiers on the battlefield.

Several men’s finger rings have been recovered from Nash Farm. A simple brass band, possibly once gold plated, was located by the present study in the heart of the battlefield (Appendix 2, PP2). Local collectors also have found examples of brass and gold men’s rings. It is tempting to conclude that these rings were lost in the heat of battle, possibly during the saber fight.

Death was commonplace in 19th century America but even moreso in the Civil War era. Mourning jewelry was worn by women and men as an expression of their loss. This tradition was popularized by Queen Victoria, after the death of her husband Prince Albert. Mourning jewelry was fabricated from a variety of organic and inorganic materials, including gold, silver, pewter, brass, porcelain, glass, jet, and human hair (Luthi 1998). One object that was discovered at Nash Farm may represent a piece of mourning jewelry. It was a small cast pewter human skull, which was found in the heart of the battlefield. It was suspended at the top, but that portion was broken and the other parts of the object were not found. This piece may have been part of a watch fob. Similar human skull fobs were given as tokens of remembrance to grieving men. Another example was located from an internet search (Beltran 2007; Michele Beltran personal communication, June 8, 2007). The archaeological specimen and the internet specimen are shown in Figure 65.

![Figure 65. Human Skull Fob (PP 751), Nash Farm.](image)
One oval jewelry piece was decorated with a large, monogrammed, “G”. On the reverse was stamped, “GERMAN SILVER”. These words may indicate that this piece may be unrelated to the Civil War action at Nash Farm.

Pocket Knives

Several pocket knives, or clasp knives, are contained in the Nash Farm collection. This type of knife was carried by boys and men throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. They were used by both the military and civilians, so their association with the Civil War battles is ambiguous.

Toys

Several children’s toys were noted in the Nash Farm collection. A broken small doll’s teacup, made from white metal, was recovered from Nash Farm (Appendix 2, PP967). This specimen probably represents a girl’s toy and it may date to the Civil War era, or for several decades following it. The Nash farm survey yielded one fragment of a cast iron toy pistol. This type of toy was popular among children in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This example probably post-dates the Civil War era. The Nash Farm collection includes a Junior Fire Marshal’s badge. This toy badge probably belonged to a child living on the property in the 20th century.

TOBACCO GROUP

Clay tobacco pipes are commonly found on Civil War sites, particular at encampments. None were located by the present survey at Nash Farm, although at least one example was identified by collectors (Appendix 2, PP1072).

ACTIVITIES GROUP

Quite a few of the artifacts that have been recovered from the Nash Farm battlefield by the present research team, as well as past amateur enthusiasts, represent the equipage of the Cavalry. The Cavalry soldier in the Civil War possessed numerous items of equipment. Many of these items were made of organic material, such as leather, wood or canvas, and rarely remain in the archaeological record. Bedrolls, tents, ponchos, haversacks, saddle blankets, feed bags, and collapsing water buckets are included among these perishable items. Some of these items may have minor metal parts, such as poncho and tent grommets and knapsack hooks, that attest to the former presence of these less-durable objects. Seventeen large brass grommets were located by the present survey at Nash Farm. Knapsack hooks are a common artifact on Civil War sites. These were made of brass and examples were recovered by the survey at Nash Farm. Other examples exist in private collections from the Lovejoy vicinity (Appendix 2, PP580).

Percussion cap boxes were used by cavalrymen where were not fortunate enough to possess modern breech-loading cartridges. The standard U.S.-issue percussion cap box was the 1850 style. Small finials from cartridge boxes are contained in the Nash Farm collection.

A small brass kit, which was severely crushed, was discovered in the heart of the battlefield (Appendix 2, PP9). This item may have held writing implements, sewing kit, or other keepsakes. An aqua-colored glass ink bottle, also found in the heart of the battlefield, may also be from a soldier’s personal writing kit.

Horse Equipment

The horses and mules used by the armies at Nash Farm required a variety of equipage. Most of this equipment was made of organic materials such as leather and cloth that have not survived in the archaeological record. A variety of metal artifacts associated with the horses and mules have survived on the battlefield (Crouch 2003; Knopp 2002).

Several brass spurs have been recovered from the Nash Farm battlefield, including one example from the present study. Collectors John Lynch and Mark Pollard have found similar examples. Lynch’s specimen was reportedly found very near the one discovered by the present research (John Lynch personal communication February 10, 2007). These three spurs are shown in Figures 66-68.
The standard saddle, saddle bags, halter, bridle, carbine socket, and other horse tack in use by Kilpatrick's Cavalry was the M1859 style. This type was also known as the McClellan saddle (3rd Texas Cavalry 2007). The Pollard collection from Nash Farm includes several distinctive pieces of horse tack pieces and numerous pieces also were recovered by the present study (Appendix 2).

Stirrups were used with all military saddles. These were made from combinations of metal, leather, and wood. One iron stirrup fragment was present in the Nash Farm collection (Appendix 2, PP 414).

Several large iron or brass rings, horse bits, and other iron objects that are probably associated with the cavalry horses are present in the Nash Farm collection (Appendix 2, PP10, PP377, PP513, PP586, PP607, PP964). Many of these are probably from halters. Knopp (2007) illustrates three types of Confederate cavalry halters and all three types use metal rings. The “five ring” variety was produced early in the war and was a copy of the Federal halter, which used iron halter bolts. After February, 1863, single rings varieties were used by the Confederates. That ring was made of iron and included both 3/16 inch and ¼ inch diameter rings. Iron rings were also used on Confederate cavalry saddles (Knopp 2002).

Heart-shaped breast straps were used by the U.S. Cavalry (3rd Texas Cavalry 2007). Examples of these have been found at the Nash Farm Battlefield, as shown in Figure 69. A Brass shield piece is shown in Appendix 2 (PP1090).

Another curious piece of horse jewelry was recovered from the heart of the Nash Farm battlefield (Figure 70). It has a stamped circular brass front and soft, white metal back. The comical motif is a horseshoe surrounding a horse’s rear, accompanied by the words, “GOOD LUCK”. Its presence on the battlefield may indicate a horse whose luck was not so good.
Horse shoes and mule shoes were discovered in surprising abundance on the Nash Farm battlefield. While a number of these may not be battle-related, a good number of them almost certainly are. Many examples of these iron animal shoes are shown in Appendix 2 (PP154, PP221, PP361, PP369, PP385, PP400, PP441, PP443, PP457, PP477, PP481, PP489, PP516, PP665, PP668, PP707, PP763, PP800, PP841, PP852, PP927, PP970, PP971, PP1114). A number of the survey specimens exhibit horseshoe nails still embedded in the shoe. TRC also reported finding several horse shoes and their report illustrations show these specimens also retain the horseshoe nails. The retention of these horseshoe nails on so many examples may indicate that the horses were allowed to decompose with their shoes intact. Other specimens clearly represent worn-out shoes. An undetermined percentage of these horse and mule shoes are probably unrelated to the Civil War events and are merely the byproduct of decades of agriculture or other farm operations.

Curry combs were an essential part of the Cavalrymen’s gear and were used to groom their horses. These were usually made of rectangular sheet brass with formed with several corrugated edges. Two or three curry comb fragments were recognized in the Nash Farm collection (Appendix 2, PP1069). Hoof picks were another essential grooming tool for the Cavalry. These artifacts also were used in everyday farm life and may not necessarily be associated with the Civil War.

Numerous rectangular, brass “roller” buckles have been discovered at Nash Farm by the present survey team and by collectors. Examples are shown in Appendix 2 (PP26, PP9, PP1070, PP1081). Pollard considers this buckle style to be Confederate-related items and they are clearly related to harnesses or similar horse tack. The examined specimens display no identification marks.

Two brass artifacts were identified as reins guides. These items were probably affixed to a wagon to keep the leather reins in line. Examples are shown in Appendix 2 (PP24, PP510).

**Musical Instruments**

Music was an important part of military life in the Civil War. The most common musical instrument artifact at Nash Farm was the harmonica reed plate. The harmonica, or mouth harp, was introduced to the United States by the Mathias Hohner Company from Germany in 1862. This was during the height of the Civil War and this small, inexpensive, portable musical instrument was an instant success. It was carried by soldiers in both armies and harmonica fragments are very common finds on Civil War camps. Harmonicas also were popular among civilians and this popularity carried through the 20th century to the present.

The harmonica parts at Nash Farm consist of several brass reed plates, one white reed plate, and one tinned brass reed plate cover. Harmonicas were manufactured by several companies in the second half of the 19th century and 20th centuries, although Hohner was by far the biggest importer in terms of volume. The recovered sample of harmonica parts are shown in Appendix 2 and one of the more complete examples is shown in Figure 71.
Several brass pump organ reed plates were recovered from the northwest corner of the Nash Farm. One example is shown in Figure 72. While organ reeds sometimes bear maker’s marks or other identification, the specimen from Nash Farm did not. This area where these organ reeds were discovered was the site of a dwelling and these artifacts probably represent fragments of pump organ that once graced that home. Pump organs were common in rural areas in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, although they were produced in fewer quantities even earlier. They were moderately expensive and were used in churches and homes. Pump organs were manufactured by several firms and were available by mail order by the late 19th century. Pump organs were made mostly of wood and the durable parts included the dozens of brass reed plates, two iron or brass foot pedal plates, and various brass wires. Figure 73 shows an example of a pump organ in disrepair, which was later restored (Kimbrell & Sons 2007). The pump organ at Nash Farm was not restored. More than likely it dates after the Civil War, as do many of the artifacts observed at this dwelling site.

Other Activity Items

Copper or brass fence wire was located in numerous places at Nash Farm. This heavy gauge fence wire may date to the 19th century and possibly indicates the approximate locations of fence lines at the time of the Civil War battles. Alternatively, this wire may post-date the Civil War and may reflect the fence configuration from a later era.

An assortment of metal tools are scattered over the landscape at Nash Farm. These include plough parts, hoes, files, and other items, most of which likely represent farming debris from the late 19th and early to mid 20th centuries.

Other objects recovered by the survey may be the byproduct of military events or they may represent household debris from the operation of the Nash Farm. A few of the more notable items are discussed.

Figure 72. Organ Reed (PP861), Nash Farm.

Figure 73. Example of a 1907 Pump Organ in Dilapidated Condition (Kimbrell & Sons 2007).

Several brass umbrella parts were recovered from the Nash Farm (Appendix 2, PP735). While these objects may be domestic in nature, they are quite often associated with military sites in Georgia.

Padlocks and padlock parts have been recovered from several areas of Nash Farm. Some of these clearly date to the 19th century (Appendix 2, PP728). One example in the Lynch Collection bears U.S. markings, which indicates it once secured official government materials.

Several brass and iron clock parts are included in the Nash Farm collection (Appendix 2, PP862). These artifacts may represent normal discard, or may possibly be some soldier’s abandoned booty, circa 1864.
VI. Artifact Patterning

While the individual battlefield relics have an interesting story to tell about the Civil War events in the Lovejoy vicinity, their value in increased multifold when the artifacts are viewed in their geographic context on the battlefield. The artifacts are patterned across the battlefield landscape and these patterns provide important clues about the battle. The importance of mapping artifacts on battlefields was driven home by Fox’s and Scott’s study of the Little Big Horn battlefield in Wyoming. The Nash Farm battlefield study adopted their basic methods to tell the real story of the Civil War engagements that took place there in August and September, 1864. In order to do this, however, the artifacts had to be carefully located, mapped and collected so that their geographic context could be properly established. Previous collections from the battlefield lacked this degree of precision and, consequently, their ability to tell the story of the battle was severely muted. As with most archaeology puzzles, many of the pieces are missing and the archaeologist must tell the story with the pieces that are available. This is particularly true at Nash Farm, where decades of agricultural land use, heavy machinery operation, and intense relic collecting have degraded the context of the battlefield. Nevertheless, enough information remains of the battle in relatively secure context for the archaeologists to attempt a reconstruction of it. Readers should understand that many factors may have affected the final disposition of the battlefield-era artifacts and that the contextual reliability of any given relic is less than 100 percent. Some artifacts may have been picked up and moved by previous persons. The fact that the property functioned as a working farm until quite recently has served to confuse the artifact patterning that was observed. In some cases, wholesale removal of the topsoil from some areas has eradicated any battlefield evidence. Mark Pollard knows of other examples where relics from the battlefield were intentionally removed, as part of a scrap metal drive in the mid-20th century (Mark Pollard personal communication, February 10, 2007). All of these negative factors notwithstanding, the Nash Farm property retains a surprising degree of context of its Civil War era relics and the LAMAR Institute researchers deemed a detailed study of the artifact patterning warranted.

SMALL ARMS, BULLET AND BLADES

The LAMAR Institute’s survey of Nash Farm resulted in the plotting of more than 160 Civil War-era bullets. While this is a relatively small sample, the collection was studied to extract a maximum degree of information about their provenance.

Union bullets were widely distributed across the landscape at Nash Farm, although several clusters were noted. Confederate bullets were widely distributed across the landscape at Nash Farm and several clusters were noted. Figure 74 shows the distribution of Union bullets, Figure 75 shows the Confederate bullets. Many bullets at Nash Farm may represent either Union or Confederate ammunition. These objects were more numerous than those bullets that were definitively linked to either army. Their distribution is more widespread than either the Union or Confederate bullets, although the distributions are similar in many respects.

Bullets used by the Cavalry may often be distinguished from those used by Infantry regiments. The Nash Farm bullet assemblage contains many Cavalry bullets, which cannot be assigned to either army. Although the September battle did involve some Cavalry troops, more cavalry were engaged in the August 20th action and there is a higher probability that these bullets are associated with the earlier action.

Brass percussion caps, brass shell casings, and dropped (or unfired) cartridges were recovered. Brass percussion caps, brass shell casings and dropped (or unfired) cartridges were recovered in limited frequency at Nash Farm. If one assumes that these artifacts were deposited in the archaeological record immediately, then their geographical locations provide important information about the positions from which weapons were fired. Twelve percussion caps were plotted on the battlefield (Table 7). Of these, only one specimen (PP974) was unfired. Their spatial distribution is shown in Figure 76.
Figure 74. Distribution of Union Bullets.

Figure 75. Distribution of Confederate Bullets.
The distribution of brass shell casings was equally sparse on the battlefield. The identified specimens were from Spencer cartridges, which were used by both Union and Confederates, when the latter were able to obtain them.

The overall bullet and small arms ammunition distribution suggests that most of the bullets are associated with either the August 20th action or the Confederate encampments of September, 1864.

While few saber parts were discovered by the survey, their geographic locations were consistent with other aspects of the battlefield. One brass saber counterguard (or basket) was discovered in the heart of the August 20th battle action, between the Nash house and the barn. Collector John Lynch reported finding similar saber artifacts in the pasture a short distance west of this location (John Lynch personal communication February 10, 2007).

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The distribution of other ordnance artifacts is more diffuse. Artillery shell fragments were widely scattered and their distribution is shown in Figure 79. Large grapeshot was even more rare on the battlefield and it was widely dispersed, as shown in Figure 80.

HORSE TACK

Well over 5,000 horses and mules were part of the U.S. Cavalry charge on August 20, 1864. We know from one official U.S. Cavalry officer’s report that many hundred horses perished at Nash Farm on August 20, 1864. The number of dead animals, including horses and mules, probably exceeded 500. The disposal of these dead animals would have proved to be a logistical challenge. The U.S. Army forces had left the battlefield by late afternoon of August 20th. The responsibility for the disposal of these hundreds of dead animals fell to the Confederate Army or to the local civilian population. These dead animals would have been widely scattered across the battlefield landscape. No written accounts of horse carcass disposal were found by the historic research, although several hypotheses were postulated.

Adding to the difficulty of interpreting the distribution of horse tack and other wagon-related gear is the fact that Nash Farm continued to operate as a farm for decades after the war. Consequently, many of these artifacts may be unrelated to the Civil War events. Horses and mules were used to plow the fields and to haul wagons and carriages well into the 20th century. Horse and mule shoes and other hardware may represent artifacts from this later era.

![Figure 78. Distribution of Canister Shot.](image-url)
UNIFORM PARTS

Military uniform parts were sparsely distributed over the battlefield. Buttons and other insignia were rare, which is partly a reflection of past intensive relic collecting. One of the more common uniform parts was copper and brass shoe taps. These were handmade items that were fashioned by the soldiers to extend the use-life of their precious footwear.
BATTLEFIELD FEATURES

The suspected location of the Columbus Light Artillery battery was only minimally investigated by the present survey team. Historian Mark Pollard provided some information about cannon friction primers that were found by Pollard and his brother on the hilltop, north of Jonesboro Road and the Nash farmhouse.

CAMPESITES

Several long-time relic collectors who were interviewed by the LAMAR Institute research team offered information about Confederate campsites that existed on the Nash Farm property. Only a portion of these was sampled by the LAMAR Institute’s survey, owing to the lack of time and resources. Archaeologist with TRC Garrow explored several of these areas, which were not part of the present study. Other potential campsites remain only as collector/informant sites and these await verification and more rigorous study. The general wisdom among collectors is that these campsites were created by the Confederate troops who occupied the area for a period of about 13 days following the September 2-5, 1864 Battle of Lovejoy Station. Their argument for this identification is based on the distribution of diagnostic artifacts, such as uniform buttons and weaponry. Buttons from North Carolina soldier’s uniforms are associated with one campsite, for example, and the North Carolina troops were only in this locality during that period of mid-September, 1864. Other indications that the artifact pattern represents an encampment are shown by the diversity and type of artifacts that were discarded. Many of the relics do not suggest discard during the heat of battle. Some artifacts, such as bullets apparently melted in a campfire, carved bullets, and harmonica fragments, denote a certain amount of boredom that was typical of camp life.

The distribution of large brass grommets may serve as one indication of the location of military camps. The soldiers were often housed in canvas tents. These tents were secured with ropes through metal grommets. Grommets are also a common feature of farms from later periods, where they were used to cover farm equipment, hay bales and other items. Seventeen large grommets were plotted at Nash Farm. With one exception, their measured diameters were 2.7 cm. The single exception was a larger specimen, whose diameter was 3.2 cm. These are listed in Table 9 and their spatial distribution is shown in Figure 83. The grommets display an interesting pattern on the Nash Farm property and do not appear randomly distributed. These clusters either represent military camps or special use areas from the later farm. The co-occurrence in several of these areas of obvious Civil War-era relics tends to indicate that at least some of the grommet clusters represent military camps.
Figure 84. Distribution of Cast Iron Cookware.

On a broader regional distribution, relic collectors have identified dozens of Union and Confederate camps in the greater Lovejoy locale. Those on the Nash Farm property represent only a small fraction of the whole. Like many of the Civil War resources in the Lovejoy area, most of these campsites remain unverified and unexplored by professional archaeologists.
VI. Ground Penetrating Radar Survey

The LAMAR Institute conducted Ground Penetrating Radar survey (GPR) on two sample areas of the Nash Farm property. The GPR survey consisted of two rectangular blocks, which were designated Blocks A and B. The survey was accomplished by using a RAMAC X3M GPR unit, coupled with a computer monitor and a 500 mHZ shielded antenna, which were all mounted on a wheeled graphite cart. This suite of instruments was developed by MALA GeoScience—a Swedish firm. Software packages used for the data collection and post-processing included GroundVision and Easy 3D, and GPR-Slice, version 5. The LAMAR Institute has used this setup of equipment and software for numerous GPR surveys conducted previously with great success. Data was collected along linear transects spaced at 50 centimeter intervals.

Block A was located immediately north of the barn and east of the white metal fence at Nash Farm. Figure 85 shows the survey underway in this area.

Figure 85. GPR Survey at Block A, Facing Southwest.

Figure 86 shows an aerial view of GPR Block A at approximately 55 centimeters below ground. A large area of strong radar reflections is evident in this image. North is toward the top of the page for this image and for the GPR maps that follow.

Figure 86. GPR Block A, Aerial View at 55 cm Depth.

Figure 87 shows an aerial view of GPR Block A at 75 centimeters depth. A utility line (or pipe) is clearly visible in this image. That utility line is oriented north-northwest. The strong radar reflections that were observed in the previous image have now nearly disappeared, which suggests that the source of those reflects were quite shallow. One interpretation is that the upper level anomalies are related to the fill dirt that was introduced prior to construction of the barn.
A smaller anomaly is also visible in the north-central part of the block. This may represent a shallow culture feature, such as a trash pit. An early 20<sup>th</sup> century trash dump or pit was identified in this general area during the metal detector survey.

Figure 88 shows an aerial view of GPR Block A at approximately 1 meter depth. A different utility line (or pipe) is clearly visible in this image. That utility line is oriented along a north-northeast axis.

Block B was located in the front yard of the Nash Farm house and just south of the Jonesboro Road Right-of-Way and east of the paved driveway entrance.

Figure 89 shows an aerial view of the GPR data in Block B at approximately 55 centimeters below ground. A wide, linear anomaly is clearly evident in this image. This anomaly may represent the road trace of the former route from Jonesboro Road to Babbs Mill Road. Mark Pollard noted that oral informants stated that the road formerly ran closer to the Nash house, and after discussion of the GPR findings, he agreed that the GPR data may represent archaeological proof of this early road.

Figure 90 shows an aerial view of GPR Block B at 90 centimeters depth. The linear feature is still apparent in this image, as are several other anomalies. The character and function of these
deeper signals remains to be determined. This area may represent the underlying natural geological strata, or possibly some man-made disturbance.

Figure 89. GPR Block B, Aerial View at 55 cm Depth.
Figure 90. GPR Block B, Aerial View at 90 cm Depth.
VII. Site Interpretation

WHAT WE KNOW NOW

At this point let us reflect on what facts we know now about the Civil War action at Nash Farm that was not known before the 2007 archaeological study. The present study was well grounded in the previous historical research by historians Jeffrey Holland (TRC), Mark Pollard (Henry County), and David Evans. Holland presented an excellent summary of the Nash family, which was not significantly expanded by the present research. Evan’s reconstruction of the battle scene was based almost entirely on his historical research. Pollard’s understanding of the Nash Farm took from Evan’s painstaking research and added to it with decades of his own historical research and his intimate knowledge of the Civil War relics that have been recovered by collectors, prior to Henry County’s acquisition of the property in 2006.

The LAMAR Institute research team attempted to build on this impressive foundation. At the same time, however, we sought to deconstruct the battlefield into its minute components and gather specific information that would verify the historical accounts and historian’s previous interpretations of the battles that were fought there. Historians Tracy Dean and Dan Elliott re-examined the primary documents already gathered by the previous researchers; reviewed published primary and secondary accounts of the battles at Lovejoy, and discovered new documents, maps, and other pertinent archival records unknown to the previous researchers. This was no easy task, since Evans’ personal research represented three decades of study at dozens, if not hundreds, of archival repositories, libraries and museums. Our modest budget did not allow for extensive travel to any of these out-of-state sources, so we relied heavily on Evans’ footwork and accurate data recordation. Since his work on Sherman’s Horsemens was published many technological advances have improved the ease and rapidity of historical research. The Internet, in particular, provided many new sources of information and it allowed our research team to “virtually” travel to distant archives to peruse their card catalogs. The ability to search thousands of volumes of Civil War-related documents by keyword yielded enormous benefits. Indeed, it yielded too much information for our available budget to be able to process.

The LAMAR Institute’s approach to artifact discovery, mapping and laboratory analysis proved to be enormously successful. The previous archaeological fieldwork effort by TRC was quite disappoint and yielded little to indicate that a major Civil War battle had been fought in the vicinity. Their shortcomings were largely due to the fieldwork methods that were employed, as well as the less-than optimal field conditions of weather and ground cover at the time of their July, 2006 survey. Whereas D’Angelo and his TRC field crew identified only one Enfield bullet and one possible artillery shell basal fragment, the present study located several hundred battlefield artifacts (D’Angelo et al. 2006). The total count of artifacts recovered by the LAMAR Institute was 1,345. Many of these items clearly post-date the Civil War period and others are of debatable age. Most, however, are probably associated with the Civil War-era. Moreover, these 1,345 artifacts represent only a very small sample collection from the Nash Farm property. More than 90 percent of the land area at Nash Farm remains unexplored. The 2007 sample provides more than enough material for an introductory study of the battlefield setting to enable the research team to reconstruct numerous features and components of the battle on the modern landscape.

As our research progressed, it became increasingly apparent that the August 20th Cavalry action was not the only battle fought at Nash Farm. The scale and scope of the September 2-5 Battle of Lovejoy Station quickly became apparent. Our research was primarily focused on the August 20th event but the later battle became an increasing distraction. This distraction was even more apparent when an independent archaeological study was instigated by the Georgia Department of Transportation. That project concerned the proposed widening of Jonesboro Road from U.S. Highway 19 east to Interstate Highway 75. That route passes completely across the northern part of the Nash Farm property. This highway survey project is currently being conducted by the Wolverton Associates engineering firm and their subcontractors, Edwards Pittman and Southeastern Archeological Services. As a result of their preliminary reconnaissance, in which this researcher [Elliott] served as a consultant, many
segments of Confederate entrenchments were located and several were test excavated to confirm their military function. Theirs is a project in progress, so any conclusions from their study are tentative. One important result from their project was the implementation of a public meeting, in which archaeologists, historians, project managers, local historians, amateur relic collectors, and interested citizens got together to share their knowledge of cultural resources in the area. These talks and the subsequent archaeological reconnaissance data were used to produce oversized project maps showing the exact location of confirmed battlefield features, early home sites, roads, destroyed sites, major military debris scatters, and other unconfirmed military sites. All of this information served as a backdrop for the Nash Farm study. The dynamic situation created by the two projects on the same battlefield simultaneously proved to be a challenge in summarizing the finds.

The Nash Farm property contains definite archaeological remains of the August 20, 1864 Cavalry engagement between Kilpatrick’s U.S. cavalry and Ross’ Texas cavalry brigade. At least three areas of the property were identified where intense battle clashes were represented by the archaeological finds.

In his field report of his recent campaign, General Kilpatrick summarized the casualties that resulted in the Third Cavalry Division, as well as his estimate of Confederate losses for the same period. Kilpatrick placed the number of Union Cavalry killed at 31 (7 officers and 24 men); wounded at 110 (5 officers and 106 men); and missing at 143 (6 officers and 137 men). He placed the number of Rebels killed at 246, wounded at 664, and 292 taken prisoner (OR Volume L:861).

At the time of the August 20th charge, Minty had three artillery pieces under his command, which were manned by the Chicago Board of Trade artillerymen. A fourth piece was disabled earlier in the day. Earlier in the day these field pieces were used to rain canister and explosive shells on the Confederates who were near Lovejoy Station, several miles west of the Nash Farm. Once the charge commenced these cannons were trained eastward on the Confederate positions at Nash Farm (Vale 1886:344-345). Additional artillery support for the Union cavalry was provided by the 10th Wisconsin battery. Their field pieces were positioned on the north side of Jonesboro Road, possibly near the Clayton-Henry County line.

The Confederates may have had as many as 10 artillery pieces, or as few as one howitzer, trained on Kilpatrick’s cavalry on August 20. One U.S. Cavalry officer later recalled that four of these were located on the left (or northeast side) of the advance and six were located on the right (or southeast side). The Confederate artillery fired two volleys of shells at the advancing Union cavalry before switching to canister shot. Captain Vale, 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry, noted that four of these Confederate guns (presumably those on the left side, were captured in the initial charge (Vale 1886:347-348). The Confederate account of their artillery strength is considerably less, consisting of a single howitzer fired by the Columbus Light Artillery.

WHERE ARE THE DEAD?

The best estimates for the number of Union soldiers who were killed in battle along the Jonesboro road on August 20, 1864 come from the official published U.S. Army records. In several instances these statistical summaries combined the losses from different battlefields in the Atlanta Campaign and the specific losses at the Nash Farm are difficult to derive. The list of losses often include those killed or wounded in the battle of August 20, but who were cut down either east or west of the study area. Holland estimates the number of Union casualties from the August 20th battle to be about 300 men (D’Angelo et al. 2006:57).

One U.S. Army officer who died on August 20 was Captain William S. Scott, Company G, 1st Ohio Cavalry, who was killed while charging an artillery battery during Minty’s charge of August 20, 1864. Although mortally wounded and dismounted, Captain Scott reportedly, “continued waving his saber and urging his men on before succumbing to his wounds”. Figure 90 shows a Civil War-era photograph of Captain Scott.
Another example of an important U.S. Army officer who was killed was 1st Lieutenant Chauncey C. Hermans, Company C, 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry. Hermans wounded at Lovejoy Station and died of his wounds on August 22, 1864. He was a native of Tioga County, Pennsylvania, enlisted at age 28 as a private at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania on November 1, 1861 (Pennsylvania State Archives 2007).

Private Thomas Wiggant, Chicago Board of Trade Battery, a native of Chicago, Illinois who was mustered into the unit on July 31, 1862, was killed at Lovejoy, Georgia on August 20th. Wiggant was the only person killed at Lovejoy from that unit (Savage 2007).

Table 10 shows a partial list of the U.S. Cavalrymen who were casualties or taken prisoner in the battle at Nash Farm. This list was compiled from muster lists of the 7th Pennsylvania and 3rd Ohio Cavalry Regiments, which were available on the internet. Several of the U.S. Cavalry regiments that participated in the battle neglected to submit casualty returns for the engagement, so an accurate death count for the entire battle will require additional research.

The death count for U.S. Army soldiers as a result of the September 2-5 engagements at Lovejoy is also an elusive mortality statistic. Officer reports from that battle were not fully examined for the present study. The casualties from this battle were greatly overshadowed by the losses at Jonesboro only days earlier. Nevertheless, the Union losses at Lovejoy from the September battle were extensive. General Stanley’s 4th U.S. Army Corps suffered the greatest losses. Stanley’s troops fought several miles west of Nash Farm, so their corpses were probably disposed someplace other than Nash Farm. Those killed from General Schofield’s U.S. troops and General Lee’s Confederate troops were more likely in the Nash Farm vicinity.

The estimates total number of Confederate soldiers who were killed in the engagement on August 20, 1864 east of Lovejoy, Georgia, and those who died soon after mortally wounded, vary considerably according to the source. Union mortality figures are drastically higher than the Confederate estimates. Holland estimates the number of Confederate casualties from the August 20th battle to be about 80 men (D’Angelo et al. 2006:57).

The number of C.S.A army dead as a result of the September 2-5 engagements at Lovejoy is also difficult to calculate. Records created and kept by the Confederates from that period in the Atlanta Campaign are scarce and terse. The casualties from this battle were greatly overshadowed by the losses at Jonesboro only days earlier. Like the Union losses, the Confederate losses at Lovejoy from the September battle were extensive.

We know that between the battles fought at Nash Farm several hundred Civil War soldiers were killed, yet there is no Civil War cemetery at Lovejoy. Historian Holland was unable to locate any historical reference to the disposition of the dead at Lovejoy resulting from the battles in August and September, 1864 (D’Angelo et al. 2006:57). The present research team was also unable to locate any written record pertaining to this subject. Mark Pollard, William Dodd and others told of several small cemeteries in the greater Lovejoy vicinity, some of which may
contain dead from these battles, but the final resting place for most of the military dead remains unknown. The possibility of one or more mass graves is quite likely. In addition to the loss of human life, many hundreds of horses were killed in the battles and their disposal is also an issue of interest. Descriptions of the battlefield include reference to a series of deep gullies, which are not evident today. Perhaps some of these gullies were adapted for use as mass graves and were filled-in by the soldiers in 1864. Or perhaps sections of the September, 1864 entrenchments were used to contain the dead after the battle had ended. The use of pre-existing excavated trenches would have been well suited for this purpose. The task of disposing of the dead in the aftermath of the August 20th engagement would have fallen to the Confederates, since the U.S. Army had completely exited from the Lovejoy area by August 21. This area was swarming with Confederate soldiers by early September, and possibly in the days prior to that. Ross’ Texas Brigade did not linger in the area, although by September 2, U.S. General Stanley observed that the Confederates were already well entrenched at Lovejoy. Nevertheless, a gap of approximately 10 days may have existed when hundreds of dead lay on the battlefield unattended. Most of these were likely U.S. Cavalrymen and their burial was not necessarily a priority for the resident Confederate troops. The existence of hundreds of dead men and horses was a sanitary hazard, however, so it was incumbent for those who stayed in the area to adequately dispose of these corpses.

The hundreds of dead horses may have served as a source of food for the Confederate troops and the local population, although the sweltering heat in late August probably limited the timing of any scavenging of these carcasses. Within a few days after August 20, the stench of the place was likely unbearable. The Confederate troops were hungry, as indicated by General Ross’ brigade order of September 11th, which addressed the problem of his troops stealing and killing local hogs for food (OR Volume 39 (Pt. 2):830).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regiment</th>
<th>Company/Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Casualty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>A Robinson, William</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Killed at Lovejoy Station, Ga., August 20, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>A Weigley, Francis</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Died at Florence, S. C., of wounds received at Lovejoy Station, Ga., August 20, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>A White, Percy H.</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Wounded and captured at Lovejoy Station, Ga., August 20, 1864; discharged on Surgeon’s Certificate, February 10, 1865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>A Ross, David F.</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>Killed at Lovejoy Station, Ga., August 20, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>A Muhlenberg, Patrick</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Died of wounds received at Lovejoy Station, Georgia, August 20, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>C Herrons, Chancy C.</td>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>Killed at Lovejoy Station, Ga., August 21, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>C Clark, Frank D.</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Captured at Lovejoy Station, Ga., August 22, 1864; died at Andersonville, February 20, 1865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>C Leavitt, Martin B.</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Killed at Lovejoy Station, Ga., August 21, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>E Hoyt, William E.</td>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>Promoted from August 20 to December 15, 1864; promoted from Quartermaster Sergeant to 2nd Lt., May 1, 1865, to 1st Lt, August 10, 1866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>E Evans, Samuel</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>Wounded at Lovejoy Station, March 3, 1864; captured August 20, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>E Moses, Henry G.</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>Promoted from Sergeant to Captain, August 20, 1864 to March 12, 1865; discharged by General Order, June 27, 1865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>E Caldwell, George</td>
<td>Sapper</td>
<td>Captured August 20, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>E Elch, Willard E.</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Captured August 20, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>E McKeown, David H.</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Captured August 20, 1864; absent, sick, at muster out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>B Bobb, Charles</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Killed at Lovejoy Station, Ga., August 21, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>G Wilson, Otto E.</td>
<td>Bugler</td>
<td>Killed at Red Oak Church, Ga., August 20, 1864 on Kilpatrick’s Raid around Atlanta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>H Davis, Thomas</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Promoted from August 20, 1864 to April 28, 1865; discharged June 17, to join May 10, 1865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>G Thompson, Lieber S.</td>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>Promoted from 1st Lt, Company F, July 1, 1863, to Captain at Lovejoy Station, Ga., August 20, 1864, resigned January 18, 1865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>I Short, Levi</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Captured August 20, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>K Mey, David G.</td>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>Killed at Lovejoy Station, Ga., August 20, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>L Padget, Joel</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Captured from Lovejoy Station, Ga., August 20, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>L Walker, James</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Captured from Lovejoy Station, Ga., August 20, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>M Burns, George</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Captured August 20, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>C Taylor, James G.</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Killed August 20, 1864 at Lovejoy Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>F Lyon, Brown</td>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>Killed at Lovejoy Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>F Long, Alfred H.</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Killed at Lovejoy Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>H Nee, John</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Lovejoy Station, died of wounds 8-23-64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>C Rousell, Denis</td>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>Wounded at Lovejoy Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>B Russell, John C.</td>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>Wounded at Lovejoy Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>D Shaw, Millard H.</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Wounded at Lovejoy Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th PA Cav.</td>
<td>E O’Brien, Thomas</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Wounded at Lovejoy Station</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. Partial Casualty List, 7th Pennsylvania and 3rd Ohio Cavalry, August, 1864.
RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES

The present study focused mostly on the people and military events associated with the August 20, 1864 action between Kilpatrick’s U.S. Cavalry and Ross’ C.S. Cavalry. The events of September 2-5, 1864 were covered to a lesser degree and future researchers should continue to reconstruct this important and neglected battle between the two armies engaged in the Atlanta Campaign. The present study also identified many important historical sources about the August 20th battle that were not examined at this time and these should be the subject of future study. The bibliography, which follows this report, contains an extensive collection of these resources and this bibliography can serve as a guide for researchers.

The artifact collection strategy and geographic location recordation strategy that was established in the present study can also serve as a template for future research. Mr. Mark Pollard, site caretaker and Henry County Historian, was given a Garmin III GPS receiver and a quantity of small archival quality zip lock bags and permanent markers so that any accidental discoveries of artifacts or features associated with the Civil War-era (or other historic or prehistoric eras) may be properly located in space and catalogued with a Piece Plot Number (starting with PP 1200). If the horizontal coordinates are recorded for each distinct item, then these data can be readily incorporated into the existing electronic relational database.

The history and biographies of the Nash family and the Nash Farm were explored as part of the TRC research effort (D’Angelo et al. 2006). The present study did not expound on their efforts to any significant degree. This subject bears additional study and this should be pursued by future researchers. The architectural history of the Nash farmhouse also merits more in-depth scrutiny by an architectural historian who is well-versed in 19th century building styles in Georgia. An intensive examination of the building would be helpful for several reasons. It would help to establish the absolute age of the dwelling and the age of its various additions and modifications.

The bibliography that follows this report contains an extensive collection of pertinent literature, many of which were not directly consulted for this project. These references may also contain additional leads to information about the Civil War battles at Nash Farm and the people who fought them. As the present research unfolded, the number of regiments, officers and other significant research subjects expanded substantially. It was a virtual Pandora’s box of important research opportunities, each one crying out for attention.

A few examples of published soldier’s accounts, which were not examined by the present research team include:


A few examples of unpublished soldier’s accounts that may greatly enhance the story of Nash Farm are mentioned below. Time and budgetary constraints did not allow for an examination of these archival documents in the present study.

Special Collections, The University of Texas at Arlington, Libraries includes these items of interest:

- L. H. Graves Diary: Diary of 2nd Lt. L. H. Graves in Capt. J. W. Throckmorton’s Company K, Sixth Texas Cavalry, Ross’s Brigade, and a muster roll of Company K.
- Mary Martha Hackney Transcriptions of Price Family Papers: Letters of 1st Lt. Benjamin Franklin Price who fought with
the Third Texas Cavalry Regiment, Company E.

McKinney-Milam Family Papers: Civil War diary of Lt. George Scott Milam, Sixth Texas Cavalry, Company D, Ross’s Brigade and letters from George Scott Milam and his four brothers to their parents, Jefferson and Eliza Milam.


Other important documents are contained in the personal papers of Robert H.G. Minty and Lawrence Sullivan Ross. Doubtless dozens of other collections of personal papers may be identified, which promise to elucidate the Nash Farm story. The present research has identified many of these and others await discovery by future research.

INTERPRETIVE HISTORY

Henry County has already begun interpretive history programming at Nash Farm Battlefield Park, which has received overwhelming public support and attendance. These efforts have been coordinated by Henry County Historian Mark Pollard, the Henry County Commission, Henry County Parks Department and other county officials.

Many Civil War re-enactor groups exist, whose missions include accurate historical reenactment of Civil War battles and skirmishes. A number of these organizations are based in Georgia or nearby southern states. Several re-enactor units were identified by a preliminary internet search of groups whose original unit was actually involved in the action at Nash Farm and Lovejoy. Oddly enough, a few of these are based some distance from Georgia, including re-enactor groups in Belgium, England and New Mexico.

Active re-enactor groups for the 4th U.S. Cavalry, the Kentucky Cavalry Brigade, the Ohio Cavalry Brigade; Companies A and D, 1st Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, Company D, 3rd Iowa Cavalry, the 3rd Texas Cavalry, and Company E, 11th Texas Cavalry [not involved in action in Lovejoy, but likely similar to other Texas Cavalry units] were identified from a preliminary internet search. No doubt many other re-enactor groups exist that would be interested in participating in future events at Nash Farm.

SITE STEWARDSHIP

The heritage that is preserved at the Nash Farm Battlefield Park is extremely unique, historically important, and irreplaceable. Stewards of this site should alter or develop the property only after careful consideration of the consequences of these actions on the buried cultural resources and cultural landscape integrity. An extremely important aspect of the Nash Farm Battlefield is the view shed that is preserved. A visitor can stand at many places on the battlefield and view the surrounding countryside, which is very much as it may have appeared in 1864. This sort of opportunity is rare for a Civil War battlefield and particularly so for sites associated with the Atlanta Campaign.

Henry County has already shown their support of the region’s heritage by the initial purchase of the Nash Farm property and the creation of a historical park, and by hiring consultants (TRC, Inc. and The LAMAR Institute, Inc.) to provide guidance with the precious historical resources. At present, however, a formal site management plan, whose purpose would be to guide future management and historical development of the park, does not exist. Adequate funding is an obvious need for future development of these resources. Henry County may wish to pursue grant funding to enhance the site’s historical interpretation and to acquire additional property that would expand and help to protect this vital view shed. The LAMAR Institute has explored many funding sources for this type of support and a few examples are discussed below.

The National Park Service, American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP) Battlefield Grants are an important source for a variety of research and site interpretation goals. A number of projects in Georgia were recently funded by the ABPP grant program, including Brown’s Mill Cavalry battlefield near Newnan, Georgia, and a number of studies in Georgia’s coastal plain, including three successfully completed by the LAMAR Institute. The funding amounts for their grants are generally less than $75,000 and most
fall within the $20,000-$40,000 range. These funds can be used for a variety of purposes, including historical research, interpretative signage, battlefield delineation surveys, and development of management plans.

Grant funds are available for outright purchase of property containing important Civil War battlefields. One source are the Land and Water Conservation Grants, offered by the NPS, ABPP. The Archaeological Conservancy, Inc. is another potential source for property acquisition funding. They also accept property donations and some property easements. Their Southeastern U.S. regional representative is based in Mississippi.

The McWhiney Foundation and the McWhiney Foundation Press, headquartered in Abilene, Texas, supports Texas military historical research and public interpretation. Initial contacts were made with the officers of their foundation with promising results. Their organization may be willing to assist with publication and museum development at Nash Farm. Their press has a Civil War Campaigns and Commanders series, which may be well-suited for a book on the Nash Farm August 20th battle, or the larger Lovejoy action of September 2-5.

Any ground disturbance of the property at Nash Farm should only be undertaken after consultation with a professional archaeologist. The archaeological resources at this battlefield are irreplaceable. Once these artifacts have been removed from their battlefield context they become merely curious relics. Their contributions to the story of Nash Farm are erased.

Any future archaeological study at Nash Farm should only be undertaken after a competent research design has been developed. Archaeology is a destructive science and excavation destroys parts of our history. It is only by detailed recording of the excavation and the findings that archaeology can justify its existence. All excavation projects should be thoroughly documented in a research report, following State of Georgia guidelines. If carefully managed, the archaeological resources at Nash Farm promise to provide great discoveries for generations of future archaeologists.
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